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THE ANTI-BOTTLENECK PRINCIPLE IN 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 
JOSEPH FISHKIN

 
State legislatures and the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission 
(EEOC) have moved in parallel in recent years to provide new protections 
for the employment prospects of some surprising groups: people who are 
unemployed, people who have poor credit, and people with past criminal 
convictions. These new protections confound our usual theories of what 
antidiscrimination law is about. These groups are disanalogous in a 
variety of respects to groups defined by such characteristics as race, sex, 
and national origin. But the legislators and regulators enacting these new 
protections were responding to pervasive problems they observed in the 
opportunity structure of our society—problems of a particular kind that I 
call bottlenecks. Essentially, these legal actors judged that poor credit, 
unemployment, and past criminal convictions were having too outsized an 
effect on a person’s employment prospects. If many or most employers 
demand good credit, then good credit becomes a serious bottleneck: a 
narrow place through which workers must pass to reach a wide range of 
opportunities on the other side. 
This Article argues that the anti-bottleneck principle—the principle 
that the law ought to ameliorate severe bottlenecks in the opportunity 
structure where it can feasibly do so—is not only a way of understanding 
these new, cutting-edge protections, but also a way of understanding much 
of the project of Title VII and our existing body of antidiscrimination law. 
This Article explores the role the anti-bottleneck principle plays in 
legislators’ decisions to enact antidiscrimination laws and in decisions by 
judges and by the EEOC about how to interpret and enforce such laws. 
The Article argues that the anti-bottleneck idea is at the heart of both 
disparate treatment law and disparate impact law—and that it should 
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cause us to think differently about the function of disparate impact law. 
The EEOC lawyers who started down the path that led to Griggs v. Duke 
Power understood that general ability tests were becoming a major 
bottleneck in the opportunity structure. By limiting the use of those tests, 
Griggs ameliorated a bottleneck that had arbitrarily constrained the 
opportunities of many whites as well as blacks.  
Finally, turning from the positive to the normative, this Article defends 
the central—if previously unacknowledged—role that the anti-bottleneck 
principle plays in our law of equal employment opportunity. It is a 
profound challenge for any legal system to promote “equal opportunity” 
in a world of pervasive difference and inequality, where the mechanisms 
that perpetuate inequality shift over time. The anti-bottleneck principle 
turns out to be a strong and surprisingly practical response to these 
challenges. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the past several years, American states and localities have enacted a 
new wave of employment discrimination statutes aimed at protecting the 
job prospects of people who are unemployed, who have poor credit, or 
who have past criminal convictions.
1
 The Obama administration, members 
of Congress, and the EEOC have recently proposed parallel protections in 
each of these areas at the federal level.
2
 
These new statutes are antidiscrimination laws. But they are 
antidiscrimination laws of a kind that most of our usual theories of 
antidiscrimination law are hard-pressed to explain.
3
 People with criminal 
convictions, people who are unemployed, and people with poor credit are 
not groups for whom one would ordinarily expect our law to show 
particular solicitude. They are disanalogous in a variety of salient respects 
to groups defined by such characteristics as race, religion, sex, national 
origin, and age, the groups covered by Title VII and the ADEA. (Indeed it 
is not entirely clear that persons with poor credit constitute a “group” in 
any relevant pre-discrimination sense at all.) 
Many of these new statutes also confound our usual ways of thinking 
about antidiscrimination law in another way. Most of the “ban the box” 
statutes about criminal convictions and most of the statutes about 
unemployment status do not actually bar discrimination on those grounds 
in an employer’s final decision. Instead these statutes bar employers from 
erecting certain initial barriers that block the consideration of all such 
applicants—policies that “no unemployed need apply,” or check-boxes on 
the initial application form asking applicants if they have ever been 
convicted of a crime (hence the name “ban the box”). An employer 
 
 
 1. See infra notes 25–35 and accompanying text. 
 2. See infra notes 27, 33, 39–41 and accompanying text. 
 3. See infra Part V. 
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remains free to obtain the information at a later stage in the process and 
free to decide not to hire the applicant because of it. Such statutes define 
no “forbidden grounds” for employment decisions. Yet these statutes have 
an important practical effect. They ensure that an applicant can make it 
through an initial cut, giving her an opportunity to convince employers 
that perhaps, despite a past criminal conviction or a bout of 
unemployment, she is nonetheless the best candidate for the job. 
Legislators enacted all these statutes in response to what they viewed 
as pervasive problems in the opportunity structure—problems of a 
particular kind that I call bottlenecks.
4
 Essentially, legislators judged that 
poor credit, unemployment, or past criminal convictions were having too 
outsized an effect on a person’s employment prospects because too large a 
proportion of employers either were using or might soon use these criteria 
to screen their applicants.  
Imagine that in a labor market with numerous employers, just one 
decided to use credit checks to screen potential hires. In that case, there 
would be no significant bottleneck—and likely no calls for legislation. 
Plenty of job opportunities would remain open to those with poor credit 
history.  
But now suppose credit checks plummet in price. Or suppose credit 
bureaus launch a marketing campaign and successfully persuade most 
employers to use their products to screen applicants. Now the good credit 
history requirement has become a serious bottleneck: a narrow place in the 
opportunity structure through which many people must pass if they hope 
to reach a wide range of opportunities that open out on the other side.  
The more pervasive the use of a particular test, criterion, or practice 
across a wider range of job opportunities and firms, and the more strict or 
dispositive its effect on employment decisions, the more severe the 
bottleneck. (A bottleneck is even more pervasive if its effects extend 
beyond the employment sphere.) The new wave of antidiscrimination 
statutes with which I began have the purpose and the effect of ameliorating 
certain bottlenecks—that is, making them less severe—by making them 
either less pervasive or less strict or both. 
So far, all this may seem an interesting but idiosyncratic tale of a few 
new cutting-edge statutes. But this Article argues that what I call the anti-
bottleneck principle—the principle that the law ought to ameliorate severe 
bottlenecks in the opportunity structure where it can—is far more than 
 
 
 4. See infra Part III. 
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that. It is a way of understanding a central dimension of the project of 
antidiscrimination law. 
The anti-bottleneck principle is a way of understanding the function of 
the more familiar, paradigmatic antidiscrimination protections—laws 
against discrimination on grounds such as race and sex. Race and sex are 
among the most powerful bottlenecks in the opportunity structure of our 
society, in the sense that they have broad, pervasive effects, both direct 
and indirect, on everyone’s opportunities. If it is not just a few employers, 
but lots of them, that evaluate applicants differently or steer applicants and 
employees into different roles based on race or sex—and especially if such 
effects are not confined to the world of employment, but extend as well to 
other domains such as education or housing—then it makes sense to use 
legal tools such as disparate treatment law and disparate impact law to 
make these bottlenecks less severe. 
In the past several years, the EEOC has moved in parallel with state 
legislators to scrutinize employers’ hiring decisions that turn on credit 
checks, unemployment, and past criminal convictions.
5
 The EEOC’s 
hearings, guidance, and enforcement actions regarding each of these 
employer practices focus on the practices’ possible racial disparate impact. 
This emphasis reflects the agency’s statutory charge: the EEOC’s job is 
enforcing Title VII, not formulating new antidiscrimination legislation. 
The state legislators, as we shall see, approach the same problems from a 
different direction. They primarily emphasize not the racial disparate 
impact of these practices, but rather, their potential to create bottlenecks 
that many of their constituents—of all races—have difficulty passing 
through. 
But in the end, these seemingly quite different approaches converge. 
Both the state legislatures and the EEOC invoke multiple arguments for 
ameliorating the bottlenecks caused by these employer practices. Some of 
these arguments focus exclusively on the set of people who will, by 
definition, have trouble passing through the bottlenecks these employer 
practices create: people with poor credit, people who are unemployed, or 
people with past criminal convictions. Other arguments, invoked both by 
state legislators and by the EEOC, focus on the ways these bottlenecks 
reinforce other bottlenecks. Although there are plenty of people with bad 
credit of every race and every socioeconomic status, bad credit is unevenly 
distributed: a credit check bottleneck is one that poor people, and members 
of some racial minority groups, will be especially likely to have trouble 
 
 
 5. See infra notes 39–41 and accompanying text. 
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passing through. Therefore, a credit check bottleneck will tend to reinforce 
these larger bottlenecks in the opportunity structure—the structural limits 
on the opportunities that racial minorities, and the poor, have open to them 
in our society. 
A crucial part of analyzing the severity of any bottleneck is tracing its 
effects on other bottlenecks in this way. Part—but not all—of why a credit 
check bottleneck is problematic is the way it reinforces these other, more 
pervasive bottlenecks that constrain opportunities based on race or class.  
Against the backdrop of the Great Recession—which caused 
unemployment to spike and ruined many people’s credit—state legislators 
and the EEOC, although reasoning from different starting points, have 
arrived at highly overlapping conclusions. The race-based disparate impact 
analysis and the non-race-based arguments prominent in state legislative 
deliberations are complementary. These modes of analysis helpfully 
foreground different aspects of what is really the same problem, in a way 
that the anti-bottleneck principle can help us see. 
This Article explores the role the anti-bottleneck principle plays in the 
reasoning of a variety of actors in a variety of contexts: decisions by 
legislators to enact antidiscrimination laws and decisions by judges and by 
the EEOC about how to interpret and enforce such laws. It argues that the 
anti-bottleneck idea is at the heart of both disparate treatment law and 
disparate impact law—and that it should cause us to think differently 
about what disparate impact law is and how it functions.  
Finally, turning from the positive to the normative, this Article argues 
that it is good that the anti-bottleneck principle plays a central, if 
previously unacknowledged, role in our law of equal employment 
opportunity. Any legal system faces complex challenges when attempting 
to implement any plausible conception of equal opportunity in a world of 
pervasive inequalities. The anti-bottleneck principle is a strong and 
surprisingly practical starting point for responding to these challenges. 
Part I of this Article very briefly sets the stage for the argument to 
follow by explaining the conceptual problem that the anti-bottleneck 
principle can help us solve. 
Part II explores the anti-bottleneck principle by investigating in some 
depth a new wave of antidiscrimination statutes: ban the box, “no 
unemployed need apply,” and the regulation of employers’ use of credit 
checks in hiring. The legislators and activists behind these statutes enacted 
them because of concerns that add up to a principle: that law ought to 
intervene, where it can, to ameliorate severe bottlenecks in the opportunity 
structure. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss6/6
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Part III offers an account of this anti-bottleneck principle and shows 
how applying it in practice involves deciding which bottlenecks are the 
most severe. This, in turn, requires analyzing the ways one bottleneck 
reinforces another. This Part offers an initial example of a court employing 
a version of the anti-bottleneck principle. It then argues that this principle 
also plays an important role in the EEOC’s choices about how to enforce 
Title VII. 
Part IV argues that the anti-bottleneck principle was at the heart of 
Griggs v. Duke Power, the foundational disparate impact case, and that it 
can help us understand what disparate impact law is really about. Justice 
Scalia has recently suggested that disparate impact law amounts to a 
“racial thumb on the scales”—essentially, that the law should be viewed as 
a form of zero-sum redistribution of opportunities from one racial group to 
another, and that this raises constitutional difficulties.
6
 The anti-bottleneck 
principle helps us see why disparate impact law in fact does not work that 
way. Instead, disparate impact law ameliorates certain bottlenecks in the 
opportunity structure, forcing employers to revise certain practices in ways 
that promote equal opportunity. This has benefits for people both inside 
and outside the statutorily protected group who would otherwise have 
been unable to pass through the relevant bottleneck. 
Part V argues that in addition to being, as a positive matter, part of our 
existing body of antidiscrimination law, the anti-bottleneck principle is a 
distinctive, and normatively attractive, way of thinking about the project 
of equal opportunity. This Part responds to some objections to the anti-
bottleneck principle, articulates some of its limits, and explores some of its 
frontiers. 
I. THE CHALLENGE: EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND EMPLOYER DISCRETION 
Before we begin in earnest, let us pause for a moment on a necessary 
preliminary question: to what problem is the anti-bottleneck principle a 
solution? Why do we need a principle like this one? 
The anti-bottleneck principle provides a basis for negotiating a deep 
conflict between two principles whose fundamental tension defines 
American employment discrimination law. On the one hand, Americans 
believe deeply in equal opportunity—although we disagree equally deeply 
about its contours.
7
 On the other hand, we are firmly committed to the idea 
 
 
 6. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 594 (Scalia, J., concurring). See infra Part IV.E. 
 7. See generally JOSEPH FISHKIN, BOTTLENECKS: A NEW THEORY OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 
25–40 (2014) (discussing competing conceptions of equal opportunity). 
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that employers should generally decide for themselves whom to hire, 
promote, and fire. 
Even at this very high level of abstraction, these two principles are in 
deep conflict. There are a number of ways to conceptualize equal 
opportunity. But any coherent conception of equal opportunity, even a 
narrow one focused solely on meritocracy, is wholly incompatible with a 
regime in which employees may be hired or fired for any reason or no 
reason at all—even for such highly un-meritocratic reasons as cronyism, 
racial bias, or personal pique. 
With the exception of a few islands of “for-cause” employment built on 
civil service rules or collective bargaining, American law offers employees 
no general guarantee either of meritocratic treatment, or of equal 
opportunity more broadly conceived. The general rule is employment at 
will.
8
 At the same time, American law does not offer employers the total 
discretion over personnel decisions that a staunch libertarian might prefer. 
Instead, American law departs from the general at-will rule selectively, 
intervening to protect workers and job applicants from certain decisions 
by employers that are inconsistent with equal opportunity, but not other 
such decisions.
9
 We label those certain decisions wrongful discrimination, 
and we make them subject to legal sanction. Meanwhile, our law permits 
all other departures from equal opportunity—cronyism, for instance—as 
part of our commitment to a general regime of broad employer discretion 
over whom to hire, promote, and fire.
10
 
The question of exactly where to draw this boundary—when to enforce 
some conception of equal opportunity, and when to allow employers to do 
as they wish—is the fundamental question at the heart of American 
employment discrimination law. Our answers to this question shape the 
field. Consider our law of disparate impact. It requires employers to meet 
a particularly high standard of meritocratic justification for some facially 
neutral criteria. But only some. Employers need not show that every 
facially neutral criterion they use is job-related and justified by business 
necessity—only those criteria with a disparate impact on one or more 
 
 
 8. See generally Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74 
TEX. L. REV. 1655 (1996). 
 9. Cynthia Estlund argues provocatively that carving out these exceptions to the general at-will 
baseline actually reinforces that baseline. Id. 
 10. Cronyism is thus actually a defense against charges of discrimination, say on the basis of 
race, in a legal disparate treatment regime focused on race-based intent. See Ann C. McGinley, The 
Emerging Cronyism Defense and Affirmative Action: A Critical Perspective on the Distinction 
Between Colorblind and Race-Conscious Decision Making Under Title VII, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1003 
(1997). 
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statutorily enumerated classes. Similarly, our law of disparate treatment 
does not bar every arbitrary reason, or every reason without a strong 
business justification, that an employer might have for hiring or firing an 
employee. Our law only bars reasons that are based on certain specific, 
enumerated characteristics such as race or sex—and now, in some states, 
interestingly, credit history. What is behind those selections? Some 
principle is needed if we are to decide, as a general matter, when equal 
opportunity ought to trump the broad employer discretion that is the 
hallmark of our at-will regime. 
Our traditional ways of thinking about this problem all focus on the 
normative or constitutional status of groups. Scholars frame the question 
in a variety of ways: in terms of which groups are subordinated,
11
 which 
forms of group-based decision-making are “demeaning,”12 or which 
group-based classifications history has taught us ought to be illicit.
13
 In 
practice, advocates usually begin not with principle but with analogy, 
mostly involving race. We have long established that race discrimination 
is both wrongful and illegal; we draw analogies to race in order to ask 
whether some other form of group-based discrimination ought similarly to 
be viewed as wrongful or made illegal.
14
 Such analogies are never perfect, 
because no two groups (and no two forms of discrimination) are ever quite 
the same. Because there are always differences, this analogical approach 
leads quickly into a morass of questions familiar—indeed entirely 
borrowed—from constitutional law. We may ask about immutability, 
political powerlessness, or a history of discrimination against the group, 
along with meta-questions about which of these variables or others 
determine whether a group is analogous in just the right ways to the 
groups whose protected status is already established in our law.
15
 
This kind of reasoning may be inevitable in constitutional law, where 
the project is to map the reach of heightened scrutiny under the Equal 
 
 
 11. In a classic article, Owen Fiss articulated this “group-disadvantaging” principle of equal 
protection, now known as anti-subordination, and distinguished it from the anticlassification principle. 
See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976). 
 12. See DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG? 34–58 (2011) (making the 
case for this view). 
 13. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 746 
(2007) (Roberts, C. J.) (“[W]hen it comes to using race to assign children to schools, history will be 
heard.”). 
 14. See SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
REVOLUTION (2011) (exploring this dynamic and how it shaped sex discrimination law). 
 15. These Equal Protection Clause criteria themselves remain deeply contested. For an early 
canonical formulation, see Justice Powell’s majority opinion in San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). 
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Protection Clause and our best guideposts are the groups already receiving 
heightened scrutiny under that clause. But such reasoning is an imperfect 
fit at best for our law of employment discrimination. American law often 
prohibits employment discrimination on grounds that fit poorly or not at 
all with this equal protection-derived framework: different states bar 
discrimination on grounds from veteran status
16
 to civil union status,
17
 
from height and weight
18
 to place of birth,
19
 from whether one receives 
public assistance
20
 to whether one is a smoker or a non-smoker.
21
 The 
federal Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (“GINA”) 
protects against discrimination on the basis of genetic characteristics that 
are often unknown to the employee herself and which hardly define any 
coherent “group” at all—let alone a politically powerless group with a 
history of discrimination.
22
 The new state employment discrimination 
statutes that are the touchstone of this Article, regarding credit history, 
unemployment status, and past criminal convictions, further underscore 
the gap between statutory employment discrimination law and our usual 
group-based frameworks for thinking about equal protection. We need 
some principle or principles, other than “follow the Equal Protection 
Clause,” to decide which employment decisions ought to be subject to 
legal sanction—and also to answer the distinct question of which 
employment decisions are normatively problematic, meaning that even if 
they are legal, one ought not to make them. 
Some might argue that we need no such principles: instead law ought 
to require “equal opportunity,” perhaps in the form of meritocratic 
treatment, across the board. On this view, the law should require 
employers to justify—in terms of something resembling business necessity 
and job relatedness—not only those facially neutral criteria that have a 
disparate impact on a statutorily protected group, but all criteria and 
business decisions, full stop.  
This proposal is a non-starter because it is simply too intrusive. It runs 
roughshod over our law’s commitment to leaving employers substantial 
discretion over whom to hire, promote, and fire. Interestingly, as Pauline 
 
 
 16. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.180 (West 2008). 
 17. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-81c (West 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5–12 (West Supp. 
2013). 
 18. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2202 (West 2001 & Supp. 2013). 
 19. See VT. STAT. ANN. Tit. 21, § 495 (2009). 
 20. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.08 (West 2012); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-03 (2009). 
 21. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.040 (West Supp. 2012). 
 22. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1 (Supp. II 
2008).  
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Kim has shown, most Americans believe incorrectly that they are entitled 
under current law to be treated in something like a meritocratic manner, at 
least once they are incumbent employees.
23
 This suggests that our societal 
commitment to some dimensions of equal opportunity runs deeper than the 
protection current law provides. Even so, our law reflects a strong 
commitment to at-will employment. So our law must enforce equal 
opportunity selectively. The key question, then—an unavoidable 
question—is what principle should guide the selections. When exactly 
should the law enforce some conception of equal opportunity, and when 
should it let employers do as they wish? 
The anti-bottleneck principle offered in this Article is an answer to this 
question. Unlike most other possible answers, it can justify not only laws 
against discrimination on the basis of characteristics such as race and sex, 
but also states’ and localities’ new protections against discrimination on 
the basis of unemployment status, credit history, and criminal background. 
Moreover it reveals important continuities among these laws and across 
the broader terrain we might call the law of equal opportunity. Not only in 
antidiscrimination law, but also in areas such as education law and 
disability law, our law often advances an equal opportunity project by 
targeting relatively severe bottlenecks in the opportunity structure and 
finding ways to make them less severe.
24
  
The best way to understand the anti-bottleneck principle is to see it in 
action. So let us begin by exploring three sets of new statutes, and the 
arguments legislators and advocates offered in favor of enacting them. 
II. THREE NEW KINDS OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION STATUTES—AND WHY 
THEY ARE HERE 
As recently as early 2007, no legal barriers prevented employers from 
using credit checks in hiring. Since then, ten states have enacted laws 
prohibiting this practice in most circumstances;
25
 parallel legislation is 
 
 
 23. See Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law: Exploring the Influences on Workers’ Legal 
Knowledge, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 447, 447 (finding that workers systematically and wildly 
overestimated their rights not to be fired without good cause); see also Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining 
with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 
83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 110 (1997) (finding, inter alia, that “although the common law rule clearly 
permits an employer to terminate an at-will employee out of personal dislike, so long as no 
discriminatory motive is involved, an overwhelming majority of the respondents—89%—erroneously 
believe that the law forbids such a discharge”). 
 24. This Article only alludes to these broader continuities. For more see FISHKIN, supra note 7. 
 25. See Act of Oct. 9, 2011, ch. 724, 2011 Cal. Legis. Serv. (A.B. 22) (codified at CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 1785.20.5 (West Supp. 2013) & CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5 (Supp. 2013)); Employment 
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pending in at least twenty more states and the District of Columbia
26
 and a 
federal ban has been introduced in Congress.
27
 Laws prohibiting 
employers from barring unemployed applicants were unheard of as 
recently as 2010, but were enacted since then in Oregon,
28
 New Jersey,
29
 
Washington D.C.,
30
 and localities including Chicago and New York 
City;
31
 they have also been introduced in other states and localities
32
 and in 
Congress.
33
 Most of these laws and ordinances merely prohibit employers 
from advertising that they are barring unemployed applicants entirely—
“no unemployed need apply”—but ordinances in New York City, 
Washington D.C., and Madison, Wisconsin, also prohibit disparate 
treatment on the basis of unemployment status. Finally, ban the box laws 
and ordinances aimed at protecting the employment prospects of 
individuals with past criminal convictions are now in force in eleven 
 
 
Opportunity Act, ch. 125, 2013 Colo. Sess. Laws (S.B. 13-018) (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 8-2-126 (West 2013)); Act of July 13, 2011, Pub. L. No. 11-223, 2011 Conn. Pub. Acts 2198 
(codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51tt (West Supp. 2013)); Act effective July 1, 2009, Pub. L. 
No. 1, 2009 Haw. Sess. Laws 793 (codified at HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §378-2(a)(8) (LexisNexis 2010 
& Supp. 2012)); Employee Credit Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 96-1426, 2010 Ill. Laws 6531 (codified at 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/10 (West Supp. 2013)); Job Applicant Fairness Act, ch. 28–29, 2011 Md. 
Laws 196 (codified at MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMPL. § 3-711 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012)); Act of May 
23, 2013, ch. 76, 2013 Nev. Laws (S.B. 127) (codified at NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.570 (2013)); Act of 
Mar. 29, 2010, ch. 102, 2010 Or. Legis. Serv. (SB. 1045) (codified at OR. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 659A.320 (West 2013)); Act of May 17, 2012, No. 154, 2012 Vt. Legis. Serv. (West) (codified at 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495i (Supp. 2012)); Act of Apr. 18, 2007, ch. 93, 2007 Wash. Sess. Laws 
344 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.182.020 (West 2013)). 
 26. See Use of Credit Information in Employment 2013 Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/use-of-credit-info-in-
employ-2013-legis.aspx (detailing pending legislation) (last updated Sept. 29, 2014). 
 27. See Equal Employment for All Act, H.R. 645 & S. 1837, 113th Cong. (2013) (federal 
legislation aimed at prohibiting the use of credit checks as part of employer hiring practices). 
 28. S.B. 1548, 76th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2012) (enacted) (codified at OR. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 659A.550 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess., Ch. 80)). 
 29. A.B. 3359, 214th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2011) (enacted as amended and passed by the 
Legislature following Governor’s conditional veto) (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:8B-1 (West, 
Westlaw through 2013 Legis. Sess.)). 
 30. B. 486, 19th Council Period, (D.C. 2012) (enacted May 31, 2012) (codified at D.C. CODE 
§ 32-1362 (2014)). 
 31. N.Y.C., N.Y. City Council Res. No. 814-A (Mar. 3, 2013) (enacted over Mayor Bloomberg’s 
veto) (codified at N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-102(5), (27) & 8-107(21)); CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL 
CODE § 2-160-055 (2013) (effective May 1, 2012). For another local example, see MADISON, WIS., 
CODE OF ORDINANCES § 39.03 (2014) (amendments enacted December 2013); see also A.B. 1450, 
2011-2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (passed but vetoed by Governor). 
 32. See Kristen B. Frasch, Pushing Back Against Unemployment Discrimination, HUM. RES. 
EXEC. ONLINE (July 10, 2013), http://www.hreonline.com/HRE/view/story.jhtml?id=534355659 
(“[A]s of May 2013, five states—New York, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Iowa and Minnesota—
have introduced bills during the 2013 legislative session, with another 17 states considering doing 
so.”). 
 33. See Fair Employment Opportunity Act of 2014, S. 1972, 113th Cong. (2014). 
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states
34
 as well as over fifty cities and counties.
35
 The details vary, but 
these laws generally bar employers
36
 from asking prospective employees 
on an application form whether they have been convicted of a crime; some 
also prohibit employers from running criminal background checks on an 
applicant until that person is a “finalist” for the position. However, all 
these laws allow employers to find out at some point whether an applicant 
has a criminal background and to choose not to hire for that reason in at 
least some circumstances.
37
 
This Part asks a simple question: Why did legislators enact these laws? 
If we thought that antidiscrimination law were exclusively about 
protecting the groups that receive heightened scrutiny under the Equal 
Protection Clause, we would understand all of these new statutes in a 
particular way: as efforts to attack certain facially neutral practices 
because of their disparate impact on protected classes. In particular, one 
could justify all three of these new sets of statutes by arguing that each 
takes aim at an employment practice that has a disparate impact on some 
racial minorities, including African-Americans.
38
 
That is part of the story of these laws. It is the part of the story that the 
EEOC has most emphasized as it has moved, in parallel with the ban the 
box legislation in the states, to update its own administrative guidance 
 
 
 34. The state legislatures in California, Connecticut, Colorado, Delaware Hawaii, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Mexico, and Rhode Island all passed statutes to ban the 
box. In addition, a twelfth state, Illinois, banned the box via administrative order. See NAT’L EMP. 
LAW PROJECT, STATEWIDE BAN THE BOX: U.S. CITIES, COUNTIES, AND STATES ADOPT FAIR HIRING 
POLICIES TO REDUCE UNFAIR BARRIERS TO EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS 2 
(2014), available at http://www.nelp.org/page/-/SCLP/ModelState HiringInitiatives.pdf; Governor 
Bans the Box for Delaware Public Employees, STATE OF DEL. (May 8, 2014), http://news.delaware. 
gov/2014/05/08/governor-bans-the-box-for-delaware-public-employees/ (reporting legislation in 
Delaware to ban the box, signed just as this Article was going to press). 
 35. See NAT’L EMP. LAW PROJECT, BAN THE BOX: MAJOR U.S. CITIES AND COUNTIES ADOPT 
FAIR HIRING POLICIES TO REMOVE UNFAIR BARRIERS TO EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL 
RECORDS 2–27 (2014), available at http://www.nelp.org/page/-/SCLP/CityandCountyHiringInitiatives. 
pdf (listing cities and counties as of January 2014). The jurisdictions include various cities of the 
Northeast (e.g., Boston, New York, and Philadelphia), Midwest (e.g., Chicago, Cincinnati, and the 
Twin Cities), the South (e.g., Atlanta, Memphis, Jacksonville, and Tampa), and the West Coast (e.g., 
Seattle, Multnomah County, Oregon, and many jurisdictions in the Bay Area). Id. 
 36. Some of these laws and ordinances apply only to public employers; others cover public 
employers and those private employers that are government contractors; still others cover all 
employers in the jurisdiction, public and private. See infra notes 113–14 and accompanying text. 
 37. These statutes interact in some cases with a different, and older, handful of state statutes that 
actually prohibit discrimination on the basis of past criminal convictions (with some exceptions). See 
infra note 115. 
 38. See infra notes 73, 89, and 118–31 and accompanying text. 
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regarding the use of past criminal convictions in hiring decisions.
39
 The 
EEOC has also held hearings over the past three years about 
discrimination against the unemployed, and about the use of credit checks 
in hiring.
40
 Unsurprisingly, given the EEOC’s statutory charge, the agency 
is scrutinizing these practices as potential Title VII violations because of 
their potential racial disparate impact. The EEOC has brought some race-
based disparate impact claims under Title VII on this theory,
41
 as have 
some private litigants.
42
 
However, most of the activity to date in all three of these areas has 
been in state legislatures. And there, the racial disparate impact story, 
while present to some degree, has not been the primary justification 
legislators have offered for enacting these laws. Advocates and sponsors 
of these three sets of laws have argued, primarily, that the practices these 
laws target amount to pervasive, and growing, barriers to employment—
barriers that make it very difficult for large numbers of people, of all races, 
to find a job.
43
 
Sponsors and advocates have also emphasized the limited meritocratic 
justification for each of these practices. That is, they have argued that poor 
credit, unemployment, or a past (especially long-past) criminal conviction 
is not effective meritocratic predictors of future job performance or 
misconduct. However, by itself, that argument is plainly insufficient. 
Employers’ hiring practices are often inconsistent with meritocracy: 
 
 
 39. See EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION 
RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (2012), 
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/upload/arrest_conviction.pdf.  
 40. See Press Release, EEOC, EEOC to Examine Treatment of Unemployed Job Seekers (Feb. 
14, 2011), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/2-14-11a.cfm; Press Release, 
EEOC, EEOC Public Meeting Explores the Use of Credit Histories as Employee Selection Criteria 
(Oct. 20, 2010), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/10-20-10b.cfm. 
 41. See, e.g., Press Release, EEOC, EEOC Files Suit Against Two Employers for Use of 
Criminal Background Checks (June 11, 2013), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/ 
release/6-11-13.cfm (describing recent EEOC lawsuits filed regarding the racial disparate impact of 
criminal background check policies at BMW and Dollar General). As of this writing, these claims by 
the EEOC have hit significant roadblocks. See, e.g., EEOC v. Freeman, No. RWT 09cv2573, 2013 WL 
4464553 (D. Md. Aug. 9, 2013) (granting summary judgment to the defendant and finding that the 
EEOC, in order to prevail, needed to identify a more specific practice than the use of credit history and 
criminal background checks, and prove the disparate impact of that practice); EEOC v. Kaplan Higher 
Educ. Corp., 122 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 509, 2014 WL 1378197 (6th Cir. Apr. 9, 2014) (in a 
credit history disparate impact case, affirming summary judgment to the defendant and finding that the 
district court properly excluded the EEOC’s expert testimony regarding the impact, on the grounds that 
the expert did not have a reliable method of determining individuals’ races). 
 42. See, e.g., Mayer v. Driver Solutions, Inc., No. 10-CV-1939 (JCJ), 2012 WL 3578856 (E.D. 
Pa. Aug. 17, 2012) (approving settlement of private class action claim of racial disparate impact of 
criminal background checks). 
 43. The remainder of this Part explores this legislative history in detail. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss6/6
  
 
 
 
 
2014] THE ANTI-BOTTLENECK PRINCIPLE 1443 
 
 
 
 
employers sometimes hire friends or family members (or family members’ 
friends, and so on), or decline to give a promotion or a raise to an 
employee they personally dislike. As Part I discussed, American law does 
not generally bar such actions. The case for selectively engaging the legal 
machinery of antidiscrimination law to challenge a given practice or 
decision requires something more. 
This Part argues that there were three key factors that caused legislators 
to pass antidiscrimination laws regarding credit checks, “no unemployed 
need apply” policies, and blanket refusals to hire anyone with a past 
criminal conviction. First, pervasiveness—legislators determined that 
these practices either were already, or risked becoming, sufficiently 
widespread to amount to severe bottlenecks in the opportunity structure, 
cutting some people off from a wide range of paths they might otherwise 
pursue. Second, evidence suggested to legislators that the number of 
individuals affected by these bottlenecks was high and/or rising. Third, it 
mattered to some legislators that these bottlenecks reinforce other 
bottlenecks—specifically, that these barriers deepen the challenges that 
poor people and/or racial minorities face in finding jobs. 
Although this Part focuses on state legislative activity, its conclusion 
should cause us to view the parallel federal regulatory activities of the 
EEOC on these same three fronts in a different light. Unlike state 
legislatures, the EEOC is simply enforcing Title VII, and is therefore 
constrained to act against facially neutral employment practices only in 
cases of disparate impact on the basis of race, sex, and so on. However, the 
EEOC has many choices to make about which of the practices that have a 
disparate impact should be the subject of hearings, regulatory guidance, 
and enforcement actions. After all, many practices have a disparate impact 
on a protected group.
44
 Most do not receive such agency scrutiny. As I will 
discuss, the anti-bottleneck principle appears to play an important role in 
the EEOC’s choices about which practices having a disparate impact ought 
to be the targets of its regulatory processes and its enforcement resources. 
This is because the EEOC, like the state legislators, is attuned to severe 
bottlenecks in the opportunity structure and ready to use available legal 
tools to ameliorate them. 
First, let us examine the new state statutes, from the perspective of the 
advocates who argued for them and the legislators who sponsored and 
enacted them.  
 
 
 44. For starters, in a society like ours in which race and poverty are linked to some significant 
degree, an enormous variety of practices that have a disparate impact on the poor will also have a 
disparate racial impact. 
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A. Credit Checks in Hiring 
Employers have been using credit checks for the purpose of evaluating 
potential hires for many decades; this use of credit information was at least 
contemplated at the time of the original Fair Credit Reporting Act in 
1970.
45
 But around the turn of the twenty-first century something changed: 
this use of credit information became much more widespread. As the State 
of Vermont prominently noted in the legislative findings section of its 
recent statute barring the practice: “Employer surveys . . . suggest that 
over the last 15 years, employers’ use of credit reports in the hiring 
process has increased from a practice used by fewer than one in five 
employers in 1996 to six of every 10 employers in 2010.”46 Those striking 
figures come from employer self-reports in surveys conducted by the 
Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM).
47
 The rapidly-rising 
SHRM survey numbers figured prominently in a number of states’ 
legislative debates about the new laws.
48
 
Why did the use of credit checks by employers rise so rapidly in just a 
decade and a half? While it is impossible to determine precisely which 
factors were responsible for how much of the increase, two contributing 
causes are clear. First, the Internet made credit information quicker, easier, 
and cheaper for employers to obtain. Second, during this period the credit 
bureaus, in an effort to expand their markets, sold and marketed new credit 
report products specifically designed for employers.  
Credit bureaus sell many kinds of products containing consumer credit 
information to different markets, from lenders to landlords and even to 
firms seeking new customers.
49
 In the early twenty-first century, credit 
 
 
 45. See Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 613, 84 Stat. 1114, 1133 (1970) 
(regulating the use of credit information for employment purposes). 
 46. Act of May 17, 2012, No. 154, § 1(2), 2012 Vt. Legis. Serv. (West). 
 47. However, the most recent survey from 2012 actually shows a drop-off from the 2010 peak. 
See SOC’Y FOR HUM. RES. MGMT., SHRM SURVEY FINDINGS: BACKGROUND CHECKING—THE USE 
OF CREDIT BACKGROUND CHECKS IN HIRING DECISIONS 8 (2012). 
 48. See, e.g., JUDICIARY COMM., CAL. STATE SENATE, BILL ANALYSIS: A.B. 22, at 4 (June 27, 
2011) (summarizing comments in the California legislative debate) [hereinafter CAL. ASSEMB. BILL 
ANALYSIS]; Rep. Matt Lesser, Statement on Hearing on H.B. No. 5061 Before the Gen. Assemb. 
Comm. on Lab. and Pub. Emps. (Conn. Feb. 18, 2010), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2010/LAB 
data/Tmy/2010HB-05061-R000218State%20Rep.%20Matthew%20Lesser-TMY.pdf; PROF. STAFF OF 
THE COM. AND TOURISM COMM., FLA. SENATE, BILL ANALYSIS AND FISCAL IMPACT STATEMENT OF 
S.B. 100, at 4 (2013) (report on pending legislation); see also 156 CONG. REC. S3083 (daily ed. May 4, 
2010) (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (quoting the same SHRM survey data in introducing amendment 
barring employers from using credit checks). 
 49. See, e.g., Industry Solutions, TRANSUNION, https://www.transunion.com/direct/industry 
solutions.page (last visited Aug. 20, 2014) (describing the services available to firms in many 
industries to screen residents, customers, debtors, and so on).  
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bureaus began to market specialized products such as Experian’s 
“Employment Insight”50 and Equifax’s “Persona Plus,”51 which were 
aimed specifically at employers interested in using credit information in 
employment decisions. Credit bureaus also sold credit information as part 
of more comprehensive background check products marketed by third 
parties to employers.
52
 
The Fair Credit Reporting Act provides that an employer cannot access 
an employee’s or applicant’s credit information without that person’s 
consent.
53
 However, this protection is largely irrelevant in the hiring 
context because employers can, and do, make such consent a necessary 
component of an application for employment. (Employers are also free 
under the Act to fire current employees who refuse to consent to credit 
checks.
54
) The Act does contain a requirement that employers notify 
employees or applicants when they have taken an adverse action on the 
basis of credit information
55
; it is unclear how often this requirement is 
actually obeyed.
56
 In any case, by 2010 the SHRM’s data from firms’ self-
 
 
 50. Employment Insight, EXPERIAN, http://www.experian.com/consumer-information/ employment 
-credit-checks.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2014). 
 51. Press Release, Equifax, Equifax Delivers Employment Screening to NASD Member Firms 
(June 27, 2006), available at http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/Equifax-delivers-employment 
-screening-to-nasd-member-firms.56976737.html. 
 52. See, e.g., PEER Background Credit Check, USA-FACT, https://www.usafact.com/ 
background-credit-check-peer-report.asp (last visited Feb. 20, 2014) (“USA-FACT currently provides 
background credit check reports directly from TransUnion.”). Some of these third-party providers are 
affiliated with the credit bureaus themselves; others are not. Although exploring this topic is beyond 
the scope of this Article, it appears that credit report products are only the tip of a large iceberg of 
consumer data-based screening products now being marketed and sold specifically to employers—
some of which fall within, and others of which fall outside, current credit reporting law. Regulators 
and legislators both appear to be stepping up their scrutiny of this broader class of products. See, e.g., 
Consent Decree, United States v. Spokeo, Inc., No. CV12-05001 (C.D. Cal. June 12, 2012), available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/1023163/spokeo-inc (resolving FTC action 
against consumer data company Spokeo for violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act); Natasha 
Singer, Citing Deep Data Collections, Senator Opens Inquiry of Information Brokers, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 11, 2012, at B3. 
 53. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2012). 
 54. See Kelchner v. Sycamore Manor Health Ctr., 305 F.Supp.2d 429 (M.D. Pa. 2004), aff’d, 135 
F.App’x 499 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 55. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3) (2012). 
 56. Because applicants have no way to know why they were not hired, violations of this 
provision have been notoriously difficult to detect. See Stuart Silverstein, Applicants: Past May Haunt 
You, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1995, at A1 (“[E]xperts say violations by employers [of this reporting 
requirement] often go undetected. The result: Many people aren't even aware that their prospects were 
doomed by a background check.”). The Federal Trade Commission has taken some actions in recent 
years to enforce this reporting provision. See, e.g., Consent Decree, United States v. Imperial Palace, 
Inc., No. CV-S-04-0963-RLH-PAL (D. Nev. July 13, 2004) (resolving FTC’s claim that defendant 
failed to notify applicants after denying or rescinding offers of employment based on credit 
information). 
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reports suggested that a solid majority of employers were using credit 
checks in hiring.
57
 The practice had become pervasive. 
Despite credit bureaus’ claims that credit history “provides insight into 
an applicant’s integrity”58 and predicts which employees will steal from 
employers and engage in other misconduct,
59
 the best social science 
evidence currently available has not found any relationship between credit 
history and employee misconduct.
60
 This presents a puzzle. Why would a 
majority of employers, or at least, a majority of those surveyed by SHRM, 
pay good money for a screening device that has not been shown to be 
valid for the purpose for which it is supposed to be used?  
The most probable answer is that this screening device is cheap and 
convenient, so if employers believe that it at least might be valid, that may 
be good enough. That is, if an employer believes that screening for poor 
credit might have some degree of performance-predictive validity, then it 
could be economically rational under some conditions to deploy such a 
screen.
61
 Specifically, it could be rational if the screening device is 
inexpensive, and one has a large number of relatively similar applicants to 
 
 
 57. See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text. 
 58. EXPERIAN, supra note 50. 
 59. As Norm Magnuson, Vice President of Public Affairs for the Consumer Data Industry 
Association, the credit industry trade group, explained to me, assessing general employee traits such as 
responsibility “[i]s not how employers use credit reports. Instead, they use credit reports to measure 
the risk of loss to a business . . . .” E-mail from Norm Magnuson to author (Sept. 20, 2012, 8:17 A.M. 
EST) (on file with the Washington University Law Review). 
 60. Interestingly, while the available, credible evidence consistently fails to find any relationship 
between credit history and misconduct—the link the credit industry emphasizes—evidence is more 
mixed regarding the possibility of a relationship between credit history and some elements of job 
performance. The study that is probably the most methodologically sound to date found no evidence of 
either correlation. See Laura Koppes Bryan & Jerry K. Palmer, Do Job Applicant Credit Histories 
Predict Performance Appraisal Ratings or Termination Decisions?, 15 THE PSYCHOL-MANAGER J. 
106, 106 (2012) (finding that credit data “had no relationship with either performance appraisal ratings 
or termination decisions”). But see Jeremy B. Bernerth et al., An Empirical Investigation of 
Dispositional Antecedents and Performance-Related Outcomes of Credit Scores, 97 J. APPLIED 
PSYCHOL. 469, 469 (2012) (finding no relationship between credit scores and workplace deviance, but 
finding a relationship between credit score and certain personality traits, and in addition, between 
credit score and “task performance” ratings on supervisor questionnaires). The only study of any kind 
that I have seen pointing toward a relationship between credit problems and workplace misconduct or 
deviance is Edward S. Oppler et al., The Relationship Between Financial History and 
Counterproductive Work Behavior, 16 INT’L J. SELECTION & ASSESSMENT 416 (2008). This study 
found a correlation between financial problems and “counterproductive work behavior.” Id. at 416. 
However, this study is less credible because unlike the other two studies just cited, it did not use actual 
credit history data furnished by the credit bureaus. 
 61. And surely it would seem to firms that it at least might be valid, if nothing else because of 
marketing by the credit reporting agencies themselves. However, it is also possible that the decision to 
use this screening device is not a rational choice at the firm level even in the limited sense outlined 
above, but human resources departments nonetheless make this choice in an effort to prove that they 
are carrying out a useful screening function. 
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deal with, many of whom are basically good enough. In that case, the 
savings in time and effort that result from culling the pool, even in an 
extremely imperfect way, exceed any marginal gains in future productivity 
that might have resulted from giving more of the applications a closer 
look. 
Under those conditions, the logic of meritocracy and the logic of 
microeconomic rationality diverge. Meritocracy demands that we search 
diligently, perhaps expensively, for the most qualified applicants, whereas 
microeconomic rationality dictates that we employ the least costly method 
of culling our list, when the additional costs of using any fairer or more 
valid method exceed the additional benefits. If the story I have just told, 
emphasizing employers’ search costs, accurately describes some 
employers’ reasons for using credit checks to screen applicants, then one 
would expect to see this practice become more widespread during periods 
of high unemployment, when there are larger-than-usual numbers of job 
seekers for each opening. During such periods, one would also expect to 
see an increase in the number of people screened out by such checks. 
In 2007, Washington became the first state to pass a law restricting the 
use of credit checks by employers, followed by Hawaii in 2009; Oregon in 
2010; Connecticut, Illinois, and Maryland in 2011; California and 
Vermont in 2012; and Colorado and Nevada in 2013.
62
 It is far from 
coincidental that almost all of these bills passed during a period of 
unusually high unemployment and economic difficulty. As State Senator 
Dan Harmon, who spearheaded the Illinois bill, argued during the debate 
in his chamber: 
[H]ow many folks in Illinois have lost their jobs and, as a result of 
losing their jobs, have gotten into some modest credit problems? 
They’re looking for a job. They’re—applying everywhere they can 
and now employers are looking at their credit history, even though 
there's no rational relationship to the job they’re being hired—you 
don't need good credit to drive a forklift. You don’t need good 
credit to turn a wrench. But you need a job to get your good credit 
back.
63
 
Harmon went on to suggest that he understood why employers might be 
ordering these credit checks: “it’s convenient.”64 But, he argued, “to look 
 
 
 62. See supra note 25. 
 63. S. Transcript, 96th Gen. Assemb., 2010 Reg. Sess. 119, at 42 (Ill. 2010), available at 
http://www.ilga.gov/senate/transcripts/strans96/09600119.pdf [hereinafter Ill. Senate Transcript]. 
 64. Id. 
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at credit history is just going to . . . perpetuate a vicious cycle and drive 
people further down.”65 This “vicious cycle” or “catch-22” argument 
seemed to strike a chord with a number of legislators in different states 
whose constituents’ credit had been battered by economic distress.66 
An opponent of the bill in Illinois, State Senator Matt Murphy, 
responded to Harmon by appealing to the general presumption in 
American law of employer discretion over whom to hire and promote. 
“[T]rust the job creator making that decision,” he argued, “don’t feel 
compelled to tie their hands with legislation.”67 Even if credit history turns 
out to be a poor measure of merit, Murphy argued, this hardly justifies 
“tak[ing] the discretion away from that job creator”68 to decide whether 
that is the case. In response, Senator Harmon argued as follows: 
As a matter of public policy, we have decided that there are certain 
things employers should not consider in making decisions: race, 
gender, other—other factors. We’re saying now that we see this 
pattern where employers are looking at credit history where it’s just 
not relevant to the job. And people who are in a hole can’t get out 
because of it. We are adding one more factor that employers 
shouldn’t consider unless it’s relevant to the job.69 
The argument here is remarkably straightforward. At the same time, it is 
an argument that stands outside the traditional, group-based, equal 
protection-inflected framework through which we usually understand 
antidiscrimination law. Senator Harmon is placing credit history on a par 
with race and gender in the sense that all are now forbidden grounds for 
employment decisions under Illinois law. At the same time, he is making 
no claim that poor credit is an immutable characteristic, or that those with 
 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id.; see also, e.g., Press Release, House Passes Job Applicant Fairness Act, Or. Leg. (Feb. 22, 
2010) [hereinafter Oregon Release] (quoting Rep. Tina Kotek stating that “[i]t simply makes no sense 
to essentially punish a job seeker for not having a job”); CONN. GEN. ASSEMB. LAB. & PUB. EMPS. 
COMM., JOINT FAVORABLE REPORT: SB-361 (2011), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2011/JFR/S/ 
2011SB-00361-R00LAB-JFR.htm [hereinafter CONN. BILL REPORT] (statement of Gwen Mills, 
representing UNITE HERE Locals 34, 217, and 335) (discussing “Catch 22”); id. (statement of Sen. 
Looney) (calling the link between unemployment and bad credit “double jeopardy”); Hearing on H.B. 
31 Before the S. Comm. on Labor, 2009 Leg., 25th Sess. (Haw. 2009), available at http://www.capitol. 
hawaii.gov/session2009/Testimony/HB31_testimony_lbr_03-19-09.pdf [hereinafter Hawaii Senate 
Hearing] (statement of UNITE HERE Local 5) (calling the use of credit checks “a form of economic 
segregation, in which job seekers are behind on their bills because they lost a job or their hours were 
cut, but are still unable to get a job or promotion because they’re behind on their bills”). 
 67. Ill. Senate Transcript, supra note 63, at 41. 
 68. Id. at 43. 
 69. Id. 
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poor credit are a discrete and insular minority, a subordinated caste, a 
politically powerless group, or a group with a history of discrimination. He 
frames poor credit as nothing more than a situation into which “many 
folks” fall. He does not posit any stable group of people here—much less a 
group with a history of discrimination.
70
 
Indeed, his claim does not invoke history at all. The claim is simply 
that “we see this pattern”—now, in the present—of employer conduct, and 
we further observe that this pattern extends to a sufficiently broad swath of 
employers that it creates a structural problem (“people who are in a hole 
can’t get out because of it”). Harmon is claiming, essentially, that credit 
checks have become a bottleneck—one that constrains opportunities 
severely enough that people are finding it difficult to reach a large swath 
of employment opportunities that open out on the other side. By itself, 
Harmon argues, this is a sufficiently good reason to “take the discretion 
away from that job creator.” This makes the use of credit checks different 
from other employer decisions that are perhaps equally questionable in 
meritocratic terms, such as a choice to hire the boss’s nephew. The use of 
credit checks creates a more substantial bottleneck, Harmon argues; this 
gives us sufficient reason to activate the machinery of antidiscrimination 
law. 
This anti-bottleneck argument was not the only argument in favor of 
credit check restrictions in the ten states that have so far passed such laws. 
But it was the main argument, and it gained critical strength as the 
recession wore on, leading to these statutes’ enactment. Among the other 
arguments proponents made were privacy claims,
71
 fairness claims related 
to the fact that many credit reports contain errors,
72
 and three types of 
possible disparate impact arguments, each of which reflects a concern that 
the credit check bottleneck reinforces another important bottleneck in our 
society’s opportunity structure. Some legislators and civil rights groups 
argued that the use of credit history has a disparate impact on racial 
minorities: data from the Federal Reserve strongly suggests that in the 
 
 
 70. Now in fact one could make the argument that there is a long history of discrimination 
against debtors. But no such claim plays any role in the argument that this legislator is making. 
 71. See, e.g., WASH. STATE S. COMM. ON CONSUMER PROTECTION & HOUSING, SENATE BILL 
REPORT: SB 5827, at 2 (2007) [hereinafter WASH. BILL REPORT] (summary of the debate in the bill 
report) (“People have a right to keep the information in their credit reports private.”); Letter from the 
Leadership Conference on Civil & Human Rights to the U.S. House of Representatives, Cosponsor the 
Equal Employment for All Act H.R. 321 (June 21, 2012), available at http://www.civilrights.org/ 
advocacy/letters/2012/cosponsor-the-equal.html [hereinafter Leadership Conference Letter]. 
 72. See, e.g., WASH. BILL REPORT, supra note 71, at 2; CAL. ASSEMB. BILL ANALYSIS, supra 
note 48, at 4; CONN. BILL REPORT, supra note 66 (statement of Sarah Poriss); Hawaii Senate Hearing, 
supra note 66 (statement of UNITE HERE Local 5). 
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aggregate, black and Hispanic consumers have significantly lower credit 
scores than whites.
73
 Some advocates and legislators also emphasized a 
different disparate impact issue, one not recognized under Title VII or the 
law of any state: the class-based impact on the lower middle class and the 
poor. For instance, proponents of the bill in Washington State argued that 
credit checks “make[] it more difficult for low-income workers to move 
into the middle class” and “unfairly penalize lower class and middle class 
people who have had financial difficulties . . . [and] are often the people 
who need employment the most.”74 Finally, some pointed out the possible 
disparate impact on victims of domestic abuse, whose credit abusers 
sometimes deliberately ruin.
75
  
Each of these disparate impact arguments reflects concern on the part 
of state legislators that the credit check bottleneck reinforces other, more 
pervasive bottlenecks in our opportunity structure. But the main arguments 
for these laws focused on the way credit checks of prospective employees 
restrict the opportunities of people with poor credit. Even many groups 
with a racial justice mission, whose interest in the credit check issue 
presumably has some connection to its disparate racial impact, tended not 
to lead with that argument, but instead emphasized that credit checks 
create a bottleneck that many people, of all races, have trouble passing 
through.
76
 (Some of the records of state legislative debates contain no 
discussion of racial disparate impact;
77
 in some other states it fell to an 
 
 
 73. See BD. OF GOVS. OF THE FED. RES. SYS., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON CREDIT SCORING 
AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY OF CREDIT, at S-2 (2007), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/creditscore/creditscore.pdf. The credit report 
products most employers obtain today do not contain the familiar “scores” used by lenders. Still, it is 
reasonable to surmise that the disparate impact will be similar, whether or not the credit history is 
reduced to a numerical score. For examples of such disparate impact arguments in legislative debates, 
see CAL. ASSEMB. BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 48, at 4; Act of May 17, 2012, No. 154, 2012 Vt. Legis. 
Serv. (West). 
 74. WASH. BILL REPORT, supra note 71, at 2; see also Ill. Senate Transcript, supra note 63, at 42 
(statement of Sen. Harmon); CONN. BILL REPORT, supra note 66 (statements in support); Hawaii 
Senate Hearing, supra note 66 (statement of UNITE HERE Local 5); Oregon Release, supra note 66. 
 75. See, e.g., WASH. BILL REPORT, supra note 71, at 2. See generally Angela Littwin, Escaping 
Battered Credit: A Proposal for Repairing Credit Reports Damaged by Domestic Violence, 161 U. PA. 
L. REV 363 (2013). 
 76. For instance, in June 2012, the Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, along 
with a broad coalition of civil rights organizations, wrote a joint letter to members of the House of 
Representatives urging passage of a federal bill that would restrict the use of credit checks by 
employers nationwide. See Leadership Conference Letter, supra note 71. The letter discussed every 
one of the arguments in the previous paragraph, and did not mention race at all until a brief discussion 
toward the end. Id. 
 77. See, e.g., WASH. BILL REPORT, supra note 71 (official summary of arguments in this debate 
does not include mention of racial disparate impact). 
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advocate or an EEOC lawyer to raise the issue at all.
78
) Thus, while the 
relevance of the racial disparate impact argument to the passage of these 
statutes should not be dismissed, legislators tended to focus more on the 
“catch-22” problem and generally on the simple argument that credit 
checks amount to a bottleneck: that is, that this practice was just making it 
too difficult for a lot of people to get jobs. The economic downturn meant 
that far more people than usual were being screened out by credit checks, a 
fact not lost on advocates of the new laws.
79
 
The anti-bottleneck argument depends crucially on the pervasiveness of 
the use of credit checks, as legislators’ frequent citations of the SHRM 
survey data underscore. The higher the proportion of jobs that require 
good credit, the more serious the problem is.
80
 This variable is 
conceptually separate from the number of individuals affected: even if 
only a small number of people have poor credit, it would be useful to 
know whether they are blocked from most jobs or only a few. 
This has remedial implications. In order to ameliorate this bottleneck, it 
is not necessary to eliminate the use of credit checks by employers 
entirely. Greatly cutting back on the practice, so that only a limited range 
of jobs involve such checks, will achieve most of the benefits of a total 
ban (from an anti-bottleneck point of view), while at the same time 
allowing employers to retain the discretion to use the checks where the 
gains from doing so seem greatest. 
That is the compromise state legislators struck. The various new 
statutes barring employers from using credit information all contain 
significant exceptions for situations, which the statutes spell out, in which 
credit history is a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) for a job. 
Some statutes make a broad exception for employers that are financial 
institutions;
81
 most exempt positions where employees will have access to 
 
 
 78. See, e.g., CAL. ASSEMB. BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 48; CONN. BILL REPORT, supra note 66 
(statement of Gwen Mills); Hawaii Senate Hearing, supra note 66 (statement of Stuart J. Ishimaru, 
Commissioner and Acting Chairman of the EEOC, and Coral Wong Pietsch, representing the Hawai`i 
Civil Rights Commission). 
 79. See, e.g., Editorial, The Credit-History Pariah Class, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2013, at A22 
(“[T]he proportion of people with poor ratings—credit scores under 600—has grown from about 15 
percent in the years before the recession to about 25 percent in 2011.”). 
 80. This formulation is a bit of an oversimplification. To measure pervasiveness in a more 
nuanced way we might ask not simply about the number of jobs, but about the different kinds of jobs 
and paths a person might pursue. A bottleneck is especially pervasive if it affects the pursuit of a wide 
range of different jobs. In addition, we ought to ask whether a bottleneck extends beyond the 
employment sphere. 
 81. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51tt(b)(1), (a)(3) (West Supp. 2013) (exempting all 
financial institutions); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495i(c)(1)(C) (Supp. 2012) (same); see also, e.g., OR. 
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other people’s bank account information or large amounts of cash.82 These 
BFOQ exceptions cover a significant number of jobs, but a very low 
proportion of all jobs. These statutes thus balance the goals of, on the one 
hand, allowing employers to use credit information where they might view 
it as most valuable to do so, and on the other hand, preventing this practice 
from becoming so pervasive that it becomes a severe bottleneck in the 
opportunity structure. 
And really this is not so different from the function of the (generally 
narrower) BFOQ exceptions in Title VII or any antidiscrimination statute. 
When the law allows a limited BFOQ exception, so that employers may in 
some cases discriminate on a ground such as sex that is normally 
forbidden, we are allowing employers to limit some opportunities to men 
or to women while at the same time making sure that such discrimination 
is confined to a sufficiently narrow band that being a man (or a woman) 
does not become a severe bottleneck through which one must pass in order 
to reach a wide range of employment opportunities. 
B. “No Unemployed Need Apply” 
The new statutes regarding discrimination against unemployed persons 
in Oregon, New Jersey, Washington D.C., Chicago, New York City, and 
Madison, Wisconsin, all of which were enacted in 2011–2013, won 
passage for reasons that were even more tightly tethered to strained 
economic circumstances. When the Oregon Senate passed its bill in 
February 2012, the Senate majority put out a press release linking the 
bill’s passage directly to the high unemployment rate: “With Oregon’s 
long term unemployment rate stubbornly high, [this bill] makes sure that 
applicants can’t be prohibited from applying for a job opening solely 
because they do not currently have a job.”83 In other words, the urgency of 
the bill was related directly to the large number of individual workers—
and perhaps more to the point, constituents—who were unemployed. 
 
 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 659A.320(2)(a) (West 2013) (exempting “federally insured banks or credit 
unions”); MD. CODE ANN., LAB & EMPL. § 3-711(a)(2) (West Supp. 2012) (similar). 
 82. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5 (West Supp. 2013) (inter alia, bank or credit card 
information and certain other personal information, or access to $10,000 or more in cash); 820 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/10(b) (West Supp. 2013) (inter alia, unsupervised access to cash totaling $2500 
or more, or authority to enter into contracts); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495i(c)(1)(E) (Supp. 2012) 
(“financial fiduciary responsibility to the employer or a client”); id. § 495i(c)(1)(G) (“access to . . . 
payroll information”); MD. CODE ANN., LAB & EMPL. § 3-711(c)(2) (West Supp. 2012) (inter alia, 
“access to personal information” or “an expense account or a corporate debit or credit card”). 
 83. Press Release, Or. S. Democrats, Bill Will Help Level Playing Field for Oregonians Looking 
for Work (Feb. 15, 2012). 
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The law’s chief sponsor, Senator Diane Rosenbaum (D-Portland), 
explained that “[a]t a time when the competition for jobs is extraordinarily 
intense, there are examples of some businesses and recruitment firms 
telling would-be job seekers that they can’t get a job unless they already 
have a job.”84 Those examples emerged in news accounts beginning in 
2010;
85
 in 2011 the National Employment Law Project (NELP) conducted 
a more systematic (but still rather informal) survey of job postings on 
popular career websites and found substantial numbers of job postings 
from major employers that specified that candidates “must currently be 
employed” or used similar language.86 The NELP white paper was cited 
widely. In California, for instance, the legislative committee analysis 
urging passage of another such bill quoted the NELP paper at length.
87
 
(That bill passed but was vetoed by the governor.) The NELP paper 
argued that excluding the unemployed creates a “perverse catch-22.”88 It 
does not mention any disparate impact arguments, although one could 
certainly argue that such policies have a disparate impact on the basis of 
race because racial groups have different rates of unemployment.
89
 
Although this sounds rather perverse from the point of view of a job 
seeker, there is a certain economic logic to refusing to consider applicants 
who are unemployed precisely when unemployment is high. The reason is 
that when unemployment is high, there are far more applicants per job 
opening than usual.
90
 This increases the administrative burden on 
employers evaluating applicants. Anything that cuts down on that burden 
might reduce overall costs. Thus, “with so many applicants for every job 
opening, screening out the unemployed or the long-term unemployed is a 
convenient device for reducing the workload associated with the hiring 
 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. See, e.g., Catherine Rampell, Unemployed, and Likely to Stay That Way, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 
2010, at B1; The Hard Truth: Companies Don’t Hire Unemployed, NPR (Dec. 14, 2010, 1:00 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/2010/12/14/132056874/the-hard-truth-companies-don-t-hire-unemployed. 
 86. NAT’L EMP. LAW PROJECT, HIRING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE UNEMPLOYED: FEDERAL 
BILL OUTLAWS EXCLUDING THE UNEMPLOYED FROM JOB OPPORTUNITIES, AS DISCRIMINATORY ADS 
PERSIST (2011) [hereinafter NELP PAPER]. 
 87. KEVIN G. BAKER, COMM. ON JUDICIARY, CAL. STATE ASSEMB., BILL ANALYSIS: A.B. 1450 
(2012); see also, e.g., D.C. COUNCIL COMM. ON AGING & CMTY. AFFAIRS, COMM. REPORT: B19-0486 
“UNEMPLOYED ANTIDISCRIMINATION ACT OF 2012,” at 2 (2012) [hereinafter D.C. COMM. REPORT] 
(citing and quoting the NELP paper), available at http://dcclims1.dccouncil.us/images/00001/ 
20120206130956.pdf. 
 88. NELP PAPER, supra note 86, at 1. 
 89. See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, LABOR FORCE CHARACTERISTICS BY RACE AND 
ETHNICITY, 2012, at 1 (2013), available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsrace2012.pdf (reporting a white 
unemployment rate of 7.2% and a black unemployment rate of 13.8%). 
 90. The NELP paper notes that the applicants-to-openings ratio peaked in 2009 at 6.9, up from a 
low of around 1.5 in 2007, during better economic times. See NELP PAPER, supra note 86, at App. B.  
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process.”91 Similar logic might explain the increased use of credit checks 
during tough economic times as well. It may seem perverse to consider 
credit history at just the moment when many more people than usual have 
a checkered credit history, but that is just when employers may be on the 
lookout for a cheap method of culling increased numbers of applicants. 
To be sure, employers would be unlikely to adopt the “no unemployed 
need apply” device if they imagined it worked no better than random 
chance. After all, it is not difficult to choose a subset of one’s applicants 
arbitrarily (e.g., by lottery, through the order in which the applications 
arrived, etc.). But employers might reasonably believe that a policy of “no 
unemployed need apply” is superior to such methods. Among the 
unemployed there is some subset of persons who lost their job for causes, 
such as their own incompetence or misconduct, which would make them 
less likely to be good employees. Even if the vast majority of unemployed 
people do not fall into this category—and perhaps during a period of high 
unemployment, that ratio is even more lopsided—at least a few do. 
Identifying those few takes effort—calling references, for instance—and is 
not always successful. Thus, if we have an excessive number of 
applicants, plenty of whom are basically good enough, it may be micro-
efficient to simply exclude all those who are currently unemployed, as a 
low-cost means of avoiding the small subset who are unemployed for 
reasons that would lead a firm to prefer not to hire them. Here again, the 
logic of micro-efficiency diverges from the logic of meritocracy, which 
would demand calling references and taking other steps that require time 
and effort to determine which applicant is actually the strongest. 
If only one employer decided to exclude the unemployed, that would 
not much affect anyone’s opportunities. But if many employers, 
collectively representing a significant fraction of the available employment 
opportunities, were to adopt a “no unemployed need apply” policy, this 
would create a severe bottleneck through which workers would need to 
pass if they hoped to find a job. Concern about this possibility—that the 
“no unemployed need apply” policy either might already be or could 
become widespread—triggered these legislative responses. As the D.C. 
City Council explained in its committee report recommending passage of 
its legislation, “[d]iscrimination against the unemployed has become such 
a pervasive issue” that many states and localities are now passing laws 
addressing it.
92
 
 
 
 91. Id. at 5. 
 92. D.C. COMM. REPORT, supra note 87, at 2. 
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Ordinances in Washington, D.C., Madison, and New York City now 
actually prohibit disparate treatment on the basis of employment status. 
But the Oregon and New Jersey statutes and the Chicago ordinance are 
more modest: they merely prohibit employers from stating that “no 
unemployed need apply,” and similar statements, in job postings and help-
wanted advertisements. These statutes do not define current employment 
status as a ground on which employers must not make hiring decisions. 
But these statutes may still do something important: they remove a 
particular kind of initial barrier that would likely prevent nearly all 
unemployed persons from even attempting to apply for a given job. 
The aim here closely parallels the elimination of sex-segregated help 
wanted advertisements in the 1970s. Those ads might have been 
convenient; they might have accurately reported the underlying 
preferences or expectations of many employers and many employees. But 
they also had a steering effect, making it even less likely that a person of 
the “wrong” sex would apply for a given opening.93 The steering effect of 
statements such as “no unemployed need apply” reinforces the effect of 
employers’ preferences against hiring unemployed applicants by strongly 
discouraging them from applying in the first place. Eliminating “no 
unemployed need apply” thus helps open up a more complete range of job 
opportunities to initial inquiries and applications from people who are 
unemployed—some small number of whom, at least, will then actually get 
the jobs, when their other strengths outweigh any negative inference an 
employer draws from their unemployment status.  
These state laws also have a signaling function of another kind: they 
convey to employers that refusal to hire the unemployed is illegitimate as 
a matter of public policy. This may cause some employers, at least at the 
margin, to modify their view of unemployed applicants. In both of these 
ways, this legislation aims to ameliorate, but not eliminate, the bottleneck. 
C. Ban the Box 
The movement to “ban the box”—to remove the check box or question 
from employment applications that asks whether the applicant has ever 
been convicted of a crime—began to gain real traction around 2005, 
starting in San Francisco and Boston.
94
 (One outlier jurisdiction, Hawaii, 
 
 
 93. See Cary Franklin, Inventing the “Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination, 125 HARV. L. 
REV. 1307, 1340–44 (2012). 
 94. S.F., Cal., Bd. of Supervisors Res. No. 764-05 (Oct. 21, 2005) [hereinafter S.F. Res.]; BOS., 
MASS., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 4–7 (2012). These measures passed in 2005 and became effective in 
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has a ban the box statute that is considerably older; and a number of states 
have older statutes other than ban the box that limit discrimination against 
people with criminal records.
95
) 
Although the local political circumstances varied, it is not a 
coincidence that many states and localities began to focus seriously on the 
problem of employment for persons with past criminal convictions in the 
mid-2000s. These efforts coincided with an unprecedented wave of 
released prisoners reentering society, a delayed demographic aftershock of 
the tough-on-crime policies of the 1980s. By the turn of the twenty-first 
century, the number of federal prisoners being released each year reached 
“nearly 600,000,” the largest number in history.96 DOJ figures indicated 
that the proportion of the American adult population that has served time 
in prison rose from 1.8% in 1991 to 3.2% in 2007 and was continuing to 
rise rapidly: trends implied a future figure of 6.6% for the cohort born in 
2001.
97
 Thus, at the start of the new century, the problem of prisoner 
reentry captured the attention of both scholars and governments.
98
 In 2000, 
U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno called prisoner reentry “one of the most 
pressing problems we face as a nation”; the Clinton Administration 
launched “Project Reentry” that year.99 In his 2004 State of the Union 
address, President George W. Bush proposed “a four-year, $300 million 
prisoner re-entry initiative” that aimed to address both employment and 
housing challenges for newly released prisoners.
100
 “America is the land of 
 
 
2006. In 2014, San Francisco enacted a ban the box ordinance more comprehensive in scope than this 
initial 2005 resolution. See S.F., Cal., Ordinance 17-14 (Feb. 2014) (applying to public and private 
employers). 
 95. See infra note 115. 
 96. See JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER REENTRY v, 
20 (2003). 
 97. See THOMAS P. BONCZAR, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., DOJ, PREVALENCE OF IMPRISONMENT 
IN THE U.S. POPULATION, 1974–2001, at 4, 7 (2003), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ 
piusp01.pdf. These rising DOJ figures are mentioned prominently in the EEOC’s 2012 enforcement 
guidance on past criminal convictions discussed below. See infra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 98. See, e.g., Jeremy Travis et al., Prisoner Reentry: Issues for Practice and Policy, 17 CRIM. 
JUST. 12 (2002) (describing national and local responses to an issue “getting much attention these 
days”); Anthony C. Thompson, Navigating the Hidden Obstacles to Ex-Offender Reentry, 45 B.C.L. 
REV. 255 (2004); MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, RELIEF FROM THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF A 
CRIMINAL CONVICTION: A STATE-BY-STATE RESOURCE GUIDE 2–3 (2005), available at http://web 
cache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/4cs/files/2008/11/stateby 
staterelieffromcccc.pdf; DEMELZA BAER ET AL., JUST. POL’Y CTR., URB. INST., UNDERSTANDING THE 
CHALLENGES OF PRISONER RE-ENTRY: RESEARCH FINDINGS FROM THE URBAN INSTITUTE’S PRISONER 
RE-ENTRY PORTFOLIO 4–5 (2006), available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/411289_reentry_ 
portfolio.pdf. 
 99. See Thompson, supra note 98, at 260. 
 100. George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2004), available at http://georgewbush 
-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html.  
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second chance,” the President said, “and when the gates of the prison 
open, the path ahead should lead to a better life.”101 
Against this backdrop, a 2003 empirical study by sociologist Devah 
Pager
102
 attracted significant attention. The study found, using a tester 
methodology, that checking “the box” on an application for employment 
had a powerful negative effect on one’s chances of being called for an 
interview.
103
 This study was cited in the text of a number of the ban the 
box ordinances, including San Francisco’s.104 Meanwhile, in 2005, an 
important report by the Re-Entry Policy Council, a project of the Justice 
Department and the Council on State Governments,
105
 found that people 
with criminal convictions face extremely pervasive difficulties in finding 
jobs: it cited survey data showing that “60 percent of employers, upon 
initial consideration, would not hire a released individual.”106 That is a 
severe bottleneck by any measure. 
During this period the use of criminal background checks by employers 
appeared to be rising rapidly. News reports of an “explosion” in such 
checks attributed the increase in part to the fact that, like credit checks, 
they were becoming cheaper and easier for employers to conduct.
107 
Scholars and advocates alike have noted this important effect of 
 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM J. SOC. 937 (2003). 
 103. See id. at 946–48, 958. Actually, perhaps the most striking result in Pager’s study is 
something else: the evidence of continuing widespread disparate treatment discrimination against 
blacks. She found that 34% of whites without criminal records received callbacks, 17% of whites with 
criminal records, 14% of blacks without criminal records, and 5% of blacks with criminal records. Id. 
at 957–59. Thus, race was such a powerful predictor of who would receive callbacks that even the 
whites with criminal records received more callbacks than the blacks without criminal records. But this 
was not the proposition for which Pager’s article tended to be cited in debates about ban the box. 
 104. See S.F. Res., supra note 94, at 2 (“WHEREAS, According to . . . Devah Pager, author of 
‘The Mark of a Criminal Record,’ individuals with felony records are twice as likely to be denied 
employment as people without past criminal records.”); see also, e.g., Minneapolis, Minn., City 
Council Res. 2006R-642 (Dec. 22, 2006) (similarly citing Pager in the resolution’s “Whereas” 
section). 
 105. JUSTICE CTR., COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, REPORT OF THE RE-ENTRY POLICY COUNCIL: 
CHARTING THE SAFE AND SUCCESSFUL RETURN OF PRISONERS TO THE COMMUNITY 293–305 (2005). 
 106. Id. at 294. 
 107. Ann Zimmerman & Kortney Stringer, As Background Checks Proliferate, Ex-Cons Face a 
Lock on Jobs, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 26, 2004, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/ SB109347 
819251301442.html (“The explosion in background checks is occurring in part because technological 
advances have made them faster and cheaper. Businesses commonly pay $25 to $100 per search, and 
the price is dropping. Several months ago, SecurTest, a Florida-based applicant-screening company, 
began offering background checks . . . [for] about $10 per applicant . . . .”). The increase is not unique 
to the United States. See generally Elena Larrauri Pijoan, Legal Protections Against Criminal 
Background Checks in Europe, 16 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 50, 52 (2014) (finding that during more or 
less this same period, from 2002–2011, criminal background checks by employers more than tripled in 
the U.K. and more than sextupled in Australia, among other jurisdictions). 
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technological change,
108
 which the EEOC also highlighted in explaining 
its own decision to update its guidance about criminal background checks 
(discussed below).
109
 Margaret Colgate Love, the former U.S. Pardon 
Attorney, wrote a report in 2005 on the collateral consequences of criminal 
convictions that identified employment barriers as “perhaps the most 
troublesome of the secondary legal consequences of conviction.”110 She 
argued that in addition to the trends just discussed, “[t]he natural 
reluctance to hire people with a criminal record has been exacerbated since 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks.”111 Thus, by the mid-2000s, it was becoming 
increasingly clear that employers’ refusal to hire applicants with a criminal 
background was a severe bottleneck—and one that might have serious 
negative social consequences given the large number of individuals 
involved. Employment became a central focus of a loose “re-entry 
movement” that joined activists and policymakers interested in helping 
prisoners re-integrate into their communities.
112
 
Some of the first ban the box ordinances applied only to municipal 
(government) employers; most later measures apply to government 
contractors as well.
113
 Some extend to all public and private employers.
114
 
 
 
 108. See, e.g., Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, Redemption in the Presence of 
Widespread Criminal Background Checks, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 327, 329 (2009) (“With the advancement 
in information technology and the Internet, individuals’ criminal records have never been more easily 
accessible. The background-check industry is burgeoning.”). State Sen. Bobby Joe Champion, the 
chief sponsor of Minnesota’s 2013 statute extending ban the box to private employers, similarly cited 
the “new and much easier access to records and increased use of them by employers” as a central 
reason the bill was necessary. Video: S.F. 523 (Champion) Employers Criminal History Reliance for 
Job Applicants Limitations and Remedies Imposition, at 42:35 (Minn. S. Comm. On the Judiciary Feb. 
28, 2013), available at http://www.senate.mn/media/media_video_popup.php? year=2013&flv=cmte_ 
jud_022813.flv. 
 109. See Questions and Answers About the EEOC’s Enforcement Guidance on the Consideration 
of Arrest and Conviction Records in Employment Decisions Under Title VII, EEOC, http://www.eeoc. 
gov/laws/guidance/qa_arrest_conviction.cfm (last visited Aug. 21, 2014) (“Why did the EEOC decide 
to update its policy statements on this issue? In the twenty years since the Commission issued its three 
policy statements, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 codified Title VII disparate impact analysis, and 
technology made criminal history information much more accessible to employers.”). 
 110. COLGATE LOVE, supra note 98, at 2. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See John V. Jacobi, Prison Health, Public Health: Obligations and Opportunities, 31 AM. 
J.L. & MED. 447, 467–70 (2005). 
 113. Compare S.F. Res., supra note 94 (city and county employment only), with BOS. MASS., 
CODE OF ORDINANCES § 4.7 (2012) (passed in 2005) (extending CORI reform provisions to the 
employment practices of vendors doing business with the City of Boston); NEW HAVEN, CONN., CODE 
OF ORDINANCES tit. III, ch. 2, art. XII (2012) (passed in 2009) (banning the box on applications for 
vendors and contractors engaged in business with the city); DETROIT, MICH., CITY CODE OF 
ORDINANCES pt. III, ch. 13, art. I, div. 3 (2013) (passed in 2010) (same); ATLANTIC CITY, N.J. CODE, 
ch. 30, art. I (2014) (passed in 2011) (same).  
 114. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, §§ 4(9½), 1(5) (West 2004 & Supp. 2013) (barring 
both public and private employers in Massachusetts from inquiring into applicant’s criminal 
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These ban the box statutes and ordinances do not actually prohibit 
employers from refusing to hire a prospective employee because of a past 
criminal conviction (although a number of states do have older laws that 
do this).
115
 Instead, as the moniker suggests, most of the new ban the box 
measures merely prohibit employers from asking about convictions on an 
initial application form, thereby enabling some with past convictions to 
pass through that initial gateway and, perhaps, prove that they are the best 
qualified applicant for the job despite their past convictions, about which 
employers are free to inquire at later stages. All the measures include 
broad exemptions, usually of two kinds: first, the measures exempt cases 
in which the crime is relevant to the job—so that some types of employers 
are permitted to ask on an initial application form about certain relevant 
types of crimes, but not all crimes—and second, certain enumerated 
categories of jobs are entirely exempt, so that employers may ask on the 
initial application form about any past convictions.
116
 
 
 
background at initial stage of hiring); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 378‐2, ‐2.5 (LexisNexis 2010 & 
Supp. 2012) (banning the box for public and private employers in Hawaii); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 364.021 (West 2012) (prohibiting pre-interview criminal history checks by most public and private 
employers); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-7(7) (Supp. 2013) (banning the box for public and private 
employers). Some local ordinances cover private employers as well. See BUFFALO, N.Y., CODE § 154-
25 (2013), Newark, N.J., Ordinance 12-1630 (Sept. 19, 2012), PHILA., PA., CODE tit. 9, ch. 9-3500 
(2014), SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE ch. 14.17 (2013). 
 115. Fifteen states currently prohibit some set of employers from refusing to hire on the basis of a 
past criminal conviction, with various exceptions. Most of these laws appear to have been enacted in 
the late 1970s or early 1980s, in what may have been a previous wave of significant concern about 
prisoner reentry. In nine of these states, the bans apply only to public (government) employers, and in 
some cases, government contractors. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-904(E) (2010); COLO. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 24-5-101 (West 2010 & Supp. 2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51i (West 2011); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.011 (West 2008 & Supp. 2013); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 335B.020 (LexisNexis 
2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2950 (2007 & Supp. 2013); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 364.03 (West 2012); 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-2-3 (2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.96A.020 (2010). Six states’ statutes 
apply to private employers as well. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2010 & 
Supp. 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4710 (2008); N.Y. CORRECTION LAW §§ 750-755 (McKinney 
2003 & Supp. 2013); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9125 (West 2000); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.31 (West 
2002 & Supp. 2012); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-103(A) (West 2011). 
 116. Most often, the job categories that are entirely exempt include those where other statutes or 
regulations require criminal background checks. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378‐2.5(a), (d) 
(LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2012) (exempting employers in Hawaii where alleged crime “bears a 
rational relationship” to the job, or where the job is in, inter alia, education, certain mental health 
services, armed security, or financial services); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4(9½) (Supp. 
2013) (exempting employers in Massachusetts where other federal or state laws specifically prohibit 
the employment of people with past convictions); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 364.09 (West 2012) 
(exceptions for law enforcement, schools, and certain other categories such as commercial driver, taxi 
drivers, medicine, and chiropractors). PHILA., PA., CODE tit. 9, ch. 9-3500, § 9-3505 (2014) (exempting 
employers in Philadelphia if job involves criminal justice system, or if industry regulations require 
background checks, as in the case of banking and financial services). 
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The effect of a ban the box statute or ordinance with all of these 
exceptions is to make a past criminal conviction a less severe bottleneck. 
Those convicted of particular crimes will remain barred from specific 
categories of jobs to which the crime is most relevant; a few limited 
categories of jobs will bar anyone convicted of anything. But for most 
jobs, individuals with past convictions who are otherwise qualified will be 
able to make it through the initial application stage. They will get a chance 
to make their case in an interview, which seems likely to result in a more 
nuanced assessment of the meritocratic relevance of an individual’s past 
conviction than the simple check box. The check box provides employers 
with an expedient way to discard all applications with past convictions, 
often before a human being even sees the application. Indeed, some 
intriguing experimental evidence suggests that speaking to a human being, 
rather than simply submitting a paper form, does reduce the negative effect 
of a past criminal conviction (although troublingly, this seems to make 
much more of a difference for white applicants than for black ones, a 
problem ban the box does not address).
117
 
To employment lawyers and employment law scholars, all this likely 
sounds a bit familiar. Employers’ blanket refusal to hire individuals with 
past criminal convictions is also a longstanding area of regulation and 
litigation under the disparate impact provision of Title VII. The EEOC 
issued policy statements in 1987 and 1990 concerning the use of criminal 
convictions and arrest records in hiring,
118
 the thrust of which was that a 
blanket refusal to hire anyone with any past criminal conviction has a 
disparate racial impact, and is rather difficult to justify in terms of business 
necessity, so employers need to take a more nuanced approach, taking into 
account the nature of the offense, the nature of the position sought, and 
how much time has passed since the conviction.
119
 In 2012, the EEOC 
issued new guidelines that reiterate these factors, continuing to emphasize 
that blanket bans on hiring anyone with a criminal conviction violate Title 
 
 
 117. DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS 
INCARCERATION 102–06 (2007). 
 118. See EEOC, POLICY STATEMENT ON THE ISSUE OF CONVICTION RECORDS UNDER TITLE VII 
OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1987), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/ 
convict1.html; EEOC, POLICY STATEMENT ON THE USE OF STATISTICS IN CHARGES INVOLVING THE 
EXCLUSION OF INDIVIDUALS WITH CONVICTION RECORDS FROM EMPLOYMENT (1987), available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/convict2.html; EEOC, POLICY GUIDANCE ON THE CONSIDERATION 
OF ARREST RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 
1964 (1990), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/arrest_records.html. 
 119. These criteria largely codified those set forth by the Eighth Circuit in Green v. Missouri 
Pacific Railroad Co., 523 F.2d 1290, 1298–99 (8th Cir. 1975). Courts have not, however, uniformly 
accepted the EEOC’s framework. See El v. SEPTA, 479 F.3d 232, 243–44 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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VII, and placing a new emphasis on the importance of individualized 
assessment.
120
 The effect of all these EEOC guidelines is to press 
employers to ameliorate the past-conviction bottleneck by replacing 
blanket exclusions with narrower rules that would bar those with past 
criminal convictions from only some, rather than all, positions. 
The EEOC’s concern about this bottleneck stems, in the first instance, 
from its disparate racial impact. The disparate racial impact of mass 
incarceration is enormous; some have called mass incarceration and its 
collateral consequences “the new Jim Crow.”121 Racial justice arguments 
played more of a role in state and local legislative debates about ban the 
box than in state and local legislative debates about either credit checks or 
discrimination against the unemployed. Still, even here, state legislators 
did not frame the problem of re-entry exclusively in racial terms.
122
 (And 
as we will see, neither does the EEOC.
123
) In state and local legislative 
debates, advocates of ban the box in the states and localities primarily 
emphasized a more race-neutral set of claims about the importance of not 
freezing out a significant population of Americans—those with past 
criminal convictions—from all or nearly all employment opportunities. 
For reformers in Massachusetts, whose efforts culminated in a 2010 statute 
banning the box for all public and private employers in the state,
124
 the 
central argument was about the social benefits, primarily in terms of 
public safety, of “reducing barriers to employment applicants with a 
criminal history face.”125  
 
 
 120. See EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 39, at V.B.7–V.B.9 & VIII (2012); id. at 
V.B.9, Example 8: Targeted Exclusion Without Individualized Assessment Is Not Job Related and 
Consistent with Business Necessity. In 2013, the EEOC initiated two enforcement actions to on the 
basis of the updated guidelines. See EEOC Press Release, supra note 41; see also Julie Forster, Pepsi’s 
Bottling Arm to Pay $3 Million to Resolve EEOC Hiring Discrimination Case, PIONEER PRESS (Jan. 
11, 2012, 10:21 PM), http://www.twincities.com/news/ci_19719924 (settling a disparate impact claim 
about criminal background checks prior to the new guidelines). 
 121. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS (2010). 
 122. Indeed, in some legislative debates, the issue of racial disparate impact does not appear to 
have been discussed at all. See, e.g., Hearing on S.B. 4 Before the S. Fin. Comm., 2013 Leg., 433rd 
Sess. (Md. 2013), available at http://mgahouse.maryland.gov/house/play/21592fd4f17e4618ae985788 
1074eb93/?catalog/03e481c7-8a42-4438-a7da-93ff74bdaa4c&playfrom=3127294 (link to audio file) 
(at the Finance Committee hearing about Maryland’s ban the box bill, speakers made a variety of 
arguments but race and disparate impact were not mentioned). 
 123. See infra Part III.D. 
 124. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4(9½) (Supp. 2013). 
 125. MASS. COMM’N AGAINST DISCRIMINATION, MCAD FACT SHEET: CRIMINAL OFFENDER 
RECORD INFORMATION ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE REFORMS n.5 (2010), available at 
http://www.mass.gov/mcad/documents/Criminal%20Records%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf (citing BOS. 
WORKERS ALLIANCE, SUMMARY OF CONFERENCE COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT: S.2220 AND H.4712 
(2010)). At the same time, it was not a secret that a number of the advocacy groups pressing for ban 
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Philadelphia enacted a similarly broad ban the box ordinance in 2011, 
covering all public and private employers.
126
 In some respects, the racial 
justice roots of the Philadelphia ordinance were readily apparent: the 
NAACP played a significant role in pressing for the ordinance’s 
passage,
127
 and NAACP President Benjamin Todd Jealous was present at 
the signing of the bill by Mayor Michael Nutter.
128
 But, at the bill signing, 
both Jealous and Nutter framed their support for the ordinance in race-
netural terms. Nutter emphasized individual fairness arguments—people 
who “have paid their debt to society” deserve “an opportunity to work to 
provide for their families and should not be discriminated against before 
they even have a first interview”—and also a policy argument for 
reintegration rooted in public safety: “Offering jobs to ex-offenders,” he 
argued, “improves the quality of life for all Philadelphians.”129 Jealous 
made essentially the same arguments.
130
  
One way to understand these race-neutral claims is as purely strategic 
moves. In an ideologically “post-racial” political world, advocates for 
racial justice may be couching their arguments in race-neutral terms 
because those terms are politically saleable. There is undoubtedly 
something to this strategic story. But the relationship between the race-
based and race-neutral arguments is more complex. 
Sometimes the effect of a bottleneck is most visible or salient when it 
has a concentrated effect on a racial group. It may be easier to notice, for 
instance, an all-white freshman class at a university than it is to notice that 
there are also no poor students in the class—even when these demographic 
effects might have the same causes, in that there is some crucial bottleneck 
 
 
the box legislation were predominantly black or had roots in predominantly black neighborhoods. For 
instance, the Boston Workers Alliance had its roots in Roxbury—but it, too, framed its mission in 
race-neutral terms. See About, BOS. WORKERS ALLIANCE, http://www.bostonworkersalliance.org/ 
?page_id=2 (last visited Feb. 21, 2014). 
 126. See supra note 114. 
 127. See ‘Ban the Box’ Bill Signed Into Law in Philadelphia, NAACP, http://www.naacp.org/ 
news/entry/ban-the-box-bill-signed-into-law-in-philadelphia (last visited Aug. 21, 2014). 
 128. Id.  
 129. Press Release, City of Phila., “Ban the Box” Ordinance Goes into Effect (Jan. 13, 2012), 
available at http://www.cityofphiladelphia.wordpress.com/2012/01/13/ban-the-box-ordinance-goes-
into-effect/. 
 130. See, e.g., ‘Ban the Box’ Bill Signed Into Law in Philadelphia, supra note 127. The legislative 
findings section of the ordinance itself mentions the disparate impact issue, but primarily emphasizes 
the high rate of criminal convictions in Pennsylvania, the even higher rate in Philadelphia, and the 
problem that “[p]ersons with criminal records suffer from pervasive discrimination in many areas of 
life—employment, housing, education, and eligibility for many forms of social benefits.” PHILA., PA., 
CODE tit. 9, ch. 9-3500, § 9-3501(1) (2014). The ordinance notes that “[i]t is estimated that 
approximately one-fifth of Philadelphia’s population has some type of Criminal Record.” Id. § 9-
3501(1)(b). 
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that neither racial minorities nor the poor are making it through. This is 
part of the argument that Lani Gunier and Gerald Torres advance in their 
important book The Miner’s Canary.131 Structural problems often affect 
the opportunities of both racial minorities and others. Where this is the 
case, identifying the forces that cause the exclusion of racial minorities 
often illuminates broader pathologies that affect others as well. For 
instance, if many employers refuse on a blanket basis to hire anyone with 
a past criminal conviction, the effects may be especially keenly felt in 
certain minority communities, such as the black community in 
Philadelphia. This concentrated effect concentrates the mind. It gives 
advocates like Benjamin Jealous a reason to engage with this issue and 
press for reforms such as ban the box. But ultimately, most of the reasons 
why we ought not to exclude those with past criminal convictions from all 
legitimate employment are not race-specific reasons. They apply more 
broadly.  
From the point of view of the anti-bottleneck principle, the race-based 
and race-neutral approaches to analyzing these bottlenecks are deeply 
complementary. Part but not all of why we ought to care about the 
exclusion of people with past criminal convictions is that this has the 
effect of making even more pervasive the bottlenecks constraining the 
opportunities of people from poor, minority communities where various 
other constraints already make it quite difficult to find jobs. Each of these 
modes of analysis can inform and deepen the other. On the one hand, a 
race-neutral analysis of the past-criminal-conviction bottleneck can help us 
understand the dynamics that play out in concentrated form in some 
minority communities. On the other hand, race-based analysis can, like the 
miner’s canary, help to illuminate a bottleneck in the opportunity structure 
that we might otherwise have ignored. 
Because so much of the modern law of antidiscrimination and equal 
protection focuses on race (and other protected categories), many students 
of antidiscrimination law reading this Article today will undoubtedly find 
the race-based disparate impact analysis more familiar and perhaps more 
appealing, as an analytic approach to phenomena like the past-criminal-
conviction bottleneck. But this is not the only way to look at it. Both state 
legislators and, as we will see, the EEOC itself, also view such phenomena 
as bottlenecks on their own terms. It is worth taking this latter set of 
arguments seriously, in part because they have become the central public 
 
 
 131. See LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING 
POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY (2002). 
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justification for many new laws. These arguments frame the project of 
antidiscrimination law itself in a new way, framing such concepts as 
discrimination and merit in terms of bottlenecks. 
D. Ban the Box as Antidiscrimination Law 
Many proponents of ban the box use the word “discrimination” to 
describe employers’ refusal to hire people with criminal convictions. The 
Philadelphia ordinance uses the word this way: to mean “discrimination” 
not in any disparate impact sense, but simply discrimination against 
people with criminal convictions.
132
 This use of the term “discrimination” 
often goes along with a claim that when employers discriminate against 
people with criminal convictions, they judge them on something other than 
“merit.” The Philadelphia ordinance, for instance, states: “This legislation 
is intended to give the individual with a criminal record an opportunity to 
be judged on his or her own merit during the submission of the application 
. . . .”133 It is worth unpacking what “discrimination” and “merit” mean 
here, and what it would mean to say that a past felony conviction is not 
part of “merit.” After all, one can imagine an employer viewing a clean 
record (i.e., a lack of past criminal convictions) as an indicator of merit. 
On one view, merit means predicted future performance in the job 
(including possible future misconduct). On this view, merit is an empirical 
fact about the world. The claim that refusing to hire based on a past felony 
conviction is not “merit” but “discrimination” is then essentially an 
empirical claim: a claim that a past felony conviction, like a spotty credit 
history (in the view of advocates of the credit check bans discussed 
above), is an ineffective predictor of future performance or misconduct 
and thus an empirically inaccurate measure of merit.  
This empirical point seems debatable. The case that past criminal 
convictions have some predictive value under a variety of circumstances 
seems intuitively likely to be stronger than the parallel claims on behalf of 
the predictive value of either unemployment status or credit score. 
Intuitions may mislead, however. Social science data suggests that after 
some number of years, ex-offenders are actually no more likely to be 
arrested for a crime than are members of the general public; the evidence 
 
 
 132. PHILA., PA., CODE tit. 9, ch. 9-3500, § 9-3501(1)(a) (2014) (“Persons with criminal records 
suffer from pervasive discrimination in many areas of life—employment, housing, education, and 
eligibility for many forms of social benefits . . . .”); see also, e.g., S.F. Res., supra note 94 (“[A]t least 
13 million people nationwide experience lifelong discrimination because of past felony convictions 
. . . .”). 
 133. PHILA., PA., CODE tit. 9, ch. 9-3500, § 9-3501(1)(k) (emphasis added).  
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that they will perform worse on the job, even many years later, is even 
more speculative and uncertain.
134
 
But one might instead take a different view of what both “merit” and 
“discrimination” mean here. Perhaps proponents of ban the box 
understand the word “merit” in a functional way that embeds certain legal 
or normative judgments: merit is the set of legally legitimate criteria that 
employers use in deciding whom to hire.
135
 “Discrimination,” on this view, 
is not the use of criteria that lack performance-predictive power. Rather, 
discrimination is the use of criteria that society has decided, for reasons of 
public policy, to make illicit—whatever their performance-predictive 
power or lack thereof. On this second view, society can decide to prohibit 
discrimination against people with criminal convictions—perhaps for 
reasons of public policy related to the public goods obtained by re-
integrating them into the world of employment—just as society can decide 
to prohibit discrimination on the basis of race. In doing so, society is using 
law to remove past felony convictions from the basket of factors that count 
as “merit,” factors such as qualifications and work experience, and placing 
past felony convictions instead into the “discrimination” basket, with 
characteristics like race or sex. The judgment here is not empirical, but 
normative or legal. 
This second way of defining “merit” and “discrimination”—one that 
embeds certain legal or normative judgments in these concepts—better 
comports with the well-established law of disparate treatment. Disparate 
treatment based on characteristics such as race and sex is prohibited even 
when it is rational statistical discrimination—that is, even when those 
characteristics have performance-predictive value. It may be rational, in 
such cases, but we still prohibit it.
136
 And we still call it “discrimination.” 
We have decided as a matter of public policy that (some exceptional 
situations aside) such characteristics as race and sex are not “merit” even 
when they do have performance-predictive value.  
For instance, in a sufficiently racist town, it may be overwhelmingly 
clear to a retailer that minority clerks will sell a lower volume of goods 
than white clerks, so that the profit-maximizing strategy is to hire white 
ones. If “merit” simply means predicted performance and nothing more—
 
 
 134. See Blumstein & Nakamura, supra note 108, at 350. The amount of time is the subject of 
some debate; it appears longer for violent offenses than for property crimes. Id. But the probability of 
re-arrest is at best only a remote proxy for the probability of workplace misconduct. 
 135. A variant of this view would define merit in terms of the employer’s normatively legitimate 
criteria. 
 136. For a helpful discussion, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” 
Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 849–59 (2003). 
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and to keep it simple, performance simply means sales volume—then 
refusing to hire minority clerks under these circumstances would be the 
meritocratic choice.
137
 However, we have decided as a matter of public 
policy that regardless of performance prediction, race is not “merit,” and 
refusing to hire minority clerks in this situation is wrongful 
“discrimination.” Moreover, we have decided that this decision is not up to 
employers. Our law embodies a public decision to make an exception to 
the usual presumption in American law that employers have the discretion 
to decide for themselves, rationally or not, what counts as “merit.” We 
make that exception in the name of providing an “equal opportunity” to 
all. 
Invoking the idea of equal opportunity here does not begin to untangle 
the question with which this Article began: when should the law restrain 
employers’ discretion to define merit in terms of any criteria they wish? 
One answer that emerges from the new laws discussed in this Part, 
regarding credit history, unemployment, and past criminal convictions, is 
this. Society ought to restrain employers’ discretion where employers’ 
exercise of that discretion creates a severe bottleneck in the opportunity 
structure—even more so where that severe bottleneck also affects a large 
number of people. Our analysis of severity here ought not to be limited to 
the employment sphere. The most pervasive bottlenecks of all affect 
“many areas of life—employment, housing, education,”138 and so on, 
making the case especially strong for altering employer practices that 
reinforce such bottlenecks. 
Ban the box illustrates how far this anti-bottleneck principle can take 
us from the usual frameworks through which we think about 
 
 
 137. In this familiar example, where I have specified that sales volume is affected by 
discriminatory customer preferences, one might object that “performance” itself is shot through with 
discrimination because race is functioning as what philosophers call a “reaction qualification.” See 
generally Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Reaction Qualifications Revisited, 35 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 
413 (2009). But the apparently special case of reaction qualifications is not as special as it seems: it is 
actually quite similar to other cases of (micro-economically) rational statistical discrimination. 
Suppose an employer believes that members of a particular racial group, on average, went to worse 
schools, and therefore predicts lower job performance and for that reason prefers not to hire members 
of this group. Suppose such a prediction were statistically accurate. Even so, most of us would not 
conclude that membership in some other, more favored racial group is therefore a form of “merit,” 
even though such membership might statistically predict performance. The reason is that we exclude 
race from “merit” on independent legal or normative grounds—regardless of any predictive power it 
might have. See Bagenstos, supra note 136, at 857–59 (discussing arguments for legal prohibitions on 
rational statistical discrimination); id. at 882–83, 894–96, & 900–01 (offering good reasons to doubt 
that discrimination rooted in customer or co-worker preference is so different from rational statistical 
discrimination by employers generally). 
 138. PHILA., PA., CODE tit. 9, ch. 9-3500, § 9-3501(1)(a) (2014). 
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antidiscrimination and equal opportunity. When someone has been 
convicted of a crime, they have by definition been judged by a public 
process to be responsible for their crime. Therefore, from one perspective, 
people with past criminal convictions are among the least plausible 
candidates one can imagine for the protections of antidiscrimination law. 
Far from being a discrete and insular minority, or the sort of group that 
would be likely to receive heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection 
Clause, here is a group that individuals joined of their own accord (or so 
courts adjudged, case by case)—a set of individuals each of whom we 
have determined is at least sufficiently culpable that the law ought to 
punish them. From the point of view of some theories of equal 
opportunity, these people had opportunities, and squandered them; they 
hardly deserve more opportunities now in the name of equal opportunity. 
To be sure, the story of criminal responsibility in the prior paragraph is 
oversimplified and contested. Some people commit crimes in part because 
their other opportunities were very limited, perhaps for structural reasons 
that are not hard to identify. But one need not endorse any such critical 
perspectives on criminal responsibility, and one need not make any claims 
at all about desert, to appreciate the simpler point that it may produce bad 
social consequences to shut those with past criminal convictions out of all 
job opportunities. When employers refuse to hire people with criminal 
convictions, they tend to make this bottleneck more severe. When 
employers instead are open to hiring them, this ameliorates the bottleneck, 
which creates a variety of positive externalities in terms of the overall 
reintegration of formerly incarcerated people into society. For many 
American jurisdictions, that is enough to justify legislation at least 
nudging, if not pushing, employers to make such choices. There is no need 
for claims about desert or about whose opportunities were “equal” to 
whose. 
In a small number of cases, both federal and state courts have moved in 
parallel to legislative efforts to ban the box, striking down as 
unconstitutional state statutes that require discrimination against some sets 
of individuals with past criminal convictions.
139
 These unusual cases are 
 
 
 139. These decisions have relied on the federal Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause and state 
constitutions’ equal protection and due process clauses. See, e.g., Miller v. Carter, 547 F.2d 1314 (7th 
Cir. 1977), aff’d by an equally divided Court, Carter v. Miller, 434 U.S. 356 (1978) (striking down 
under the Equal Protection Clause a Chicago ordinance that prevented people with certain offenses 
from obtaining a public chauffeur’s license); Kindem v. City of Alameda, 502 F. Supp. 1108 (N.D. 
Cal. 1980) (same, ordinance regarding municipal employment of people with criminal convictions); 
Furst v. N.Y.C Transit Auth., 631 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (same as Kindem, but transit 
authority policy); Nixon v. Commonwealth, 839 A.2d 277 (Pa. 2003) (striking down on state 
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interesting for a number of reasons. They universally purport to apply 
rational basis review: constitutional doctrine holds that the right to work is 
not a fundamental right, and that people with criminal convictions are not 
a suspect class. However, often immediately after announcing this 
standard of review, which ordinarily is very deferential, each of these 
courts then applies it with real “bite.” Some of the courts frame the 
problem in terms of overbreadth or a lack of “tailoring”: a broad, across-
the-board statutory ban is unconstitutional, whereas a more narrowly 
tailored ban would be constitutional if it linked specific categories of 
criminal conviction to specific jobs for which they are relevant.
140
 In other 
words, these unusual constitutional cases invalidating laws that require 
across-the-board bans press legislatures to draw tighter connections 
between specific crimes and specific jobs. This has the effect of making 
the bottleneck less severe. The courts deciding these cases cannot agree on 
a constitutional rationale. Some of the cases are equal protection, others 
due process; none purports to find either a fundamental right or a suspect 
class. Instead, the courts deciding these cases appear to be demanding 
something more than minimally rational tailoring or fit on grounds that 
amount to the same anti-bottleneck arguments this Part has explored: 
arguments that broad, across-the-board restrictions on those with criminal 
backgrounds limit people’s opportunities too severely.141 
The anti-bottleneck principle also diverges in another way from our 
usual ways of conceptualizing the project of antidiscrimination and equal 
opportunity. Most of the discussion of ban the box statutes above would 
have applied without revision to state statutes actually barring employers 
 
 
constitutional grounds a statute barring those convicted of certain crimes from working with older 
adults); Doe v. Saenz, 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 126 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (striking down on federal equal 
protection grounds a statute barring those convicted of any crime except a minor traffic offense from 
working in licensed community care facilities for the elderly, foster children, the disabled, etc.); 
Johnson v. Allegheny Intermediate Unit, 59 A.3d 10 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012) (striking down on state 
due process grounds a ban on employing those convicted of homicide). For an excellent overview of 
these cases, see Miriam J. Auckerman, The Somewhat Suspect Class: Towards a Constitutional 
Framework for Evaluating Occupational Restrictions Affecting People with Criminal Records, 7 J. L. 
SOC’Y 18 (2005).  
 140. See, e.g., Kindem, 502 F. Supp. at 1112. 
 141. It seems non-coincidental that these cases fall almost entirely during the same two periods—
first, the mid-1970s through the 1980s, and second, the past decade or so—in which states also enacted 
statutory protections for those with criminal convictions. These are also the two critical periods for 
disparate impact challenges to criminal convictions under Title VII. The EEOC’s guidelines on the 
subject, see supra notes 118–20 and accompanying text, are from 1987 and 1990 (largely codifying 
Green v. Missouri Pacific Railroad, 549 F.2d 1158 (8th Cir. 1977)); the agency updated those 
guidelines in 2012 and initiated high-profile enforcement actions in 2013. These were two periods in 
which it was becoming increasingly apparent that past criminal convictions might amount to a severe 
bottleneck limiting the opportunities of large numbers of people. 
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from discriminating on the basis of past criminal convictions (as some 
states indeed do
142
). Ban the box does not do this. It is a different, subtler 
intervention, more of a nudge than a shove. Ban the box does not touch the 
ultimate conception of merit that employers may use in deciding whom to 
hire. Instead it constrains something else: the rougher conception of merit 
that is operative in the initial application screening phase. 
Employers have reason to use different conceptions of merit at many 
points in the hiring process. To decide where or how to advertise a job 
requires some very rough conception of what counts as merit for that job. 
Processing the initial application forms requires some rough conception of 
merit as well. Some employers decide that at that early stage, it is best to 
simply put all applications with the box checked in the discard pile. That is 
what ban the box prohibits—while continuing to allow employers at the 
final, decisive stage to do as they wish. 
From many of the usual perspectives through which we understand 
antidiscrimination law, this approach seems bizarre. It would be like 
prohibiting sex-segregated help-wanted ads, but nonetheless allowing 
employers to discriminate in their final decisions on the basis of sex. If we 
understand antidiscrimination law in terms of the stigmatic, demeaning 
harm of discrimination, or in terms of the subordination of groups, or for 
that matter in terms of the inherent wrongfulness of certain types of 
classification, there is precious little reason to choose an approach that 
prohibits discrimination in the initial application form yet allows it in the 
final decision. 
The anti-bottleneck principle begins from a different starting point—
one from which this approach could actually make sense. Past criminal 
convictions are a severe bottleneck in part because employers simply do 
not want to hire those with past criminal convictions, but also in part for a 
different and subtler reason: employers are throwing out the applications 
of even some people they would ultimately decide to hire, all things 
considered. It might seem irrational for employers to decide to throw out 
the applications of individuals they would ultimately decide to hire. But 
this is not necessarily the case. The rough conception of merit operative at 
the initial application stage is never as nuanced as the one in the final 
evaluation; at the first cut, a simple “no convictions” rubric may well be 
the micro-efficient choice. Here again, micro-efficiency and meritocracy 
diverge. Ban the box requires employers to pay for a more meritocratic 
 
 
 142. See supra note 115. 
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hiring strategy than some might otherwise choose, perhaps more 
meritocratic than micro-efficiency can justify. 
Ban the box thus imposes some definite costs on employers, but not the 
costs one might expect. The costs are mainly search costs, the time and 
effort involved in interviewing applicants. Whether or not a jurisdiction 
wishes to impose the (potentially greater) costs on employers of an 
antidiscrimination regime that actually protects against discrimination on 
the basis of criminal conviction, the limited step of banning the box does 
useful work by itself in making a pervasive bottleneck that much less 
severe. 
III. THE ANTI-BOTTLENECK PRINCIPLE 
A common thread runs through the arguments that led state legislators 
to enact all three of these sets of novel employment discrimination 
statutes. In each case, legislators saw that some variable about a person—
good credit, currently being employed, a clean criminal record—was 
playing (or might soon play) an outsized role in many employers’ hiring 
decisions, to the point that those without the requisite qualification might 
face sharply constrained employment opportunities. In each case, there 
were colorable arguments of varying degrees of plausibility that these 
variables might be performance-predictive, although in each case 
legislators were skeptical of those arguments. In each case, legislators 
judged that there were good policy reasons to activate the machinery of 
antidiscrimination law to restrict substantially—but not eliminate 
entirely—employers’ discretion to use each of these facts about a person 
in allocating opportunities. 
Do these reasons add up to a general principle? This Part will argue 
that they do. The argument up to this point has repeatedly invoked the 
anti-bottleneck principle but has not really explained it. This Part gives an 
account of the principle and suggests that we can see it in action not only 
in legislative enactments, but also in some aspects of the ways courts and 
the EEOC reason about how best to interpret Title VII. 
This Part thus marks a major turn in the argument, from recent history 
to theory. The project of this Part is not to reconstruct, as a positive matter, 
what one or another legislator may have had in mind when enacting any of 
the new laws discussed in Part I. Rather, the objective here is to build as 
normatively compelling an account as possible of a general principle—the 
principle that I call the anti-bottleneck principle—that can explain and 
justify not only these recent enactments, but also, as the remainder of this 
Article will argue, much of antidiscrimination law.  
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A. The Anti-Bottleneck Principle and the Opportunity Structure 
First, a word about what the anti-bottleneck principle is not. It is not a 
principle about individual desert. Nor is it a principle about group-based 
justice. Instead the anti-bottleneck principle is structural: its object is the 
way a society structures and organizes the many different kinds of 
opportunities it offers. 
We can visualize the numerous opportunities available in any society 
as being arranged in an opportunity structure: a lattice of forking and 
intersecting paths through which individuals pursue different jobs and 
careers, different goods such as money and prestige, and ultimately, 
different lives, involving different combinations of forms of human 
flourishing. The opportunity structure encompasses the world of education 
and training as well as the world of work; it begins with the developmental 
opportunities available to children growing up in different environments 
and extends upward through all the roles in society, including but not 
limited to jobs, that one might hold as an adult. Individuals must navigate 
this structure to reach whatever goals they may have. 
In any real society, different parts of this opportunity structure are 
organized in different ways. Perhaps the only paths to high elective office 
involve intensely competitive, zero-sum electoral competitions, structured 
in a pyramidal way. A few exceptionally competitive professional career 
paths may work similarly. Other paths will not have this shape. For 
instance, the paths that lead to the role of parent depend on various social 
norms and legal constraints concerning procreation and adoption; these 
paths do not generally involve any zero-sum competitions for fixed 
numbers of scarce opportunities. 
Although there is great variation and complexity within societies, the 
overall shape of the opportunity structure also varies from one society to 
another. Indeed the shape of the opportunity structure is a highly 
consequential, if rarely noticed, fact about any society. Some societies 
organize more of the paths worth pursuing in a way that involves zero-
sum, high-stakes competitions. At one extreme, imagine a society in which 
a single variable—say, one’s score on a standardized test, administered at 
age eighteen—is completely determinative of one’s future life 
prospects.
143
 Unless one scores well on this test, the vast majority of paths 
 
 
 143. This example borrows from and adapts the “warrior society” in Bernard Williams’ classic 
essay, “The Idea of Equality.” See Bernard Williams, The Idea of Equality, in 2 PHILOSOPHY, 
POLITICS AND SOCIETY 110, 126 (Peter Laslett & W. G. Runciman eds., 1962). For a fuller discussion, 
see FISHKIN, supra note 7, at 11–13. 
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in the employment sphere are forever closed. The test in this “big test 
society” is a very extreme example of a bottleneck: a narrow place through 
which people must pass in order to reach many opportunities that fan out 
on the other side.  
There are many questions we might ask about fairness and desert in 
who passes and who fails the big test. However, the anti-bottleneck 
principle is not primarily about those questions. Instead, the anti-
bottleneck principle draws our attention first to a different, and in some 
sense prior, structural question: why is the test so “big” in the first place? 
Why do so many of the paths in this opportunity structure require going 
through this bottleneck—and must they? Another society might organize 
opportunities differently: while a few corners of the opportunity structure 
might turn on a zero-sum test, by and large, a variety of paths lead to most 
of the valued careers and roles in life, and people can embark on the 
preliminary steps on those paths at different moments in life. Opportunity 
structures of this sort are more pluralistic, in the sense that they offer 
people at different points in life a richer plurality of opportunities they 
might pursue. 
Societies also vary along a closely related dimension: in all societies, 
some characteristics such as race, gender, class, physical appearance, or 
the geography of where one grew up affect which opportunities are open 
to any given person, for reasons both direct and indirect. These 
characteristics, then, act as bottlenecks: society is narrowing opportunities 
by channeling people into particular sets of life paths deemed appropriate 
for people like them. At the extreme, we might imagine a society that 
separated people into hereditary “priest” and “warrior” castes, where 
members of the two castes have separate, non-overlapping sets of 
opportunities.
144
 Caste membership, in that society, amounts to an 
extremely powerful bottleneck: an absolute prerequisite for pursuing any 
opportunity is membership in the correct caste. Similarly, in a society 
where pursuing one set of opportunities requires being a man, and 
pursuing another set of opportunities requires being a woman, gender is 
functioning as a powerful bottleneck. One must be the “right” gender—or, 
in a less extreme case, it helps a lot to be the “right” gender—to pursue 
many paths. The severity of such bottlenecks is a matter of degree. In a 
relatively more pluralistic opportunity structure, the bottlenecks are less 
 
 
 144. See Mary Anne Case, “The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns”: Constitutional Sex 
Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1476 (2000) (inventing 
this useful analogy for sex discrimination).  
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severe, with the consequence that people will generally have before them a 
broader plurality of paths they could pursue. 
Most ways of thinking about equal opportunity treat the types of cases 
in the previous two paragraphs quite differently. The effects of caste or sex 
on opportunity seem unfair in part because these variables are unchosen 
demographic facts about a person, whereas a test might instead reflect 
efforts for which we are responsible.
145
 Equalizing opportunity, on most 
conventional views, is about giving everyone the same chance, regardless 
of unchosen demographic factors, to take the test. If the test is fair, then 
those who fail had their fair opportunity. Similarly, those convicted of 
crimes might be viewed as having failed a certain sort of test society puts 
to all its members. When we speak of equal opportunity we typically are 
speaking about a fair first chance for everyone, not a second chance for 
those who squandered their first. 
And yet, something important is missing from this typical way of 
framing equal opportunity. To make this illustration as stark as possible, 
let us imagine that the “big test” is perfectly fair, and furthermore, that 
those who fail do so entirely because of their own choices not to study 
hard enough, choices for which (let us suppose) they were entirely 
responsible. Even in that case, we might ask: is shutting these people out 
of pursuing any further career opportunities really the best we can do? Is 
there no normative reason we might want to give people another chance—
in the form of a training program, a community college program, an entry-
level opportunity in some new field—some path whereby they can find 
their way out of the dispiriting cul-de-sac in the opportunity structure in 
which they find themselves stuck? 
Opening up such additional paths makes a society’s opportunity 
structure more pluralistic, in the sense that no single test or other single 
factor has quite so outsized an effect on a person’s prospects. In a more 
pluralistic opportunity structure, different gatekeepers impose different 
requirements; the most important gatekeepers offer multiple points of 
entry. From any position in a more pluralistic opportunity structure, even 
those positions that seem rather bleak, the first steps along a variety of 
paths remain open. As the statutes in Part I suggest, this idea applies not 
only to those who may have lost their job or ruined their credit, but even to 
those who have committed a felony and served time in prison. The 
principle here is not about judgments of responsibility or desert. It is a 
 
 
 145. However, teasing out the part of anyone’s performance that is chosen from the part that is 
unchosen is an impossible task, in practice and even in ideal theory. See FISHKIN, supra note 7, at 56–
65. 
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structural principle about the ways opportunities are organized and the 
paths that lead from one to another. 
B. The Relative Severity of Bottlenecks 
In any real society, even a relatively pluralistic one, some requirements 
will loom large, across many jobs and other fields of endeavor. This is 
another way of saying bottlenecks are inevitable. For instance, in most 
societies, including our own, speaking the dominant language is helpful 
for almost every job and essential for many. In that sense, speaking 
English is a bottleneck in our society, a criterion individuals must satisfy if 
they hope to proceed along a wide range of paths that lead to most jobs. 
Not only do many jobs themselves require English, but many of the prior 
steps that lead to jobs—educational credentials, other roles and jobs that 
provide the necessary experience, and so forth—require English 
proficiency as well. Moreover, the ability to speak and understand the 
dominant language is relevant far beyond employment. But both within 
the employment sphere and outside it, public policy choices and 
antidiscrimination laws, as well as the decisions of numerous private 
actors, will affect just how severe this bottleneck will turn out to be. 
We can measure the severity of a bottleneck along two dimensions. 
First, strictness: is this requirement absolute, or is it merely a “plus”? 
Second, pervasiveness: how widespread is the requirement, in terms of the 
proportion of all paths that lead to desired jobs and other roles, and 
ultimately, to flourishing lives? For our purposes here, we can use as a 
rough measure of pervasiveness the proportion of all jobs that one must 
pass through this bottleneck in order to reach.
146
 These variables together 
define the severity of a bottleneck. Aside from severity, we also ought to 
consider how many people will actually be affected by a given bottleneck, 
and to what degree. People may be affected by a bottleneck either because 
they will be unable to pass through, or because their efforts to pass 
through will reshape their lives and their other choices in some important 
way. 
As the example of English proficiency underscores, bottlenecks are an 
inevitable feature of any opportunity structure. But many choices by firms, 
 
 
 146. A fuller analysis of pervasiveness would require a further step. We ought to ask what 
proportion of all paths that lead to (different dimensions of) flourishing lives require a person to pass 
through this bottleneck. In this analysis, jobs are not all that matters; some roles in the family or 
community may be as or more important. Moreover, some jobs may be so awful that they count for 
little. 
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institutions, and governments can shift the opportunity structure in a more 
unitary or more pluralistic direction, by altering the severity of key 
bottlenecks.
147
 In particular, where a bottleneck is severe, such as this 
English proficiency bottleneck, two strategies can help ameliorate it: 
(a) creating more paths that enable individuals to pass through the 
bottleneck (here, opportunities to learn English) and (b) creating more 
paths around the bottleneck (here, jobs that do not require English). The 
ideal balance between these two strategies will shift depending on their 
feasibility and tradeoffs with other goals.  
These two strategies, and the anti-bottleneck principle itself, are 
addressed not only to governments and policymakers, but to all institutions 
whose choices affect the shape of the opportunity structure. The question 
of the appropriateness of legal intervention to ameliorate bottlenecks is a 
function of both the bottleneck’s severity and some additional questions: 
how effective the law will be in ameliorating it, and what other costs that 
intervention will impose. 
Many of the most vivid illustrations of the anti-bottleneck principle 
come from the world of disability. To take the most obvious example, 
imagine a world in which most buildings are physically inaccessible to 
those in wheelchairs. A vast range of paths in the employment sphere and 
in other spheres of human social life are then inaccessible—literally 
physically inaccessible—as well. In that situation, the configuration of 
physical space becomes a severe bottleneck, limiting the opportunities of 
people whose mode of locomotion the built environment does not support. 
This bottleneck is quite strict because in order to work at a job—and to do 
other things, such as testify in a courtroom—one definitely needs to be 
able to enter the building. It is pervasive because here we are talking about 
not just one obscure building that is inaccessible, but large numbers of 
important buildings. Thus, this bottleneck is sufficiently severe to justify a 
robust response—even if the number of people affected were not 
especially large. Moreover, this is a bottleneck that the law is well 
positioned to ameliorate. 
The appeal of the anti-bottleneck principle—the appeal of moving 
toward a more pluralistic opportunity structure—comes from the idea that 
people are better off when they have access to a greater range of paths 
around which they can build a life. The argument here is not about why a 
person ended up stuck, unable to get through a bottleneck. Consider the 
 
 
 147. Bottlenecks are not the only aspect of a society’s opportunity structure that makes it more 
unitary or more pluralistic, but they are enough for our discussion here. For a more detailed discussion, 
see FISHKIN, supra note 7, ch. III. 
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“big test” once more. It may be that someone cannot pass the big test 
because she was born poor, or it may be that she failed for reasons that are 
entirely her own fault. In reality, it is usually impossible to disentangle the 
threads of causation in any case, so it is problematic to build theories that 
depend heavily on such disentangling.
148
 Instead of asking questions about 
responsibility and desert, the anti-bottleneck principle focuses on the 
shape of the opportunity structure. Regardless of why people may be 
unable to get through a severe bottleneck, the anti-bottleneck principle 
holds that it would be good to create some opportunities for them to get 
through or around it. When an individual has made an early exit from the 
highways of opportunity, even if this was entirely her own fault, the anti-
bottleneck principle suggests that we ought to leave some onramps that 
would give her a path back on. 
A more traditional egalitarian approach to the problem of those who 
have made their exit from the highways of opportunity would be to 
redistribute resources to them, especially to those who are the worst off. 
This is obviously helpful. But individuals who are frozen out of most 
opportunities—whether because they use wheelchairs, because they failed 
the big test back when they were eighteen, or because they do not speak 
English—ought to be able to obtain something other than redistributed 
resources. They have good reason to seek opportunities to, in John Rawls’ 
formulation, “experienc[e] the realization of self” that comes from 
developing one’s capacities and exercising them in the “skillful and 
devoted exercise of social duties”; this is “one of the main forms of human 
good.”149 Such a realization of self requires more than resources: it 
requires opportunities to be structured in such a way that one has paths one 
can pursue. The anti-bottleneck principle aims to provide this. 
The anti-bottleneck principle is not a flat prohibition on bottlenecks. 
(That would be impossible in any event.) It is principle that holds that we 
ought to make the opportunity structure more pluralistic. This principle 
must be balanced against competing considerations, and sometimes it is 
outweighed. In the case of any given bottleneck, we might think about 
those competing considerations in terms of what good, if any, the 
bottleneck is doing. Specifically, from this perspective, we might conclude 
that some bottlenecks are more legitimate, in the sense that they serve 
 
 
 148. See Samuel Scheffler, What is Egalitarianism?, 31 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 5, 21 (2003) 
(discussing the impossibility of “disentangling the respective contributions made by her will, on the 
one hand, and by unchosen features of her talents and personal circumstances, on the other”). 
 149. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 73 (Rev. ed. 1999); see also id. at 374 (explaining the 
“Aristotelian Principle” that human beings “enjoy the exercise of their realized capacities”). 
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legitimate goals, while other bottlenecks are more arbitrary. Conceptually, 
just as we can arrange bottlenecks along a spectrum of severity, we might 
also arrange them along an axis from legitimate to arbitrary:
150
 
CLASSIFYING BOTTLENECKS 
Severe (Pervasive and Strict) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legitimate  Arbitrary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mild 
In the hiring context, if our bottleneck is a requirement imposed by an 
employer, we can think of the legitimacy-versus-arbitrariness axis, to a 
first approximation, as essentially a meritocratic performance prediction. 
That is, if an employer requires employees to pass a particular test, or 
obtain a particular qualification, in order to be hired, we might ask: does 
this actually predict who will better perform the job? The more it does, the 
more legitimate the bottleneck.
151
 
The anti-bottleneck principle generally aims to push bottlenecks 
downward and leftward on the above chart. The case for ameliorating a 
 
 
 150. This chart is a simplification in that “severe” is really a combination of two variables: 
pervasive and strict. 
 151. This simple definition leaves some deeper questions unresolved. Performance—and in turn, 
predicted performance—depends on many variables. For instance, perhaps a job candidate could 
perform very well if equipped with an assistive device that the employer presently does not provide. 
The legitimacy-versus-arbitrariness scale can be applied in different ways to this problem, yielding 
different conclusions. For a fuller discussion of some of the considerations involved in balancing the 
anti-bottleneck principle against other goals, see FISHKIN, supra note 7, ch. III. 
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bottleneck is strongest when that bottleneck is as far as possible toward the 
upper-right corner (severe and arbitrary). Here, a wide range of employers 
are imposing a requirement that has little performance-predictive value. 
Opponents of the use of credit checks in hiring are essentially arguing that 
credit checks fall squarely in the upper right quadrant, and that the law can 
do something about the pervasiveness of this bottleneck, so it should. 
But the anti-bottleneck principle also has force in the upper left and 
lower right quadrants. In the upper left, a bottleneck is relatively severe 
but also relatively legitimate. Consider the English-speaking example 
above. Let us suppose for purposes of argument that there are many jobs 
for which speaking English is a necessary prerequisite, and that for some 
but not all of those jobs, there is no good alternative to setting up 
workplaces in that way. In that case, the solution is not for the law to force 
employers to hire non-English speakers for jobs that legitimately must 
require English. Rather, the solution is twofold. First, firms, organizations, 
and governments ought to provide more opportunities for people to learn 
English. Public policy can further this goal. Second, employers who are 
requiring English for jobs where it is relatively less important, or not 
important at all, ought to consider removing this requirement.
152
 Each 
employer that does so helps shift the bottleneck incrementally downward 
and to the left—downward because the requirement is now slightly less 
pervasive, and therefore less severe, and leftward because the pool of jobs 
that continue to require English is now that much more dominated by 
situations where the requirement is (more) legitimate. 
Finally, it is important to view bottlenecks as situated within the 
opportunity structure as a whole. Imagine an economy in which different 
employers’ business practices and requirements have the collective effect 
of making it difficult for women to pursue most employment. Suppose 
some employers engage in disparate treatment against women, while 
others impose various facially neutral requirements that have a disparate 
impact on women. Of the latter group, suppose a small handful of 
employers impose some height requirements, which far more men than 
women satisfy. 
Viewed in isolation, these height requirements are not severe. Only a 
handful of employers impose them. People who are short, who cannot pass 
 
 
 152. This second strategy raises the potential objection that it may be exactly the bleakness of 
opportunities for non-English speakers that creates the incentive to learn English. However, there are 
reasons to be skeptical of paternalistic arguments for limiting opportunity in a world in which the 
incentives to get through severe bottlenecks, such as this English proficiency bottleneck, are already 
strong. See FISHKIN, supra note 7, at 172–73, 183–86. 
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through this bottleneck, are not missing out on much; only a few paths are 
closed to them. However, this bottleneck, although non-severe on its own 
terms, also contributes to a much larger gender bottleneck, in the 
following sense: in order to pursue most paths in the world of employment 
in the economy we are imagining, it helps—directly or indirectly—to be 
male. If we want to do something about this larger gender bottleneck in 
the opportunity structure, one part of our response might be the tools of 
antidiscrimination law. Disparate treatment law will impose liability on 
employers who hire men instead of women. Disparate impact law goes 
further, taking aim at some facially neutral practices such as the height 
requirements just discussed, because of their connection to the larger 
gender bottleneck in the opportunity structure. 
In both cases, the purpose and effect of these legal interventions is to 
push the overall gender bottleneck downward and to the left on the chart. 
Disparate treatment law reduces the total amount of disparate treatment, 
pressing downward (less pervasive, therefore less severe); and pressing 
leftward because a slightly higher proportion of what remains will be 
relatively legitimate (i.e., those rare cases in which sex is a BFOQ). 
Disparate impact law has exactly the same effect. Consider our height 
requirement example. As a result of the intervention of disparate impact 
law, height requirements will be imposed by fewer employers, pushing 
downward on the chart (less pervasive, therefore less severe). Moreover, 
more of the cases that remain will be cases in which the requirement really 
is legitimate, in the sense that the law has judged the requirement to be 
job-related and consistent with business necessity, a doctrinal test 
(discussed further below) that presses firmly to the left.
153
 Thus, imposing 
disparate impact liability on the height requirement, subject to a business 
necessity/job-relatedness defense, helps render both the height bottleneck 
and the gender bottleneck relatively less severe and relatively more 
legitimate. 
This point about disparate impact law brings us full circle. Part II 
showed that the anti-bottleneck principle has force, in the view of some 
legislators, even outside the usual equal protection-inflected domains of 
race, sex, and similar characteristics. For bottlenecks like credit score, 
unemployment status, and past criminal convictions, new statutes such as 
those discussed in Part II can usefully nudge the opportunity structure in a 
more pluralistic direction either through prohibitions on consideration of 
 
 
 153. For a real-world version of this height example, see infra notes 190–91 and accompanying 
text. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1480 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 91:1429 
 
 
 
 
these factors, or through subtler interventions that operate only at the 
initial application stage. Legislators enacting these cutting-edge laws made 
arguments that we can understand in these terms.  
At the same time, a simple prohibition on disparate treatment may be 
inadequate to the scale and complexity of problems such as the way race 
and sex function as bottlenecks in our opportunity structure. Those major 
demographic variables powerfully affect the paths one may pursue, not 
only in the world of work but also in many other areas of life, for reasons 
both direct and indirect. Legislative responses to these especially severe 
and complex bottlenecks may usefully include more than one form of 
antidiscrimination protection: not only a prohibition on disparate 
treatment, but also disparate impact laws which challenge facially neutral 
practices that contribute to the larger bottleneck. 
My claim is not that the legislators who enacted Title VII and other 
antidiscrimination laws crafted these laws with a general anti-bottleneck 
principle in mind. Those legislators acted for reasons specific to the social 
and historical contexts in which they operated. Congress enacted Title VII 
as part of a broader Civil Rights Act that was a response to the civil rights 
movement and its demands for racial justice. In the employment sphere, 
Congress was responding to the fact that opportunities for African-
Americans in particular were severely limited by discrimination. 
But if we view what Congress was aiming to accomplish at a slightly 
higher level of abstraction, we can understand these aims in terms of the 
anti-bottleneck principle. That is, the idea of intervening in the opportunity 
structure to ameliorate the severe constraints African-Americans faced on 
the opportunities they might pursue is, in a philosophical sense, an 
instance—a particularly powerful instance—of the anti-bottleneck 
principle. Stated in these terms, the case for building modern 
antidiscrimination law in the first place, and overriding employer 
prerogatives over many employment decisions, turned on the 
pervasiveness of employment discrimination against African-Americans in 
particular, as well as the connections between that employment 
discrimination and broader dimensions of the opportunity structure 
(education, housing, etc.) that conspired to constrain black people’s 
opportunities in ways that amounted to an extremely severe bottleneck. 
As the remainder of this Article will discuss, this way of understanding 
the project of antidiscrimination law can help us understand the internal 
logic of a number of aspects of how Title VII and other antidiscrimination 
laws operate in practice and have developed since their enactment. This is 
the case in part because, over time, a number of courts have interpreted 
these antidiscrimination statutes in ways that closely track the anti-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss6/6
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bottleneck principle. Let us begin by considering one example of a case in 
which a court, albeit in a somewhat inchoate way, appeared to make use of 
a version of the anti-bottleneck principle to arrive at what might otherwise 
seem an unlikely interpretation of Title VII. 
C. Situating Bottlenecks in the Opportunity Structure as a Whole: An 
Initial Example 
EEOC v. Consolidated Services Systems
154
 concerned a small, Korean-
owned cleaning company in Chicago that relied exclusively on word-of-
mouth recruiting for its hiring. This recruiting practice resulted, 
predictably, in a workforce that was composed almost exclusively of 
Korean immigrants, a group that made up only three percent of the 
relevant labor market.
155
 The EEOC brought a racial discrimination claim 
under Title VII, alleging that this disparity was intentional. The district 
court dismissed the claim; in an opinion by Judge Richard Posner, the 
Seventh Circuit affirmed.
156
 The court held that this employer had adopted 
word-of-mouth recruiting because it was cheap, not because it liked the 
resulting racial composition of its workforce. Then the opinion took a 
more interesting turn. 
One can imagine a scenario in which, in an ethnically segregated 
society, most or all employers recruited and hired exclusively by word of 
mouth. In that case, everyone outside the dominant ethnic group would be 
entirely frozen out of most employment opportunities. The bottleneck of 
ethnic group membership would be severe. 
Judge Posner saw the situation in Consolidated Services Systems as 
differing quite dramatically from this hypothetical. Neither the overall 
labor market in Chicago, nor this particular segment of it, was dominated 
by Korean-owned firms that tended to freeze out non-Koreans. To the 
contrary, Judge Posner argued, such recent immigrants are themselves 
“frequent targets of discrimination.”157 Far from limiting opportunity, 
small immigrant-owned businesses, which often hire mainly co-ethnics, 
“have been for many immigrant groups, and continue to be, the first rung 
on the ladder of American success.”158  
 
 
 154. EEOC v. Consol. Serv. Sys., 989 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 155. Id. at 235. 
 156. Id. at 238. Because of an earlier Seventh Circuit holding, the EEOC did not attempt to argue 
on appeal that the word-of-mouth recruiting practice had a disparate impact. See EEOC v. Chi. 
Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d 292, 299 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 157. Consol. Serv. Sys., 989 F.2d at 238. 
 158. Id. 
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These claims seem irrelevant to the ostensible ground of Posner’s 
decision, which purported to turn on the efficiency of Consolidated’s 
recruiting practice. From the point of view of efficiency, it ought not to 
matter whether immigrants are targets of discrimination or whether 
businesses of this kind are “the first rung on the ladder of American 
success.” However, these claims make a great deal of sense in terms of the 
anti-bottleneck principle, which Posner seems to be acknowledging in an 
inchoate way. 
Posner is suggesting that even though the word-of-mouth recruiting at 
this one company does indeed create a bottleneck through which, as a 
practical matter, few people other than Korean immigrants can pass, the 
larger opportunity structure is dominated by just the opposite sort of 
bottleneck. In a much wider and more significant range of contexts, he 
suggests, immigrants, including Korean immigrants in particular, have a 
difficult time passing through bottlenecks that constrain the pursuit of 
many paths. Against this backdrop, Consolidated’s practice does not 
reinforce any major bottleneck in the opportunity structure, but instead 
might actually make the opportunity structure more pluralistic. 
It is difficult to assess the truth of Judge Posner’s broad claims about 
the immigrant experience and his implication that small, immigrant-run 
firms providing opportunities mainly to co-ethnics actually improve the 
opportunity structure by helping immigrants overcome the bottlenecks 
they themselves face. These claims are plausible but debatable; at any rate 
they were outside the factual record of the case. They were inevitably 
colored by Judge Posner’s own preconceptions about which groups are the 
real victims of discrimination.
159
 
Employment discrimination litigation focuses, by necessity, on the 
practices of a particular employer. There is usually little evidence of how 
the bottlenecks at issue in the case fit into the overall opportunity 
structure, other than evidence of disparate impact. This problem suggests 
that while the anti-bottleneck principle can usefully play some role in 
judicial decision-making, it is very important for institutions with broader 
fact-finding capabilities—legislatures and agencies such as the EEOC—to 
play the central role in deciding where and how to apply the anti-
 
 
 159. See Ian F. Haney L pez, “A Nation Of Minorities”: Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary 
Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985, 1025–28 (2007) (describing the emergence of the argument 
that in our multi-ethnic “nation of minorities,” new immigrants are themselves the real victims of 
discrimination, and they ought not to bear the burden of remediating the subordination of African-
Americans); id. at 1017–21 (describing Judge Posner’s own early colorblindness arguments, which 
predate the “nation of minorities” argument but are highly compatible with it). 
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bottleneck principle. These legal actors can guide courts toward correct 
judgments about how to situate the facts before them in the context of the 
broader opportunity structure, and specifically, the bottlenecks in that 
structure that are especially severe. 
D. EEOC Enforcement Choices and the Anti-Bottleneck Principle 
And that is just what these legal actors do. It is not a coincidence that at 
the same time that state legislatures have been moving to limit employers’ 
use of hiring criteria involving credit checks, unemployment status, and 
past felony convictions, the EEOC has been moving on all three of those 
same fronts. In each case, because the practices in question have a racial 
disparate impact, the EEOC is on firm statutory ground in choosing to 
examine and regulate them. But numerous practices have a racial disparate 
impact; why focus in particular on these practices? 
At the outset of the EEOC’s meeting to discuss the regulation of credit 
checks, EEOC Chair Jacqueline Berrien answered the question this way.
160
 
“There are several reasons to give special attention to the use of credit 
checks as a screening tool,” she said. “First, at a time when the nation’s 
economic difficulties have spurred an increase in the number of job 
applicants, the use of credit checks in the hiring process has also 
increased,” rising in a decade from thirty-five percent to sixty percent of 
employers. (Berrien here quoted the same SHRM survey data that was 
prominently cited in many state legislative debates and that often appears 
in the preambles of state statutes restricting the use of credit checks.) 
“Second, we are becoming increasingly aware of the practice’s potential 
discriminatory impact on workers and job applicants.” Finally, she 
explained, “[a]s economic hardship spreads and the potential of adverse 
credit history grows, use of credit reports for hiring, promotion or 
retention decisions could adversely affect employment opportunities for a 
wide range of applicants and workers.” Of these reasons, one 
(discriminatory impact) ties the practice back to the EEOC’s statutory 
charge. But all three articulate anti-bottleneck concerns. The SHRM data 
illustrates the pervasiveness of the practice, and therefore the bottleneck’s 
severity; the observation about spreading economic hardship evokes the 
large number of people affected (and is also suggestive of the bottleneck’s 
pervasiveness). 
 
 
 160. Transcript: Meeting of October 20, 2010—Employer Use of Credit History as a Screening 
Tool, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/10-20-10/transcript.cfm (last visited Aug. 21, 2014). 
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These concerns are why credit checks emerged as a natural target for 
EEOC regulation. And on one level, of course that is the way things work. 
The EEOC is hardly going to use its scarce enforcement resources to issue 
regulations about obscure practices that have a disparate impact but that 
are used by only a few small employers and affect only a small number of 
people. But EEOC Chair Berrien is not simply making the point that the 
EEOC should use its resources to address widespread rather than isolated 
Title VII violations. Instead she is explaining that the EEOC is 
scrutinizing credit checks in large part because of the bottleneck they 
create in the opportunity structure as a whole—not exclusively for 
members of a statutorily protected class. She focuses on the “increasing 
number of men and women across the country” who are entering or 
returning to the job market and being subject to credit checks
161—not only 
the individuals who are members of a protected class and might have a 
disparate impact claim. In other words, the EEOC’s interest in credit 
checks is due not only to their substantial disparate impact, but also to the 
fact that they are creating a new, and potentially severe, bottleneck in the 
broader opportunity structure that affects a very large number of 
individuals of all races. Doing something about this bottleneck will 
disproportionately help groups the statute protects. But it will also help 
many other people. 
A persnickety observer might object at this point that these larger anti-
bottleneck concerns are misplaced—that they represent a departure from 
the EEOC’s mission of enforcing its statutes. But this objection is itself 
misplaced. These anti-bottleneck concerns are the EEOC’s mission, 
restated at a high enough level of abstraction. As Berrien put it in that 
hearing about credit checks: “As the nation’s leading enforcer of federal 
laws prohibiting employment discrimination, the EEOC’s ultimate 
concern is whether these screening practices, devices or tools deny equal 
employment opportunity to any workers in the country and are keeping 
qualified and capable people from entering the workplace for unfair 
reasons.”162 There is no mention of race or sex or national origin or 
disability in that sentence, and there does not need to be. At this higher 
level of abstraction, what the EEOC does is take aim at barriers that 
“prevent qualified and capable people” from being hired.163 Disparate 
treatment law, disparate impact law, and the law of reasonable 
 
 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Which reasons exactly should count as “unfair” is a much trickier question, and one 
dependent on public policy judgments. See supra Part II.D (discussing “merit”). 
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accommodation can all be viewed as approaches to implementing this 
general aim. Thus it should not surprise us to see the EEOC implementing 
the anti-bottleneck principle in ways that are not wholly confined to a 
focus on the classes that Title VII directly protects. In such cases the 
EEOC is finding ways, consistent with its specific statutory charges, to 
pursue a dimension of its more general mission. 
Over the years, the EEOC has used its regulatory powers relatively 
sparingly in comparison to its powers of direct enforcement. When we 
look at which facially neutral practices the EEOC has chosen to scrutinize 
because of their potential disparate impact on protected classes, a pattern 
emerges. In general, the EEOC’s scrutiny has been triggered by a concern 
about the pervasiveness of a given practice or set of practices—and 
therefore its potential to become a severe bottleneck. Criminal background 
checks have been the subject of more EEOC guidelines and regulations 
than any other topic.
164
 The EEOC has also issued regulations on such 
topics as English-Only Rules,
165
 which concerned the agency because of 
their potential to freeze out, from many workplaces, large numbers of 
workers who are more comfortable speaking languages other than English. 
Most recently, the EEOC has held a number of hearings regarding 
discrimination against caregivers.
166
 The EEOC’s concern about 
discrimination against caregivers is in part about the disparate treatment of 
women, and in part about facially neutral practices that have a disparate 
impact on women. But the EEOC has consistently framed its interest in the 
topic of caregiving in more universal terms—specifically, in terms of the 
bottleneck created by the large set of employers who make it difficult for 
workers (of any sex) to combine work and family responsibilities. The 
EEOC framed the problem of caregiving discrimination in terms of “both 
men and women [who] too often face unequal treatment . . . because of 
their efforts to balance work and family responsibilities”; the Commission 
focused a great deal on the pervasiveness of the problem.
167
 We might 
restate the problem this way. If a large (and desirable) portion of all 
possible career paths in the opportunity structure impose something like 
the “ideal worker” norm, which assumes a worker with no caregiving 
 
 
 164. See supra notes 118 & 120. 
 165. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (2012). 
 166. See, e.g., Transcript: Commission Meeting of April 22, 2009—On Best Practices to Avoid 
Discrimination Against Caregivers, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/4-22-09/transcript. 
cfm (last visited Aug. 21, 2014). 
 167. Press Release, EEOC, Unlawful Discrimination Based on Pregnancy and Caregiving 
Responsibilities Widespread Problem, Panelists Tell EEOC (Feb. 15, 2012), available at http://www. 
eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/2-15-12.cfm (emphasis added). 
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responsibilities and a flow of domestic labor from someone else at home, 
then this creates a severe bottleneck.
168
 The EEOC is explicitly 
acknowledging this problem, which constrains (in different ways) the 
choices that both men and women face about how to combine work and 
caregiving as they try to pursue their own conceptions of a flourishing life. 
Something like the anti-bottleneck principle has driven the regulatory 
priorities of the EEOC from the start. In particular, it was part of the logic 
that led lawyers at the EEOC to press for the regulation of ability testing 
that led to the creation of disparate impact law. The next Part tells this 
story, which has important implications for how we ought to understand 
disparate impact law. 
IV. GRIGGS, DISPARATE IMPACT, AND THE ANTI-BOTTLENECK PRINCIPLE 
What is disparate impact law? From one perspective, it is essentially a 
form of group-based redistribution of opportunities, a means of shifting 
opportunities to members of the protected class who brought the disparate 
impact challenge. Advocates of this understanding often argue that 
disparate impact is justified (if at all) only as a response to covert disparate 
treatment that the law cannot easily detect; we are shifting opportunities 
back to those who would have had them in the first place, absent that 
disparate treatment. This view of disparate impact is not new,
169
 but it 
gained new prominence when Justice Scalia nodded in its direction in 
Ricci v. DeStefano, in a concurring opinion that raised questions about 
whether disparate impact law, if it means any more than this, is even 
constitutional.
170
  
From the perspective of the anti-bottleneck principle, disparate impact 
law looks entirely different. This Part explains why. More ambitiously, 
this Part argues that the anti-bottleneck principle is at the heart of how we 
ought to understand disparate impact law. It can help us understand some 
underappreciated features of how disparate impact law works, as well as 
how it became part of our law.  
Once we see the anti-bottleneck principle at work in disparate impact 
law, something important comes into focus that we might otherwise miss: 
Every time plaintiffs win a disparate impact case, they remove or loosen a 
bottleneck that had unnecessarily constrained the opportunities of many 
people—not only members of the plaintiff class, but also others who were 
 
 
 168. For a fuller discussion, see FISHKIN, supra note 7, at 224–31. 
 169. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 170. See infra Part IV.E. 
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similarly unable to pass through the bottleneck. This feature of disparate 
impact law would be more than a little odd if disparate impact law were 
simply a mechanism for group-based redistribution. But it is not. In fact, a 
version of the anti-bottleneck idea was at work in the process that led both 
EEOC lawyers and the Supreme Court to embrace disparate impact law in 
the first place. 
A. Bottlenecks and the Origins of Disparate Impact 
The black plaintiffs in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
171
 famously 
challenged two requirements that Duke Power used to select candidates 
seeking promotion from the lowest-skilled job categories to the better, 
“inside” positions at its Dan River plant: the company required candidates 
to (1) have a high school diploma and (2) exceed a cutoff score on two 
intelligence tests.
172
 
Neither of these requirements was at all unique to Duke Power—a fact 
the plaintiffs made sure the courts understood. The plaintiffs noted that 
Duke Power was only one of many companies that had similarly instituted 
intelligence testing requirements after Title VII took effect.
173
 Indeed, of 
the various pre-Griggs cases the plaintiffs in Griggs cited, from the lower 
courts and the EEOC, that had embraced a disparate impact theory, a 
strikingly high proportion involved similar testing fact patterns. Quite a 
few involved exactly the same two so-called “quickie” intelligence tests 
that were specifically at issue in Griggs.
174
 The plaintiffs emphasized that 
if this defendant were permitted to adopt these requirements without any 
meaningful showing that they were related to a specific job, “any employer 
in the country would . . . be absolutely free” to adopt the same 
requirements, creating barriers that were potentially “vast” in scope.175  
This claim by the Griggs plaintiffs resonated strongly with the EEOC’s 
earliest regulatory concerns. Very soon after the passage of Title VII in 
 
 
 171. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).  
 172. Id. at 426–27. The intelligence tests were the Wonderlic Personnel Test and the Bennett 
Mechanical Comprehension Test. Id. at 428. The cutoff score was set around the national median for 
high school graduates. Id. 
 173. See Brief for Petitioner at 11, Griggs, 401 U.S. 424 (No. 124), 1970 WL 122448 (noting “the 
increased use of tests since the passage of Title VII”). Duke Power had simply barred blacks from the 
“inside” jobs up until the effective date of Title VII, on which date the company instituted the testing 
requirements. Id. at 44 (The diploma requirement had been instituted in 1955. Id. at 38 n.47.). 
 174. Id. at 6 (describing the Wonderlic and Bennet tests as “quickie ‘intelligence’ tests”); see id. at 
19–25 & app.; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 21 n.24, Griggs, 401 U.S. 424 (No. 
124), 1970 WL 122637 (gathering cases in which the EEOC had previously imposed a job-relatedness 
standard on fact patterns that included those two specific tests). 
 175. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 173, at 14, 18 (emphasis added). 
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1964, lawyers at the EEOC realized that many companies had begun to 
use paper-and-pencil ability tests like those at issue in Griggs in hiring and 
promotion—and that as such tests became more widespread, they “proved 
to be major barriers to minority advancement.”176 Those EEOC lawyers 
pushed for official guidelines, which the EEOC promulgated in 1966, 
restricting the use of these tests.
177
 Those guidelines underwent a number 
of revisions in subsequent years,
178
 but their core principle from the start 
was that employers ought to use only “[t]ests selected on the basis of 
specific job-related criteria.”179 The point of this “job-relatedness” 
requirement is to ensure that tests relate to specific jobs, thereby avoiding 
the pervasive bottleneck that might arise if many or most employers used 
the same “general ability” tests to screen candidates for all or most jobs.180 
The Court adopted this reasoning in Griggs. It held that “any tests used 
must measure the person for the job and not the person in the abstract.”181 
By requiring tests to be more specifically tailored to particular jobs, the 
EEOC and the Court did not eliminate the bottlenecks such tests create. 
But they ameliorated those bottlenecks, making them less pervasive, and 
therefore less severe. After Griggs, a test might still block access to a 
particular kind of job. But no single test or cluster of related tests would 
create the across-the-board impact—the pervasive bottleneck—that the 
EEOC lawyers had feared. 
For both the EEOC and the Court, what mattered about the intelligence 
test bottleneck and the high school diploma bottleneck at issue in Griggs 
was their relationship to the opportunity structure as a whole—and 
specifically their power to reinforce a much larger bottleneck that Title VII 
aimed to disrupt: the fact that to pursue most opportunities and career 
 
 
 176. Alfred W. Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of 
Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59, 59–60 (1972).  
 177. EEOC, GUIDELINES ON EMPLOYMENT TESTING PROCEDURES (1966), available at 
http://njlegallib.rutgers.edu/misc/GETP.pdf. 
 178. See, e.g., Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 43 Fed. Reg. 38295 
(1978), codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (adopting a major revision to the guidelines). 
 179. GUIDELINES ON EMPLOYMENT TESTING PROCEDURES, supra note 177, at 3.  
 180. See id. at 2 (ability tests must measure “knowledge or skills required by the particular job or 
class of jobs” or must predict performance of “a particular job or class of jobs”). This same concern 
about “general ability” testing—applied to the civil service—was among the reasons Congress offered 
for extending Title VII to cover government employees in what became the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act of 1972. See H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 24 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2137, at 2159 (observing that the civil service was “replete with artificial selection and promotion 
requirements that place a premium on ‘paper’ credentials which frequently prove of questionable value 
as a means of predicting actual job performance,” a problem “further aggravated by the agency’s use 
of general ability tests which are not aimed at any direct relationship to specific jobs”) (emphasis 
added); S. REP. NO. 92-415 at 14 (similar observations). 
 181. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971). 
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paths in America in 1964, one needed white skin. The Court in Griggs 
traced the contours of important paths through the opportunity structure, 
explaining why black people would have a harder time than whites passing 
through the two bottlenecks directly at issue in the case. The Court 
explained that black people “have long received inferior education in 
segregated schools,”182 leaving them less likely to receive a diploma and 
leaving them without the developmental opportunities they would need for 
their “basic intelligence” to find the “means of articulation” that would 
enable them to pass an intelligence test.
183
 These connections led the Court 
to hold that the diploma and intelligence test requirements would 
indirectly “operate[] to exclude” blacks.184 Therefore, the Court held, these 
requirements would fall within the subset of all business practices that the 
Court would thenceforth subject to a heightened meritocratic filter: the 
practices must be “shown to be related to job performance”; “the 
touchstone is business necessity.”185  
This filter, requiring employers to tie tests to specific jobs, does two 
things. First, it presses employers to adopt tests that are, in my 
terminology above, relatively more legitimate as opposed to arbitrary, 
because they pass this heightened test of meritocratic validity. Second, it 
ensures that a particular test is used only for the subset of jobs for which it 
is specifically relevant, rather than for all jobs—reducing the 
pervasiveness and therefore the severity of the bottleneck that test creates. 
In other words, the law presses employment practices both downward and 
leftward in Figure 1. Duke Power lost its case because it had simply 
posited that its requirements would “improve the overall quality of the 
work force.”186 Of course, that may have been true. But the Court required 
Duke Power to find a way to accomplish this goal that did not, in the 
process, create such a severe bottleneck. 
B. Griggs’ White Beneficiaries 
When we view Griggs through the lens of the anti-bottleneck principle, 
some striking facts about the case come into focus: in particular, the fact 
that many, probably most, of the direct beneficiaries of Griggs were white. 
According to the Census data cited by the Court, only thirty-four percent 
 
 
 182. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430. 
 183. Id.; see also id. at 430 n.6. 
 184. Id. at 431. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
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of white males in North Carolina had high school diplomas.
187
 That figure 
is far higher than the twelve percent of black males with high school 
diplomas;
188
 the difference leads to the disparate impact. But it is 
important to recognize that the high school diploma requirement screened 
out not only the overwhelming majority of blacks, but also the vast 
majority of whites. Indeed, though the pool of those excluded by the 
diploma requirement was disproportionately black, it is likely that in 
absolute numbers, of the future job applicants who benefited from the 
removal of this unnecessary bottleneck, the majority were white.
189
 
We see this pattern throughout the disparate impact canon, although 
not always as starkly as in Griggs. Disparate impact law has the effect of 
ameliorating bottlenecks in the opportunity structure. In terms of Figure 1, 
it presses them downward and to the left; it makes them less severe and at 
the same time requires them to be more legitimate, at least in the sense of 
being more predictive of how someone will perform the specific job they 
are seeking. Changes of this sort have many beneficiaries—some of them 
members of the protected class that brought the Title VII claim, some not. 
This pattern extends beyond ability tests, and it applies even when an 
employer’s criterion has some substantial degree of connection to the 
performance of the job. For example, in Boyd v. Ozark Air Lines, the 
Eighth Circuit found a disparate impact in an airline’s height requirement 
for pilots, which excluded 93% of women and 25.8% of men.
190
 The 
difference between those two figures was of course the source of the 
disparate impact liability; because height is not itself a protected 
characteristic under Title VII, a class of short people would not have stated 
a valid claim. Nonetheless, short people won out in Boyd. Just over a 
 
 
 187. Id. at 430 n.6. The Court offers no reason for its unfortunate but unsurprising choice to limit 
the analysis to “males.” 
 188. Id. 
 189. The specifics depend on the exact racial makeup of the labor market and of subsequent 
applicant pools at Duke Power specifically, but it is quite likely that the overall set of beneficiaries 
from the outcome in Griggs, while disproportionately black, was majority white. For instance, if we 
just use population figures as a proxy, the population without high school diplomas in North Carolina 
was solidly majority-white, even though disproportionately black. 
 At the time, this may have been obscured by the fact that the litigation in Griggs concerned 
current employees, among whom the impact of the requirements fell much more starkly along racial 
lines. In part that was because many whites who had already been promoted to “inside” jobs were 
grandfathered in: many lacked high school diplomas and were not required to meet the new 
requirements. Indeed there was also some evidence that Duke Power adopted an intelligence test for 
internal promotions as an alternative that could “free up” some whites without diplomas who had 
suddenly been “blocked off” from further promotions by the diploma requirement. See Brief for 
Petitioner, supra note 173, at 44 (internal quotations omitted). 
 190. Boyd v. Ozark Air Lines, Inc., 568 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1977); see id. at 52 n.1. 
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quarter of men faced a bottleneck that prevented them from being able to 
apply for pilot jobs. 
On remand, Ozark successfully proved that there was a business 
necessity in its height requirement, given the physical design of the 
cockpits of its planes, which would apparently have been prohibitively 
expensive to alter.
191
 However, the court found that Ozark’s requirement 
was far stricter than what safety required. It ordered Ozark to loosen the 
requirement by several inches, rendering many women, and also some 
men, eligible to pursue the pilot jobs for which they were otherwise 
qualified but from which they had been barred.
192
 Boyd illustrates the 
suppleness of disparate impact law as a tool for ameliorating or loosening 
bottlenecks: even where a height requirement was necessary in the eyes of 
the law, disparate impact law was able to separate the job-relevant portion 
of the requirement from the rest, thereby loosening an unnecessary and 
arbitrary bottleneck so that more individuals, both men and women, were 
qualified to pass through. 
C. Opening Bottlenecks vs. Group-Based Redistribution 
How should we understand the role of the white beneficiaries of Griggs 
and the male beneficiaries of Boyd? From one perspective, these people 
are just lucky: they are the incidental beneficiaries of an antidiscrimination 
statute intended to help someone else. Indeed, from that perspective we 
might even view these beneficiaries, especially when there are a lot of 
them, as evidence that our legal remedies were poorly targeted: a 
significant chunk of remedy seems to be aiding individuals outside the 
plaintiff class. If we understand disparate impact law as a mechanism of 
group-based redistribution of opportunity, then the potentially rather large 
proportion of white beneficiaries of Griggs would suggest that our 
mechanism is not redistributing in an especially efficient way.  
But what if disparate impact law is not about the group-based 
redistribution of opportunities, but instead is about ameliorating 
bottlenecks? The white beneficiaries of Griggs had two important things 
in common with the black beneficiaries. First, they all were unable to 
proceed through a bottleneck that Duke Power had created, which the 
Court determined was an “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary 
 
 
 191. Boyd v. Ozark Air Lines, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 1061, 1064 (E.D. Mo. 1976). 
 192. Id. at 1065. 
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barrier[].”193 Second, they all were actually qualified for the job.194 In 
other words, leaving group membership aside, all of these people were in a 
sense similarly situated. They all stood outside, unable to reach the better 
“inside” jobs at the plant because they could not squeeze through the 
arbitrary bottlenecks Duke Power had created. The Court scrutinized those 
bottlenecks because of their disparate racial impact. But that racial impact 
is a justification for activating the machinery of antidiscrimination law, not 
a comprehensive picture of whom the “arbitrary, and unnecessary barrier” 
kept out. 
Here it is important not to be Pollyannaish about the distribution of 
opportunities. Nothing in Griggs increased the number of job openings at 
Duke Power. Thus, for every individual without a high school diploma 
who was actually hired as a result of the litigation, it must be the case that 
someone else who would have been hired—someone with a high school 
diploma—was not. In that sense, all hiring is zero-sum. 
However, the story here is not one of a zero-sum redistribution of 
opportunities from whites to blacks. To whatever extent removing the high 
school diploma requirement actually altered any of Duke Power’s hiring 
decisions, it must be the case that in the eyes of those making those hiring 
decisions, at least some individuals without high school diplomas must 
have turned out to be stronger candidates, all things considered—once the 
diploma bottleneck was taken out of the picture—than the other 
individuals with high school diplomas who would have been hired, had the 
diploma requirement remained in place. That is, to the extent that we 
accept the Court’s holding that this requirement was an arbitrary and 
unnecessary barrier, we should also accept the counterintuitive proposition 
that, in terms of the employer’s own valid criteria,195 the law redistributed 
opportunities from less qualified people to more qualified people by 
removing the diploma requirement. This had the important additional 
consequence that the pool of more qualified people also contained more 
black people. 
In other words, in Griggs, disparate racial impact was the reason the 
Court decided to scrutinize Duke Power’s hiring practices. But once that 
decision was made, eliminating what the court found to be an “arbitrary, 
 
 
 193. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. 
 194. By “beneficiaries” I mean those who were actually hired and who would not have been but 
for Griggs. By definition, these were the people Duke Power decided were qualified, once the diploma 
and IQ test requirements were out of the picture. 
 195. By valid, here I simply mean any criteria other than the one that failed the Court’s business 
necessity/job-relatedness test. 
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unnecessary barrier” had benefits for members of many racial groups who 
were qualified for the jobs. The Court itself seems to have been aware of 
these broader benefits, and of the bottleneck in the opportunity structure 
that its decision was ameliorating: 
The facts of this case demonstrate the inadequacy of broad and 
general testing devices as well as the infirmity of using diplomas or 
degrees as fixed measures of capability. History is filled with 
examples of men and women who rendered highly effective 
performance without the conventional badges of accomplishment in 
terms of certificates, diplomas, or degrees. Diplomas and tests are 
useful servants, but Congress has mandated the commonsense 
proposition that they are not to become masters of reality.
196
 
This remarkable passage eloquently articulates a version of the anti-
bottleneck principle, as applied to the world of “certificates, diplomas, or 
degrees.” The Court is not suggesting here that “badges of 
accomplishment” are inherently illegitimate. Far from it: they are, as the 
Court says, “useful.” Nothing in this passage or in the Court’s opinion 
requires employers to disregard diplomas and degrees across the board. 
The Court’s point in this passage is that when such criteria are imposed in 
an overly strict and overly pervasive way, as “fixed measures of 
capability,” they can so severely constrain opportunities that unfair 
negative assessments of capability become self-fulfilling. A person who 
has the ability to perform well—and the potential to develop the skills to 
perform even better and perhaps advance in their career—will never get 
the chance if unable to pass through an initial bottleneck. It is in that sense 
that credential requirements can become “masters of reality.” 
One can perhaps hear, in this passage, a personal message from Chief 
Justice Burger, who wrote Griggs. Unlike many elite Washington lawyers, 
Burger attended law school at night at a non-elite school in Minnesota 
while working during the day at an insurance company. As a result, he had 
some direct experience with what his first law clerk described as an “elitist 
perception of some in the legal establishment that a city night law school 
graduate did not quite fit in with those who had enjoyed a Brahmin's Ivy 
League education.”197 For Burger, it was surely apparent that having the 
 
 
 196. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433. 
 197. F. Carolyn Graglia, His First Law Clerk’s Fond Memories of a Gracious Gentleman, 74 TEX. 
L. REV. 231, 236 (1995). Burger was a graduate of William Mitchell law school. See also id. (“[A]ll 
his education beyond high school took place in night classes, after working all day in the accounting 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1494 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 91:1429 
 
 
 
 
right “certificates, diplomas, or degrees” can function as a significant 
bottleneck—for many people, of any race—and that such certificates and 
degrees are not always accurate measures of a person’s potential. 
From this perspective, it is not surprising that the “masters of reality” 
passage nowhere mentions race. There is no need to. Like Commissioner 
Berrien, in her comments about the EEOC’s enforcement priorities 
discussed above, Chief Justice Burger is reaching here for a more 
universal conception of the benefits of reshaping the opportunity structure 
in the manner Title VII requires. And yet, of course, the reason Title VII 
has anything to say about the specific high school diploma requirement in 
Griggs is entirely about race. 
Race functions here as the “miner’s canary,” in Guinier and Torres’ 
evocative phrase.
198
 The fact that very few black people were making it 
through the high school diploma bottleneck generated a legal reason to 
scrutinize that bottleneck, to question whether it was really necessary. That 
special scrutiny—the business necessity/job relatedness inquiry—is too 
intrusive for courts to apply to all hiring practices by all employers 
everywhere. But courts can apply this scrutiny some of the time. Disparate 
impact law requires that they do so here. 
We can understand that choice, too, in anti-bottleneck terms. In the 
larger opportunity structure, race operates as a severe bottleneck—for 
reasons the Court explained in Griggs in some detail, reaching out beyond 
the specific employer to discuss the ways race operated as a bottleneck 
more broadly.
199
 However, the law’s response to this larger bottleneck 
does not simply redistribute opportunities from whites to blacks. Instead it 
enforces, in a careful and selective way, a conception of equal opportunity 
in which everyone can compete for desirable jobs on the basis of fair 
criteria that do not create unnecessary bottlenecks. 
That is what the law of disparate impact does in practice. We can see 
this in any disparate impact case—even Ricci v. DeStefano,200 the case 
concerning perhaps the most infamous of all efforts to comply with the 
law of disparate impact. In Ricci, the City of New Haven threw out its 
firefighter promotion test after fearing (or so the City argued) that the test 
had a disparate impact and could not be justified in terms of business 
necessity/job relatedness. White firefighters sued. The unusual posture of 
 
 
department of an insurance company.”). I thank Professor Russell Lovell for pointing out to me this 
aspect of Chief Justice Burger’s biography and its relevance to this passage. 
 198. GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 131, at 72–74 (explaining the concept). 
 199. See supra text accompanying notes 182–85. 
 200. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
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the case—the test had already been administered, and the races of those 
individuals up for promotion as a result of the test were known—led a 5–4 
majority to portray the City’s actions as essentially a ham-fisted attempt to 
take officer jobs from whites and redistribute them to blacks.
201
 
But the real gravamen of the disparate impact claim the City had 
feared—a claim that, in fact, was later brought, by a New Haven 
firefighter named Michael Briscoe
202—was that the test was in various 
respects an arbitrary and unfair bottleneck. The test was based on written 
study materials that some applicants could and did obtain “from relatives 
in the fire service”—those applicants allegedly “had the necessary books 
even before the syllabus was issued”—while others faced long delays and 
great expense.
203
 Moreover, some of the test questions were allegedly 
inapplicable to New Haven; and in any event this entire memorization-
and-written-test methodology was allegedly outdated, compared to more 
modern assessment methods that were more effective (and that had less of 
a disparate impact).
204
 This claim—Briscoe’s claim—is not exclusively a 
claim about racial justice. It is a claim about the quality of the test itself; it 
is an argument that the City should have to use a better test. The reason to 
require the City under Title VII to use a better test is the racial disparate 
impact. The disparities in study materials, for instance, apparently “fell at 
least in part along racial lines.”205 But—only in part. Many whites, like the 
black plaintiffs in Briscoe, are “first-generation firefighters without such 
support networks.”206 They, too, would benefit from a change in the City’s 
assessment process. 
Viewing disparate impact law in anti-bottleneck terms yields a 
conception of what this body of law is about that departs profoundly from 
the conception of disparate impact law that assumes it is all about group-
based redistribution of opportunities. But these are not just two different, 
equally valid perspectives on disparate impact law. As a positive matter, 
when our law has faced a fork in the road between these two conceptions 
of what disparate impact law is about, it has taken the anti-bottleneck path. 
 
 
 201. Id. at 579 (explaining that the City threw out the test because otherwise “too many whites and 
not enough minorities would be promoted”—and that this “express, race-based decisionmaking” was 
disparate treatment). 
 202. See Briscoe v. City of New Haven, No. 3:09-cv-1642 (CSH), 2013 WL 4780097 (D. Conn. 
Sept. 9, 2013) (dismissing Briscoe’s claim on the ground that he was not able to show statistically that 
the 60:40 weighting actually had a disparate impact on black candidates in the first place). 
 203. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 613–14 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 204. Id. at 614–18. 
 205. Id. at 613. 
 206. Id. at 614 (internal quotations omitted). 
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We can see this most starkly in a case like Connecticut v. Teal.
207
 In 
Teal, the State had imposed a written test on some state agency workers 
who sought promotion to supervisor. The test had a disparate impact based 
on race. Connecticut argued that it had compensated for this successfully, 
through what amounted to an affirmative action program: the State simply 
hired enough black supervisors so that the “bottom line” was roughly 
proportional, despite the test’s disparate impact.208 The plaintiffs in Teal 
were black women who had, oddly enough, successfully performed the job 
on a temporary basis for two years before finding themselves unable to 
pass through the bottleneck of the written test. They brought a disparate 
impact claim and won; the Court emphasized that an arbitrary, 
unnecessary test with a disparate impact cannot be cured by redistributing 
jobs from one racial group to another. This was a profound holding: the 
Court held that disparate impact law is not, at bottom, about group-based 
outcomes. Rather, the statute “guarantees these individual respondents the 
opportunity to compete equally with white workers on the basis of job-
related criteria.”209 The statute, as interpreted, favors an approach that 
removes arbitrary bottlenecks, opening paths for all, over an approach that 
focuses primarily on group-based redistribution of opportunity.
210
 
D. Disparate Impact and Universal Remedies 
For disparate impact law to function in an anti-bottleneck way, the 
remedies in disparate impact claims must be universal. If a court had 
ordered that only blacks were exempted from Duke Power’s diploma and 
testing requirements, or that only women were exempted from Ozark Air 
Lines’ height requirement, then the remedy would no longer have the 
same bottleneck-disrupting power.  
Christine Jolls has identified a limited set of disparate impact cases in 
which courts have ordered remedies for disparate impact claims that seem 
narrowly targeted to accommodate members of the plaintiff class rather 
than loosening the bottlenecks that affect individuals both inside and 
outside the plaintiff class.
211
 These cases are a central illustration of Jolls’ 
broader argument about the continuity of disparate impact and 
 
 
 207. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982). 
 208. Id. at 442. 
 209. Id. at 451. 
 210. Interestingly, there were also some white plaintiffs in Teal. They, too, sued to invalidate the 
test; their claim was that it violated state civil service laws that required tests to be job-related. See id. 
at 442 n.2. 
 211. See Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642 (2001).  
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accommodation.
212
 In the most prominent such case, the Eighth Circuit 
upheld a finding that the no-beard policy at a Domino’s Pizza had a 
disparate impact on blacks because many black men suffer from 
pseudofolliculitis barbae (PFB); those with severe PFB cannot shave 
without causing serious infection.
213
 Finding no business necessity,
214
 the 
Eighth Circuit held that Domino’s must carve out “a limited exception to 
its no-beard policy for African American males who suffer from PFB and 
as a result of this medical condition are unable to shave.”215 This was quite 
different from the broadest remedy, which would have simply struck down 
the no-beard policy across the board, for everyone. 
But the difference between this holding and a broader remedy is not as 
stark as it sounds. The most universal remedy would have simply 
eliminated the no-beard rule. But short of that, the Eighth Circuit could 
have created an exception to the no-beard rule for all PFB sufferers, not 
only black male PFB sufferers. Interestingly, the court is ambiguous about 
whether this was, in fact, what it intended to do. The decision refers 
interchangeably to “those afflicted with PFB” and “members of the 
protected class who suffer from PFB”; it switches back and forth between 
“PFB sufferers,” and “African American males who cannot shave because 
of PFB.”216 It may be that the court was simply unaware of the fact that, 
while approximately fifty percent of black males suffer from PFB, 
approximately three percent of white males do as well.
217
 At any rate it is 
not clear that limiting the remedy to PFB sufferers who are black is 
lawful: in that case, if a white person with PFB actually appeared, he 
ought to be able to make out a disparate treatment claim. 
The class of disparate impact claims with non-universal remedies is 
actually quite narrow; remedies like the no-beard PFB carve-out are 
notable because they are rare. But it is important to be careful here about 
what we mean by “universal.” Jolls argues that all disparate impact 
remedies are in a sense “accommodation,” to the extent that they require 
 
 
 212. Id. Jolls’ broader thesis about the continuity of disparate impact and accommodation focuses 
on the point that even universal remedies may impose costs on businesses; in that specific sense, they 
are like accommodation requirements. (Disparate treatment prohibitions may, of course, impose costs 
on businesses as well.) 
 213. Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 7 F.3d 795 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 214. Cf. Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112 (11th Cir. 1993) (finding business necessity for 
a no-beard rule in a firefighting job that required employees to wear breathing apparatuses that were 
apparently incompatible with beards). 
 215. Bradley, 7 F.3d. at 799. 
 216. Id. at 799. 
 217. See Agnessa Gadeliya & Parwathi “Uma” Paniker, A Prickly Problem, 119 AM. J. MED. 413, 
413 (2004). Nothing in the court’s opinion suggests it was aware of this. 
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an employer to incur “special costs.”218 For instance, an employer might 
have to incur the cost of using a more accurate, but also more expensive, 
test or selection procedure, if the less costly procedure has a disparate 
impact. But even where the law requires an employer to incur costs only 
because of group-based disparate impact, the benefits of the policy change 
are ordinarily more universal. The changes made to loosen the bottleneck 
apply to everyone, not only to members of the statutorily protected group. 
This is the fundamental disjunction at the heart of disparate impact law: on 
the liability side, the law is targeted and race-conscious (or otherwise 
group-conscious) but on the remedy side, the law is universal and race-
neutral (with very rare, if any, exceptions). 
This same disjunction can sometimes be found in the law of disability 
accommodation. Almost all accommodations for individuals with 
disabilities under the ADA involve “special” costs in Jolls’ sense—the 
cost would not have to be incurred but for the employee(s) or other 
individuals with covered disabilities. Yet these accommodations often 
provide broad or universal benefits.
219
 In particular, disability 
accommodations often provide benefits that help nondisabled individuals 
(as well as some individuals with very minor or temporary disabilities who 
are non-disabled for ADA purposes) who for whatever reason have trouble 
passing through the same bottlenecks that constrain the opportunities of 
members of the ADA-protected class. As Elizabeth Emens has noted, 
“New equipment or an office redesign that makes lifting easier for an 
employee with a disability may make lifting easier for everyone. Taller 
dividers on office cubicles to help one employee with a cognitive or 
psychiatric disability to concentrate may have the same benefit for others 
. . . .”220  
Not all disability accommodations work this way. Many provide 
benefits that are more narrowly targeted at members of the protected 
class.
221
 But the most visible of all disability accommodations in our 
 
 
 218. Jolls, supra note 211, at 648. 
 219. Elizabeth Emens’ article, Integrating Accommodation, offers a helpful framework for 
understanding which disability accommodations provide these “third-party” benefits to individuals 
other than those protected by the ADA, and which accommodations do not. See Elizabeth F. Emens, 
Integrating Accommodation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 839 (2008). My focus here is on what she terms 
“usage” benefits rather than “attitudinal” benefits. See id. at 848, 898–902. 
 220. Id. at 850–51 (internal citation omitted). 
 221. Indeed, in some cases accommodations make things worse for those outside the protected 
class; for example, by redistributing more heavy lifting work to them. Emens argues that disability 
accommodations sometimes can have far-reaching benefits for non-disabled co-workers even where 
the initial benefits are targeted rather than universal; for example, because they cause a workplace to 
discover process changes or technological changes that are initially only available to the disabled 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss6/6
  
 
 
 
 
2014] THE ANTI-BOTTLENECK PRINCIPLE 1499 
 
 
 
 
society—the ramps, elevators, and widened physical paths the ADA 
requires—certainly do work this way. Such physical changes are perhaps 
the most literal manifestation in our world of the anti-bottleneck principle. 
Congress enacted these changes because it judged that people with 
mobility impairments faced severe constraints on their opportunities 
because they literally could not pass through the gates, the narrow 
hallways, the stairwells, and so on that led to many important 
opportunities, both in the employment sphere and in other spheres such as 
education, housing, and voting.
222
 The ADA-mandated changes ameliorate 
these bottlenecks in ways that make it easier for those with disabilities 
covered under the law and everyone else to pass through and reach the 
opportunities on the other side. 
The disjunction between group-based liability and universal remedies 
is only sometimes characteristic of the law of disability accommodations, 
but it is characteristic of disparate impact law in nearly every case. Viewed 
in terms of its remedies, disparate impact law is quite unlike a system of 
“bonus points” for members of some group, aimed at redistributing 
opportunities in a zero-sum way from one group to another. The 
beneficiaries in a disparate impact case are almost never all members of 
the same group. But they do have something important in common: they 
all have difficulty squeezing through a bottleneck of some kind. Disparate 
impact law, in other words, is a body of law whose remedies highlight a 
commonality of experience across groups—the experience of being stuck 
unable to get through some sort of arbitrary and unnecessary bottleneck 
that business necessity cannot justify. 
E. Disparate Impact and Equal Opportunity 
In a characteristically pithy bombshell of a concurrence in Ricci v. 
DeStefano, Justice Scalia argued that disparate impact law is in deep 
tension with the Equal Protection Clause. “[T]he war between disparate 
impact and equal protection will be waged sooner or later,” he wrote, in a 
passage that attracted wide attention.
223
 The problem, Scalia suggested, is 
that “Title VII’s disparate-impact provisions place a racial thumb on the 
scales” in a way that raises equal protection concerns.224 
 
 
employee, but are successful enough that employers later make them available more broadly. See id. at 
855–59. 
 222. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 12101(a)(3), (5) (2012) (the text of the ADA itself, enumerating different 
spheres in which people with disabilities face pervasive barriers). 
 223. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 595–96 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 224. Id. at 594. 
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The argument of the preceding pages can help us understand the nature 
of this “thumb on the scales”—what it is and what it is not. In Griggs 
itself, the case in which the Court built disparate impact law, the new 
selection procedures that resulted from the Court’s decision were as race-
neutral as the old. That is, the remedy in Griggs did not involve Duke 
Power treating black applicants any more favorably than white 
applicants—not as a tiebreaker, not as a “plus factor.” Indeed, as discussed 
above, it is probable that most of the beneficiaries of the decision in 
Griggs to eliminate the high school diploma requirement were white. 
Moreover, in Teal, as we have seen, the Court specifically rejected an 
effort by a defendant to escape disparate impact liability for its arbitrary 
and unnecessary test by placing a compensatory “thumb on the scales” of 
individual decisions, on behalf of black applicants. Such affirmative action 
programs have their place in American law—but that place is not disparate 
impact law. Disparate impact law aims not to shift opportunities from one 
group to another in any zero-sum way, but instead, to alter policies and 
selection procedures in ways that ameliorate bottlenecks. 
Justice Scalia characterizes the “thumb on the scales” differently, by 
focusing on liability rather than remedy: disparate impact is race-neutral in 
its remedies, but race-conscious in determining liability. But either way, in 
the end, the “thumb on the scales” metaphor invokes a baseline of fairness: 
a fair and impartial scale for the thumb to bias. If a challenged test itself is 
flawed, then disparate impact law begins to look less like a thumb on the 
scale and more like a legal means of building a better scale. This is why so 
much of the disagreement in Ricci between the majority and the dissent 
focused on the merits of the original firefighter test—both in terms of 
meritocratic performance-prediction, and in terms of something else: 
whether the test was creating an unnecessary bottleneck that those with 
inside knowledge and connections would more easily pass through.
225
 
Both of these ideas are important elements of our law’s conception of 
equal opportunity. Part of the significance of the anti-bottleneck principle 
is that it can help us see how disparate impact law operates in practice to 
promote both. Disparate impact law promotes a conception of equal 
opportunity that has a significant meritocratic component: any test with a 
powerful enough meritocratic justification survives any disparate impact 
challenge. But that is not the whole story. Disparate impact law does not 
simply say that employers must use the most meritocratic test available. 
Instead, disparate impact law presses firmly toward the use of tests that are 
 
 
 225. See supra notes 202–06 and accompanying text. 
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job-specific rather than general. From its inception, disparate impact law 
has aimed to prevent any given test, like the IQ tests in Griggs, from 
becoming pervasive bottlenecks that dominate the opportunity structure, 
greatly limiting the opportunities of those who cannot pass through. This, 
too, is an important dimension of equality of opportunity.
226
  
Some critics of disparate impact law, most prominently Amy Wax, 
have criticized exactly this feature of disparate impact law, arguing that 
the law’s clear preference for job-specific rather than general tests rests on 
an empirical “fallacy”: an assumption that job-specific tests are always 
more meritocratically accurate than general ability or intelligence tests.
227
 
Wax argues that the opposite is the case: “measures of general cognitive 
ability,” she writes, “are generally the best predictors of work performance 
for all types of positions.”228 Suppose this claim were true. Even so, no test 
is perfect. For any job or role, there is always a range of possible measures 
of merit, which can be employed separately or in combination. These 
measures vary along several dimensions. Some are cheap; others 
expensive. Some are more accurate than others. Some may be useful 
mainly for identifying who has a chance to be among the very best 
performers; others may be useful mainly for separating the poorest 
performers from the rest. Finally, some measures tend to reinforce 
pervasive bottlenecks in the opportunity structure, making them even more 
severe, while other measures do not. 
This last dimension is important and unappreciated. Bringing it to light 
is the project of this Article. Thus, even if it were true that, as Wax asserts, 
“cognitive ability” tests were excellent predictors of performance across 
all jobs, opportunity pluralism would still give us one good reason to resist 
using the same tests everywhere as a universal measure of merit. The 
widespread or universal use of any single test, or cluster of closely 
correlated tests, creates an opportunity structure whose shape is 
problematic: a structure in which all prospects depend on passing through 
a single, very severe bottleneck. Disparate impact law can help us avoid 
this outcome, even if at the margins this entails some costs in terms of 
meritocratic performance-prediction. 
In other words, meritocracy is one important component of equal 
opportunity—and by and large, antidiscrimination law tends to promote it. 
 
 
 226. For a fuller argument that opportunity pluralism amounts to a conception of equal 
opportunity, see FISHKIN, supra note 7. 
 227. See Amy L. Wax, Disparate Impact Realism, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 621, 655 (2011). 
 228. Id. at 641. 
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But meritocracy is not all there is to equal opportunity. Ameliorating 
bottlenecks, or avoiding reinforcing them, is also crucial.  
To see why, it may be helpful to step outside the employment sphere 
and consider an analogy from the world of higher education. College 
admissions officers can select applicants based on a variety of factors, of 
which the most obvious are high school grades and standardized test 
scores. One of those two factors—the test scores—tends to create a 
bottleneck that certain groups of students, including racial minorities, rural 
students, and the poor, have difficulty passing through. They simply score 
lower, on average, than affluent, white, suburban students. In the 1990s, 
when the Hopwood decision shut down affirmative action at the 
University of Texas, this bottleneck suddenly became obvious: the 
university faced the prospect of admitting very few minority students to its 
flagship campus.
229
 But really, the bottleneck should have been obvious 
before that. Under the pre-Hopwood regime, most of the undergraduates 
hailed from just ten percent of the high schools in the state; there were 
entire rural counties that had never sent a single student.
230
 Texas’ 
response to Hopwood was to adopt a different measure of merit: under the 
Texas Ten Percent Plan, the flagship campus automatically admits a 
number of the top graduates of every high school in the state, based on 
grades alone.
231
 
Is this measure more accurate, or more meritocratically predictive of 
performance, than the old combination of grades and scores? It is very 
difficult to say. The Ten Percent Plan students have done rather well, 
confounding predictions that admitting students with low standardized test 
scores was a recipe for failure.
232
 Neither the old measure of merit nor the 
new is perfectly predictive of performance; no measure of merit ever is. 
But suppose the new approach were not quite as predictive of performance 
 
 
 229. For a good overview of this history, see Gerald Torres, We Are On the Move, 14 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 355 (2010). For the Hopwood decision, see Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 
1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996) (invalidating the university’s affirmative action program). 
 230. Id. at 363. 
 231. See OFFICE OF ADMISSIONS, THE UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN, IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS 
OF THE TEXAS AUTOMATIC ADMISSIONS LAW (HB 588) AT THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN, 
REPORT 13, at 11 tbl. 6 (2010), available at http://www.utexas.edu/student/admissions/research/ 
HB588-Report13.pdf. 
 232. See, e.g., Sunny X. Niu & Marta Tienda, Minority Student Academic Performance Under the 
Uniform Admission Law: Evidence from the University of Texas at Austin, 32 EDUC. EVALUATION & 
POL’Y ANALYSIS 44 (2010). Indeed, in terms of freshman-year grades, over a decade of data, in most 
years the Top Ten Percent students actually outperformed the non-Top Ten Percent students, even 
though the non-Top Ten Percent students entered with considerably higher standardized test scores. 
See OFFICE OF ADMISSIONS, IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS, supra note 231, at 11 tbl. 6 (tracking the 
two groups’ GPAs); id. at 10 tbl.4 (comparing their standardized test scores). 
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as the old. The new approach might still be the better one, all things 
considered, because maximizing meritocratic accuracy is not the only 
goal. Another component of equal opportunity, Texas legislators decided, 
is creating pathways to the state’s elite institutions of higher education that 
do not require passing through a standardized test bottleneck.  
Part of why that matters is that the standardized test bottleneck turned 
out to reinforce a number of other important bottlenecks: specifically, the 
limited opportunities available to racial minorities, rural students, and the 
poor. In the Ten Percent Plan, Texas found a way to ameliorate all of these 
broader bottlenecks, rendering the overall opportunity structure in the state 
more pluralistic. This is part of the project of equal opportunity, broadly 
conceived. It is an approach to equal opportunity that has deep continuities 
with the approaches of Griggs, our law of disparate impact, and all the 
cutting-edge legislation that Part II of this Article described.  
V. BOTTLENECKS AND THE PROJECT OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 
A. Why the Anti-Bottleneck Principle? 
The anti-bottleneck principle amounts to a distinctive approach to the 
problem of equal opportunity—one that, as a positive matter, has played a 
role in our law of disparate impact since that body of law’s inception. The 
anti-bottleneck principle reveals some important continuities among 
disparate impact law, disparate treatment law, disability accommodations 
law, and the cutting-edge statutes such as ban the box discussed in Part II. 
All of these bodies of law renovate the opportunity structure by 
ameliorating relatively severe bottlenecks that (legislators concluded) the 
law is in a good position to address. 
Thus, the anti-bottleneck principle provides a distinctive and 
compelling answer to the deep question with which this Article began: 
which forms of discrimination ought to be viewed as significant and 
worthy of redress, either normatively or legally? To answer this question 
we need something more than a principle that everyone should be treated 
equally, or that employers should only make decisions on merit, rather 
than on traits that are irrelevant to job performance. On the one hand, our 
law prohibits discrimination on certain bases even where those traits are 
relevant to job performance—rational statistical discrimination is 
prohibited by our employment discrimination statutes.
233
 On the other 
 
 
 233. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Supreme Court, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and 
Rational Discrimination, 55 ALA. L. REV. 923, 926 (2004) (“Race and sex discrimination is frequently 
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hand, our law does not prohibit all “irrational” discrimination. 
Innumerable human characteristics are completely irrelevant to the 
performance of most jobs, but we do not use law to create liability for 
discrimination against the red-haired or the green-eyed.
234
 We do not make 
these forms of discrimination illicit. Why? 
The anti-bottleneck principle offers an answer to this last question that 
rests squarely on the interests of individuals. The answer goes like this: 
Discrimination against the red-haired or the green-eyed does not create a 
significant bottleneck in the opportunity structure, for the simple reason 
that it is too rare. Such discrimination may exist somewhere, but it is not 
close to being pervasive and strict enough to constrain individuals’ 
opportunities significantly. It does not constrain in any meaningful way 
the paths they might pursue that lead to careers and to flourishing lives. 
Discrimination on the basis of the traditional protected categories looks 
different: each is a category that, as an empirical matter in our society, 
significantly shapes a person’s range of opportunities. The sex-role system 
provides men and women with strikingly different developmental 
opportunities, and then further steers them into jobs and social roles. 
Opportunities differ by race, both because of present discrimination on the 
basis of race and because of broader sociological and historical factors, 
such as the link between race and the geography of opportunity, which 
results in race affecting the developmental opportunities we each 
experience.
235
 If these empirical claims are true enough, for long enough, 
then it makes sense for societies to use legal tools to ameliorate those 
bottlenecks. Functionally, this is what legislatures do when they enact 
antidiscrimination laws, whether or not the legislators themselves view 
those enactments in these terms. This story, unlike most other possible 
stories, can tell us what legislatures do when they enact all the new, 
cutting-edge antidiscrimination laws discussed in Part II, as well as more 
traditional antidiscrimination laws such as Title VII and the ADEA, and 
even accommodation laws such as the reasonable accommodation 
requirement of the ADA. 
 
 
a bottom-line rational decision for employers, and the law properly prohibits it even in those 
circumstances.”); see also id. at 926, 936–37 (further exploring this proposition and suggesting the 
Court has introduced some ambiguity about whether this long-established principle applies in the 
domain of disability); Bagenstos, supra note 136. 
 234. This classic eye color example comes from Richard A. Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and 
Preferential Treatment: An Approach to the Topics, 24 UCLA L. REV. 581, 586, 604 (1977). 
 235. See, e.g., PATRICK SHARKEY, STUCK IN PLACE: URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE END OF 
PROGRESS TOWARD RACIAL EQUALITY (2013). 
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This anti-bottleneck story overlaps significantly with, but also departs 
from, our usual ways of thinking about equal opportunity. It is distinctive 
in (at least) the following respects from one or more of the alternatives: 
(1) It does not rest directly on any claims about history or past 
discrimination; (2) it does not rest on any claims about the intent of the 
individuals or groups doing the discriminating or the subjective experience 
of the victims of discrimination; (3) it does not rest on claims about social 
meaning, such as the question of which forms of discrimination are 
demeaning or offensive; and, perhaps most distinctively, (4) it does not 
require that a “group” exist at all. Instead, the focus is entirely on the 
opportunities open to individuals and the forces that constrain those 
opportunities. People need not be aware of any connection, let alone a 
shared group identity or a history, linking themselves to the others who 
face the same constraint on their opportunities as a result of a 
discriminatory practice. 
It may seem counterintuitive to suggest that we do not need claims 
about history and past discrimination to decide which forms of 
discrimination should be subject to legal sanction. To be clear, history is 
always relevant—but only to the extent that history’s effects linger into the 
present, as they typically do to some substantial degree. The reasons that 
race is linked with geography and with class today are deeply intertwined 
with the long trajectory of practices and policies of racial subordination, 
by both governmental and non-governmental actors. Understanding that 
history should help us understand why, how, and in what respects race acts 
as a bottleneck today.
236
 History can thus contribute to a nuanced, 
sociologically informed understanding of the dynamics of bottlenecks in 
the present. 
But in principle there need not be any history of discrimination at all. 
Suppose credit checks had never existed. Suppose tomorrow they were 
invented, and the next day employers began to use them to discriminate in 
hiring. As soon as enough employers did so that the effect was to create a 
pervasive bottleneck, this ought to trigger our concern. From the 
perspective of the anti-bottleneck principle, the fact that people with poor 
credit now have trouble proceeding along many paths in the opportunity 
structure is enough, by itself, to justify a potential remedy such as a statute 
banning the use of credit checks in hiring.
237
 There need not be any history 
of discrimination, and people with poor credit need not know they have 
 
 
 236. Cf. FISHKIN, supra note 7, Part IV.A. 
 237. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 69–70 (remarks of Sen. Harmon regarding the 
credit check law he sponsored). 
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poor credit or think of themselves as part of a group of people with poor 
credit. Indeed they need not even know what a credit check is. The 
severity of the bottleneck is sufficient. 
B. Objections to the Anti-Bottleneck Principle 
That last point underscores perhaps the most radical aspect of the anti-
bottleneck principle as an approach to antidiscrimination law: it does not 
necessarily require any claims about groups. And this leads to an objection 
to framing antidiscrimination law in terms of the anti-bottleneck principle, 
which runs as follows: what we really care about in antidiscrimination law 
is the welfare or the opportunities of groups—in particular, racial groups 
such as African-Americans. Group-based discrimination was the reason 
we built antidiscrimination law in the first place; surely, this objection 
runs, groups are what really matters, so it is either some sort of 
anachronism or mischaracterization to frame our understanding of 
antidiscrimination law in terms of bottlenecks. 
This objection initially seems to have some real force, but on a deeper 
level, it may not really be an objection at all. If we move up one level of 
abstraction we might ask: Why does the subordination of a racial group, or 
any group, matter in the first place? There are various ways to answer that 
question, but perhaps the most straightforward reason—and certainly a 
complete and sufficient reason—to care about group subordination is that 
it affects individuals. Specifically, it shapes and limits individual 
opportunities. 
There are, to be sure, other normative starting points from which one 
can understand group subordination and its significance. But in the end, in 
a more fundamental way than each of us is a member of any group, we are 
all individual human beings. A very strong reason to care about group 
subordination is because it affects individual human beings. Indeed, if it 
did not, it is not clear whether we would care about it. Thus, even if the 
anti-bottleneck principle were the only principle operative in 
antidiscrimination law—which it plainly is not, as discussed below238—
much of antidiscrimination law would continue to track group 
subordination. But it would do so for reasons that are ultimately 
individualistic. 
One advantage of building our understanding of groups and justice on 
this sort of individualistic foundation is that we minimize the reification of 
 
 
 238. See infra Part V.C. 
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groups and their boundaries. We minimize the need to police the 
boundaries of group membership for purposes of determining who is 
covered by antidiscrimination law. Instead of first making sure that 
someone is really a member of a group, in order to determine whether the 
law protects them, we need only ask whether a person’s opportunities are 
being constrained by the relevant form of group-based discrimination—
that is, by the relevant bottleneck.  
Employment discrimination law is in harmony with this idea when it 
recognizes “regarded as” claims—that is, claims that a person was 
discriminated against because they were regarded as a member of a 
protected group, regardless of their actual group memberships—and 
claims by individuals who face discrimination based on their association 
with members of a protected group or because of their refusal to engage in 
discrimination against members of the protected group.
239
 Regardless of 
whether they are actually members of the group the statute may aim to 
protect, such individuals find their opportunities constrained by the form 
of discrimination the statute prohibits. 
From an entirely different perspective, one might object to the anti-
bottleneck principle—and to the actual statutes described in Part II of this 
Article—on the grounds that they are unnecessary, or even 
counterproductive, because they aim at the kind of problem that the market 
will fix. That is, on this view, we do not need special antidiscrimination 
protections for the unemployed, those with past criminal convictions, or 
those with poor credit because, in a free market, the irrational refusal to 
hire people from any of these categories will create market opportunities 
and will ultimately be self-correcting. Specifically, if many employers are 
refusing to hire those with poor credit, and this has no real justification in 
terms of the efficiency or productivity of the business, then competitors 
will have an opportunity: hire those with poor credit, perhaps paying a 
lower wage, and reap the competitive advantages. The trouble with this 
objection is that it is really an objection to the entire project of 
antidiscrimination law—and indeed it is one that illustrates the continuity 
of the anti-bottleneck principle with traditional antidiscrimination law. 
This same argument could be made—and was made—as an objection to 
the project of antidiscrimination law itself, and to the enactment of statutes 
such as Title VII.
240
 
 
 
 239. See generally Noah D. Zatz, Beyond the Zero-Sum Game: Toward Title VII Protection for 
Intergroup Solidarity, 77 IND. L.J. 63 (2002). 
 240. To understand the foundations of this line of reasoning, the classic argument that 
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Finally, from yet another perspective, one might object that what we 
really need is not an anti-bottleneck principle, but an antidiscrimination 
law based on class, including disparate impact provisions that would cover 
class as well as such variables as race and sex. Each of the cutting-edge 
examples with which this Article began could have been framed—and 
interestingly, each sometimes was framed
241—in terms of class: 
discrimination on the basis of credit, unemployment, or past criminal 
convictions all have a disparate impact on the poor. Perhaps instead of an 
anti-bottleneck principle, we should just build an antidiscrimination law 
based on class in addition to our existing body of antidiscrimination law 
based on such characteristics as race and sex.  
This suggestion certainly has some appeal. As I will discuss briefly 
below, class may be the most pervasive bottleneck in the American 
opportunity structure. It affects everything from prenatal developmental 
conditions and early developmental opportunities in childhood through 
educational opportunities, employment prospects, and everything in 
between. It is therefore extremely important, from the perspective of the 
anti-bottleneck principle, to ameliorate this class bottleneck. Many 
different laws and policies, in areas from education policy to economic 
policy, provide chances to do this. 
However, it is less clear that disparate impact law is the right tool for 
this job. The problem is that almost everything has a disparate impact 
based on class: there are very few employment practices of any kind that 
make distinctions among employees or applicants that do not have some 
significant class-based disparate impact. Therefore, a body of disparate 
impact law focused on class would be tantamount to a legal rule that 
nearly all employment practices must meet the business necessity/job 
relatedness test.
242
 Moreover, not every bottleneck in the opportunity 
structure does track class. Even if credit scores did not correlate with class 
background at all, we still ought to be concerned if employers’ use of 
credit history is creating a severe bottleneck. 
A virtue of the anti-bottleneck principle is that it allows us to approach 
the problem of equal opportunity in a retail rather than wholesale way. 
Instead of focusing only on broad-gauge inequalities such as class 
 
 
in GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 37, 44–45 (2d ed. 1971). 
 241. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 242. But cf. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Discrimination: What Is It and What Makes It Morally 
Wrong?, in NEW WAVES IN APPLIED ETHICS 51, 60 (Jesper Ryberg et al. eds. 2007) (arguing that 
“indirect” (i.e. disparate impact) discrimination based on class is wrongful, while acknowledging that 
getting rid of it would require “extremely drastic social changes”). 
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difference, we can also focus on more particular knots in the opportunity 
structure and how they might be loosened. Where accidents of geography 
block some people from pursuing most opportunities, we can think about 
ways to ameliorate this bottleneck even if we cannot conclusively 
determine whether it is class- or race-linked (although of course, tracing 
such links could yield more reasons to ameliorate the bottleneck). In a 
deeply complex and unequal world, it is helpful as both a practical and a 
theoretical matter to be able to think about equal opportunity from this 
kind of starting point. 
C. Limits of the Anti-Bottleneck Principle 
This Article has argued that the anti-bottleneck principle plays a central 
role in employment discrimination law—not only in the new cutting-edge 
statutes with which I began, but across the field, in the law of disparate 
treatment and the law of disparate impact. But I want to be clear about 
what this Article does not claim. It does not claim that the anti-bottleneck 
principle is the only principle underlying our law of employment 
discrimination. Employment discrimination law is rich with plural, 
overlapping, and occasionally contradictory principles, which play various 
roles in shaping the law’s contours. 
For instance, within Title VII itself, the anti-bottleneck story fits best 
with protections against discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, and 
national origin. When it comes to protections against discrimination on the 
basis of religion, the role of the anti-bottleneck principle seems 
considerably more attenuated. This protection instead seems designed 
primarily to serve values of religious freedom with their roots in the First 
Amendment.  
To be sure, there are situations where discrimination on the basis of 
religion could create a severe bottleneck that antidiscrimination law could 
help ameliorate. These situations are of two general types. First, in some 
corner of American society, a dominant religious group might control 
most employment and favor its own members. Second, if prejudice against 
a particular religious group, say Muslims, were to become sufficiently 
pervasive, members of that group could face a severe bottleneck akin to 
that created by pervasive discrimination on the basis of national origin or 
race. However, even where neither of these situations exists, our law still 
has independent reason to protect against discrimination on the basis of 
religion, even of a sporadic and non-pervasive kind. The reason is that this 
protection helps undergird religious liberty. 
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Even outside the religious sphere, a number of principles provide 
overlapping justifications for various parts of antidiscrimination law. In 
some cases these help fill lacunae that would result from attempting to 
explain the whole of antidiscrimination law in anti-bottleneck terms. The 
most significant of these lacunae is this: by itself, the anti-bottleneck 
principle has some difficulty explaining our law’s evenhandedness with 
respect to claims by groups that do not face a significant bottleneck in the 
opportunity structure, but rather, indirectly benefit from one. 
Consider disparate impact claims brought by whites. White people are 
not the victims of pervasive discrimination in the United States, and are 
not likely to be in the foreseeable future. Leaving aside a few advocates’ 
florid fantasies that affirmative action has gone so far that a white man 
can’t catch a break, in reality it is extremely difficult to make the case that 
there is a severe bottleneck in the opportunity structure through which 
only (or mostly) non-whites can pass. However, white people are 
occasionally, sporadically the victims of race-based disparate treatment; 
and sometimes there are facially neutral employment practices that have a 
disparate impact on whites. Title VII evenhandedly allows both disparate 
treatment and disparate impact challenges by any covered group, including 
whites. Thus, in Meditz v. City of Newark,
243
 a white man challenged a 
requirement that non-uniformed city employees reside inside the city 
limits, on the grounds that this residency requirement had a disparate 
impact on whites and was not justified by business necessity. 
Under Title VII, Meditz states a valid disparate impact claim. The anti-
bottleneck principle by itself cannot explain this. (Nor can a number of 
other principles, such as the anti-subordination principle—there is no good 
case to be made that whites, suburbanites, or white suburbanites are 
subordinated.
244
) From an anti-bottleneck point of view, the logic of 
Meditz’ complaint would be that the specific bottleneck through which he 
cannot pass—the residency requirement—should be subject to the job 
relatedness/business necessity inquiry because it reinforces a larger 
 
 
 243. Meditz v. City of Newark, 658 F.3d 364 (3d Cir. 2011) (reversing the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment for the City). Such claims are quite rare, for understandable reasons. See Richard 
A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 494, 528–29 & 
nn.149–50 (2003); id. at 528 n.149 (“[F]ew facially neutral employment practices have disparately 
adverse impacts on whites. . . . After all, a historically advantaged group is almost by definition one 
that has the education, skills, and other resources necessary to succeed in whatever endeavors a society 
customarily uses to measure the comparative worth of its members.”). 
 244. Indeed, Charles Sullivan has argued that “[a]pplying disparate impact beyond minorities and 
women is profoundly ahistorical and inconsistent with the theoretic underpinnings of the theory.” 
Charles A. Sullivan, The World Turned Upside Down?: Disparate Impact Claims by White Males, 98 
NW. U. L. REV. 1505, 1512 (2004). 
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bottleneck of discrimination against and limited opportunities for whites. 
But this larger bottleneck does not exist. For reasons very similar to those 
Judge Posner articulated in EEOC v. Consolidated Services Systems,
245
 the 
residency requirement here appears if anything to ameliorate a bottleneck: 
residents of Newark, not to mention minorities, face limited opportunities 
overall, for reasons of both race and geography. The residency 
requirement, like the word-of-mouth recruiting at immigrant-owned firms 
Judge Posner discusses, may be a minor bottleneck that actually has the 
effect of making the overall opportunity structure a little more pluralistic. 
That is, it may be that by reserving some opportunities for people whose 
opportunities are, overall, more limited, the residency requirement helps 
ameliorate a bottleneck more severe than any it reinforces. 
But the shape of Title VII is not a function of the anti-bottleneck 
principle alone. The case of disparate impact claims by whites illustrates a 
principle of evenhandedness that has been incorporated into Title VII at a 
deep level. To put it simply, any claim black people can make under Title 
VII, white people can make too. This principle of evenhandedness is not 
part of every antidiscrimination statute. In particular it is not part of the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),
246
 which protects only 
older workers, not younger ones. In interpreting the ADEA this way, the 
Court inferred reasoning from Congress that was consistent with the anti-
bottleneck principle: it explained that there was no evidence before 
Congress showing pervasive discrimination against younger workers—
only against older ones.
247
 Similarly, the Americans with Disabilities Act 
does not allow claims by individuals without disabilities that they face 
discrimination on account of not having a disability, as a principle of 
evenhandedness might suggest.
248
 But Title VII is different—perhaps 
because, unlike in the areas of age and disability, the Fourteenth 
Amendment (at least as now interpreted) might not permit Congress to 
enact an employment discrimination statute that protected racial minorities 
but not whites from racial discrimination.  
Leaving constitutional law aside, there are some good normative 
reasons we might want employment discrimination law to adhere to this 
 
 
 245. See supra Part III.B. 
 246. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 247. See Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 587–89 (2004) (discussing 
evidence before Congress that “arbitrary discrimination against older workers was widespread and 
persistent enough to call for a federal legislative remedy”—while there was no similar evidence of 
widespread, persistent discrimination against younger workers in favor of older ones). 
 248. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(g) (2006 & Supp. V 2011); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4(b) (2013). This 
provision was added as part of the Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008. 
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principle of evenhandedness even where there is no severe bottleneck to 
ameliorate. For instance, it may be important for public acceptance of this 
body of law. Moreover, the gains may be significant and the costs 
relatively modest. Because there is in fact not all that much discrimination 
against whites, fair antidiscrimination protections for whites should 
constrain in only a very small way the prerogatives of employers to use 
whatever employment practices they would like, and hire and fire whom 
they wish.
249
 
So to review: The claim here is not that we ought to understand the 
anti-bottleneck principle to be the principle of antidiscrimination law, but 
rather, that we should recognize that this principle plays a central role in 
antidiscrimination law as we know it. In fact I do not think there is any 
single principle that can qualify as the principle of antidiscrimination law. 
Anyone who spends significant time teaching or practicing in this area will 
likely come to see multiple and sometimes contradictory principles at 
work. 
D. Frontiers of the Anti-Bottleneck Principle 
If we take the anti-bottleneck idea seriously, it ought to unsettle any 
assumption that the existing categories of antidiscrimination protection 
will be fixed for all time. Over time, changes of many kinds—
sociological, economic, cultural—will cause some bottlenecks to emerge 
and become severe, while others fade. Imagine a world, perhaps hundreds 
of years in the future, or perhaps only in the realm of science fiction, 
where race truly were not a significant bottleneck. This is an imaginative 
exercise more complex than simply imagining that employers stop 
discriminating on the basis of race. It is true that we first have to imagine 
that employers no longer prefer resumes with white names at the top to 
those with black names at the top.
250
 But then we must also imagine that 
the schools white students attend and the schools black students attend 
perform equally well, that white and black children and adults have equal 
access to networks, capital, and so on. In this scenario, from the point of 
view of the anti-bottleneck principle, it would no longer be necessary for 
 
 
 249. By “fair” here, I mean antidiscrimination protections that include well-crafted exceptions for 
valid affirmative action plans, so that the protections for whites do not swallow up affirmative action 
programs that are well designed to ameliorate important bottlenecks in the opportunity structure. 
 250. See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable than 
Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991 
(2004) (classic study finding large differences in callback rates by real employers, by manipulating 
only the name at the top of the resume). 
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antidiscrimination law to protect against discrimination on the basis of 
race. Race would be just like eye color or hair color today: a job-irrelevant 
detail about a person that is not linked to any larger bottleneck in the 
opportunity structure.
251
 In other words, from the perspective of the anti-
bottleneck principle there is nothing fundamental or primordial about a 
category like race; the argument for antidiscrimination statutes covering 
race depends on the empirical reality that race acts as a bottleneck in our 
opportunity structure.
252
 
On the other hand, the anti-bottleneck principle also suggests that the 
law ought to be more attentive to some forms of discrimination it now 
ignores. For instance, consider appearance discrimination. Empirical 
evidence suggests that people whom society deems unattractive currently 
face bias that cuts across many spheres—not only employment but also 
classrooms, courtrooms, and essentially every arena of human life that 
involves interpersonal interaction and relationships.
253
 Women who are 
anything other than thin and young face an especially powerful version of 
this bias.
254
 Because empirically this bias appears both strong and 
pervasive, cutting across many spheres beyond employment, it amounts to 
a severe bottleneck. 
Indeed, it is so severe that one objection to enacting antidiscrimination 
laws on the basis of appearance is that it is simply not possible to make 
human beings indifferent to the appearance of others: humans are wired, in 
a deep way, to care about beauty. But this objection proves too much. We 
are not blind to any of the variables on which antidiscrimination laws turn. 
From the point of view of the anti-bottleneck principle, there is no need to 
aim for a state of affairs in which everyone is indifferent to the appearance 
of others. In the real world, the function of antidiscrimination law is not 
actually to make us blind to variables such as race or sex. Instead, 
antidiscrimination law is a social practice that intervenes in, and attempts 
 
 
 251. In precisely what sense “race” would exist at all, absent all the structures of subordination 
and unequal opportunity that today partly constitute its meaning, is an interesting question for another 
day. 
 252. Of course, one would want to be careful about repealing laws precipitously, as one 
approached this scenario, given the many uncertainties surrounding it. Sliding backward generally 
seems a greater danger than the harm caused by an unnecessary law. But there comes a point where 
there truly is no longer a justification, in terms of the anti-bottleneck principle, for such laws. 
 253. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE BEAUTY BIAS: THE INJUSTICE OF APPEARANCE IN LIFE AND 
LAW 26–28 (2010). 
 254. See, e.g., id. at 30–32, 97–99. Appearance discrimination—and especially weight 
discrimination—are also deeply intertwined with class. It is expensive to maintain an attractive 
appearance, and poverty is linked with obesity. These forms of discrimination are also linked with 
race, given the racially coded beauty norms in our culture. Id. at 41–44, 96. 
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to limit, other social practices. As Robert Post explains, using sex 
discrimination as an example, despite the law’s ostensible aspiration to 
eliminate sex discrimination, the real effect of the law is to interact with 
social practices of sex discrimination in a way that cabins them 
somewhat.
255
 Title VII’s prohibition on disparate treatment is not absolute 
on its own terms,
256
 and in any event, not everyone will obey the law. And 
some who try in good faith not to discriminate will fail. The statute’s 
effect will be to reduce the amount of a given type of discrimination in the 
opportunity structure, not eliminate it. 
Although this Article focuses on employment discrimination law, 
antidiscrimination protections are never the only possible social or legal 
response to a bottleneck. In general, I have suggested that society’s 
response to a bottleneck ought to be some combination of (1) helping 
people through a bottleneck, and (2) helping people around a bottleneck, 
with the correct balance between these two goals depending on 
countervailing considerations. These countervailing considerations may be 
completely dispositive in some cases. For instance, the solution to race 
discrimination is not to enable people more easily to change their race, 
even if that were easy to do. The reason is that racial identity is too 
important to people; it is asking far too much to require someone to 
relinquish their racial identity in order to pursue opportunities in the 
world. Is appearance the same? Many in the fat rights movement argue 
that being fat is part of their identity, and that they should not be forced to 
give this up to pursue opportunities.
257
 On the other hand, some people 
would be more than happy to stop being fat—and many people would be 
more than happy to stop being unattractive—but they cannot do it. People 
in that situation might prefer, rather than antidiscrimination protections, 
some help (perhaps of a financial kind) with changing the characteristic 
that is causing them to be discriminated against. 
This point leads quickly into some uncomfortable territory. Do we 
really want the solution to harsh and exacting beauty norms to be 
assistance for people to conform to those same norms? We can imagine a 
society subsidizing orthodontia to help everyone conform to a norm of 
perfect teeth, rhinoplasty to help everyone conform to a certain ideal shape 
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of nose, or even breast implants to enable small-breasted women to 
conform to a larger-breasted beauty norm. But at some point, going down 
this road begins to seem dystopian. The reason is one that we can best 
understand in terms of the anti-bottleneck principle itself. By trying to 
help people through these bottlenecks, we might entrench or give an 
official imprimatur to increasingly narrow and stringent norms of human 
physical beauty, thereby making those bottlenecks even more severe. 
There is no perfect solution here. The best we can do is to tread carefully, 
attempting to help people both through, and around, the physical 
appearance bottleneck, keeping in mind that the two goals are partly in 
conflict. Helping people around the bottleneck requires norms, social 
practices, and perhaps laws that press against appearance discrimination. 
Helping people through requires that in at least some cases society ought 
to provide—for example through social insurance—the opportunity to 
ameliorate at least some set of disfiguring conditions. 
What we ought not to do is address the appearance discrimination 
bottleneck in a way that makes the overall opportunity structure less 
pluralistic, by reinforcing other bottlenecks. One familiar American 
response to the difficult problem discussed in the previous paragraph is 
that society ought to permit all sorts of cosmetic changes and treatments, 
but subsidize none of them. This response has a predictable effect. It links 
appearance ever more tightly with class. If perfect teeth become the norm 
among everyone except the poor, then less-than-perfect teeth become a 
marker of poverty. Appearance discrimination is probably already one of 
the more significant bottlenecks that add up to the deeper, 
unacknowledged class bottleneck at the heart of the American opportunity 
structure. 
It is difficult to know for sure—it has some real competition—but it is 
possible that class is the single most severe bottleneck in the contemporary 
American opportunity structure.
258
 In the main, it is a bottleneck built not 
of disparate treatment on the basis of class, but instead, of all the ways that 
class constrains developmental opportunities, from the early 
developmental opportunities of childhood through the educational 
opportunities, networks, and job opportunities that are linked with class 
position among adults. Class is a particularly difficult bottleneck for 
American law to ameliorate—not only, as discussed above, because a law 
prohibiting disparate impact on the basis of class might be too sweeping to 
be an attractive legislative response. The larger problem is the background 
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assumptions of American political discourse, which generally eschews 
serious discussion of class. Under these conditions, perhaps the best we 
can hope for is that legislators, courts, agencies, and individual 
gatekeepers such as schools and employers will recognize the problem, 
and do what they can to ameliorate—or at least not exacerbate—the 
bottleneck of limited opportunities for those born working-class or poor.  
A virtue of the anti-bottleneck principle, in comparison to some other 
ways of thinking about the project of equal opportunity, is that it makes no 
impossible demands, such as that everyone from all class backgrounds 
should have the same opportunities. Instead of describing an end state of 
equal opportunity and then working backward to find ways to achieve it, 
the anti-bottleneck principle prompts us to begin with the specific 
bottlenecks before us, and look for ways to ameliorate them.
259
 It is a 
direction of effort, rather than a goal to be achieved. This makes the anti-
bottleneck principle well-suited to the task of pressing against complex 
social phenomena like the bottleneck of class in American society—
phenomena so vast and pervasive that it is difficult even to imagine what 
unraveling them would look like. Instead of imagining this, and perhaps 
setting our sights on goals that are unhelpfully utopian, the anti-bottleneck 
principle lets us make progress in an ameliorative way, inching toward 
justice incrementally, one change to the opportunity structure at a time. 
CONCLUSION 
Employment discrimination law is a rich and complex field that cannot 
accurately be described as the outworking of any single principle. But the 
anti-bottleneck principle plays a very substantial role in this body of law—
one that has not heretofore been acknowledged or understood. The 
legislators and activists behind the new, cutting-edge antidiscrimination 
laws discussed in Part II have tended to articulate their aims more or less 
explicitly in terms of the anti-bottleneck principle; that principle helps us 
see the significance of a variety of present and possible future 
antidiscrimination protections whose purpose and appeal would otherwise 
be obscure. 
This Article has made no claim that the legislators who enacted Title 
VII and our other more traditional antidiscrimination laws similarly 
articulated their aims in anti-bottleneck terms. However, the project of 
ameliorating the severe racial constraints limiting African-Americans’ 
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opportunities is one that we can understand, at a higher level of 
abstraction, as a powerful instance of the anti-bottleneck principle. 
Viewing Title VII in this way can help us understand why the law of 
disparate impact works the way it does—why, for example, so many white 
people in North Carolina without high school diplomas were necessarily 
the beneficiaries of Griggs. They, like many other white people, generally 
poor white people, before and since, stand to benefit from the removal of 
“arbitrary, unnecessary barrier[s]” that constrain the opportunities of many 
people of all races—even when those barriers’ impact on racial minorities 
is what brings them to the attention of the law. 
Today, the project of antidiscrimination law is under severe strain, with 
some scholars beginning to ask whether the entire project is reaching its 
end at the hands of hostile courts.
260
 Disparate impact law is under 
particularly intense scrutiny, both in employment and in other fields such 
as fair housing law. Critics of disparate impact law, and advocates of 
paring back antidiscrimination law more generally, view these bodies of 
law as essentially in tension with equal opportunity. That is, despite the 
explicit stated aspirations of these statutes to promote equal opportunity, 
these critics view them as measures that do little but redistribute 
opportunities from meritorious individuals who are white, male, able-
bodied, and so forth, to other people who are less meritorious but are the 
special favorites of the law. On this (stylized) view, equal opportunity is 
what happens when employers are allowed unfettered discretion over their 
employment decisions, whereas antidiscrimination law tends to make 
opportunities less equal. 
The anti-bottleneck principle can help us see why this story has it 
almost entirely backward. Equal opportunity is actually in deep tension 
with the mostly unfettered employer discretion that is the hallmark of 
American employment law. Selectively, through antidiscrimination law, 
we sometimes force some employers to hew more closely—and at times 
more expensively—to norms of equal opportunity. In doing so, we loosen 
bottlenecks in the opportunity structure. When we do this, the 
beneficiaries turn out to be surprisingly numerous and diverse. In that 
sense, we can understand antidiscrimination law as part of a broader and 
more universal project. This is the project of what we might call the law of 
equal opportunity: not only employment discrimination law, but also such 
fields as fair housing law and much of education law. In all these areas, 
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our law intervenes selectively in the opportunity structure, reshaping that 
structure in ways that open up severe bottlenecks so that people will face 
fewer constraints on their ability to choose and pursue paths that lead to 
flourishing lives.  
The universality of this project ought to be a source of solidarity rather 
than divisiveness. All of us face bottlenecks. Any of us may at some point 
be a direct or indirect beneficiary of the broad changes to the employment 
landscape that antidiscrimination law has wrought. This is a hard truth to 
grasp for those who insist on viewing the world of employment 
exclusively in zero-sum terms. It is one that the anti-bottleneck principle 
can help us see. 
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